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Overview of dissertation 
Sources of finance vary according to firm’s lifecycle. Berger and Udell (1998) argue that 
financing sources are different in firm’s size, age, and information availability. For each stage, 
financial intermediaries that associate with are also different. In the early stage, firms 
typically use short-term or intermediate-term financial loans from banks. As firms grow, in 
the risk stage financing, the roles of other financial intermediaries, such as venture capital 
(VC) firms, become more important and banks are not a main player. In the exit stage, 
investment banks, which are known as underwriters, play an important role for the successful 
exit. 
This dissertation is focusing on the relationships between financial intermediaries and 
human resources and the issue of human resources over time in firm’s lifecycle. This 
dissertation is organized into five chapters and its structure is illustrated in Figure 1. The first 
chapter starts by looking at the problem of the lack of human resources for start-up 
companies. Specifically, I examine the effect of stock option grants on the attraction and 
retention of human resources. Stock options are particularly attractive incentive system, 
especially in start-ups. 
In the subsequent two chapters, I tackle the central issue of entrepreneurial finance: 
financing from outside investors. In general, startups face high information asymmetry 
between outsiders. Chapter 2 examines the role of financial experts and the issue of financing 
sources between loans and VC funds from banks. In other words, I examine how banks build 
relationships with start-ups. This issue is important especially in bank-oriented counties. 
For small and young firms, bank loans is not enough to meet their demand for financing, 
and then the role of VC firms becomes more important. Unlike in the US and Europe, there 
are several types of VC firms in Japan. This unique setting of the Japanese VC industry 
provides additional questions of how firms choose a particular VC firms. Chapter 3 examines 
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the effect of human resources on financing from the various types of VC firms. 
As firms grow, entrepreneurs can choose to exit via an IPO. An IPO is one of the most 
important events in the life of a firm. Once firms have decided to go public, they must choose 
an underwriter to place their shares to public investors. Chapter 4 explores the relationships 
between human resources and underwriter selection. 
Chapter 5 again turns to the incentive problem and examine the determinants and the 
consequences of stock option grants after the IPO. In general, an IPO alters the firm’s 
ownership structure because shares of the firm are widely sold to public investors. The 
dispersed ownership causes the conflict of interest between management and investors and 
granting stock options are expected to align the interest. 
 
 
References 
Berger, A. N., and Udell, G. F. (1998). The Economics of Small Business: The Roles of 
Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 22(6–8), 613–673. 
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 Chapter 1: Do stock options accelerate the growth of start-ups? 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates whether and how stock option grants affect the time to initial public 
offering (IPO). Using data on stock options granted in private period, I find a positive 
relationship between new managers joining a firm and subsequent management stock option 
grants; in addition, start-ups that attract new managers in the early stages reach an IPO sooner. 
These results suggest that stock options granted in the early stage play an important role in 
inviting an additional board member, leading to faster IPO. 
 
Keywords: stock options; attraction; IPOs 
JEL classification: G39; M13; M52  
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1. Introduction 
Fast-growing companies are central to economic development and job creation. For 
instance, Apple and Genentech went public less than five years after their foundation and 
have contributed to innovation and employment.1 Now, it is noteworthy that these companies 
grant stock options during the period when the company is private. 
A grant of stock options is supposed to be an effective way to create incentives, save cash, 
and attract and retain skilled workers, especially in start-ups.2 However, although there is a 
large body of literature on stock options, almost all of it focuses on large and mature 
companies (e.g., Yermack, 1995). In addition, although stock options are widely used by 
start-ups, little is known about the effects on them. Therefore, the main objective of this paper 
is to examine whether stock options affect the growth of start-ups. 
Specifically, this study examines two important issues concerning the effects of stock 
options for start-ups. First, I examine the relationship between stock option grants and new 
board member joining the firm. Ittner et al. (2003) find that attracting new employees and 
retaining them are important objectives for granting stock options for “new-economy” firms.3 
Start-ups face a lack of human capital; they also have limited cash to pay high compensation 
and to attract highly skilled workers. Then, granting stock options is a useful way for 
attracting and retaining them. I thus predict that start-ups grant stock options to attract new 
managers. Second, this study investigates the relationship between the presence of stock 
option grants and the time to IPO which serves as a proxy for firm growth. 
To examine these predictions, I use a dataset of 206 firms that went public at stock 
1 Apple Inc. was founded in 1976 and went public in 1980. Genentech, Inc. was founded in 1976 and went 
public in 1980. Apple’s job creation website states, “Throughout our history, Apple has created entirely new 
products–and entirely new industries–by focusing on innovation. As a result, we’ve created or supported nearly 
600,000 jobs for U.S. workers…” (http://www.apple.com/about/job-creation/). 
2 Using a sample that is composed of both large and small firms, Babenko et al. (2011) find that granting stock 
options can save cash and provide cash inflow due to the exercise of options. Core and Guay (2001) find that 
firms grant employees stock options because of cash constraints, high capital needs, and the high costs of 
external financing. 
3  The new-economy firms are defined as organizations competing in the computer, software, internet, 
telecommunications, or networking fields (see Ittner et al., 2003). 
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exchanges for start-ups in Japan between 2006 and 2011. To empirically distinguish between 
the effects of stock option grants in the early stages and immediately before an IPO, I divide 
the full sample into several groups based on the timing of stock option grants. Then, I 
estimate a hazard model to examine the effect of stock options on the time to IPO. In addition, 
to reveal the mechanism of the effect of stock option grants to the milestone of start-ups, I 
estimate ordinary least square (OLS) and a probit model to examine manager entrants and 
subsequent stock option grants. 
Consistent with the suggestion that firms grant stock options as a reward for the IPO (Hand, 
2008), in my sample, about 90% of IPO firms granted stock options in private period. I also 
find that almost all of the firms that go public on the emerging markets grant stock options 
just before the IPO. On the other hand, some firms grant options in the early stages of their 
lifecycle. Almost all of those grants are large and are given to management. Further, I find 
that firms grant stock options to managers within a year of the managers joining the company. 
In addition, I find there is a negative (positive) relationship between early stage new 
managers joining and the time to IPO (the hazard rate of the IPO). These results suggest that 
stock options contribute to recruiting management of start-ups that lack the human capital 
and cash to attract highly skilled people and that this leads to a shorter time to IPO. 
This study contributes to the literature on stock options in the following two ways. First, 
while the prior literature has focused on the effect of stock options on mature companies (e.g., 
Yermack, 1995), this study focuses on the effect of stock options on IPO firms. Second, this 
paper contributes to the literature on team building. A number of studies have examined the 
relationship between top management teams and firm performance and suggest the 
importance of a strong teams enabling a startups to growth faster (Beckman, Burton, and 
O’Reilly, 2007; Beckman and Burton, 2008; Eisenhardt, 2013). Beckman et al. (2007) 
examine the effect of team experiences and composition on the financing from VC firms and 
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time to IPO and find that team composition reduces the time to IPO. My findings show that 
granting stock options early contributes to attracting new managers and going public early. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3 
presents the empirical methods. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical analysis; and 
Section 4 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Data and sample description 
2.1. Data sources 
I use 206 firms that went public in the stock exchanges for emerging companies in Japan (i.e., 
Mothers, Hercules, Centrex, Ambitious, Q-board, and NEO) between January 2006 and 
December 2011.4 Information on stock options (e.g., grant date, exercise price, number of 
shares of stock options granted, expiration date, and those who received grants) was obtained 
from the IPO prospectuses. Financial and attribute data were obtained from the IPO White 
Book and Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest. To identify the attraction effect of stock options, I 
obtained the data on board members of the IPO firms (e.g., the number of new managers who 
entered the company after the company was founded) from Nikkei database.5 
Panel A of Table 1-1 provides the number of IPOs and firms with stock options before the 
IPO from 2006 through 2011. During the sample period, 89% of firms on average completed a 
stock option grant before the IPO. After 2010, all firms granted stock options before the IPO. 
More than 80% of the firms granted options in the period from 2006 to 2009. 
Panel B provides the number of IPOs by founding year. The sample includes firms founded 
between 1949 and 2009. I divide the data into three periods based on the founding years of 
the firm: (1) before 1998, (2) between 1999 and 2000 (during the internet bubble period), and 
4 These stock exchanges are dominated by start-ups that have high growth opportunities and short track records. 
5 There is a possibility that the database cannot cover board members that had retired their jobs soon or early 
because the dataset is updated yearly and information of board members is based on the member that has been 
employed at the time of the IPO. 
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(3) after 2001. Prior to 1997, the Commercial Code prohibited firms from granting stock 
options in Japan. Since the revision of the Commercial Code, firms can grant options with 
some restrictions. Following the revision, the evolution of stock options in Japan has changed 
rapidly. Some firms that went public between 2006 and 2011 were founded before the revision 
of the Commercial Code; those firms were not able to grant stock options when they were 
founded. 44 of the firms in the sample were founded during the dot-com bubble period 
between 1999 and 2000. The number of firms that grant stock options is larger after 2001 
than during the dot-com bubble period. As a whole, Table 1-1 shows that firms gradually 
began using stock options after the revision of the Commercial Code. 
[Insert Table 1-1 here] 
 
2.2. New manager joining and attraction effect 
To reveal the mechanism of the effect of stock options on the likelihood of achieving an 
IPO, I focus on the number of new managers as a measurement of the attraction effect of 
stock options. I count the number of new board members who entered a company within the 
previous year before stock options were granted. Statutory auditors (kansayaku) are not 
included,6 even if the name is on the roster of board members, because they usually do not 
participate in management and their tenure is limited. If no new managers entered a company 
within a year before stock options were granted, the value is counted as zero. If firms do not 
grant stock options before the IPO, I also define the number of new managers as zero. In 
empirical analysis, the natural logarithm of the number of new managers is used as the 
independent variables. Besides, a dummy variable that takes a value of one if new managers 
entire the firm before the stock options were granted. Additionally, attraction effect is defined 
as the new manager joining when the condition of stock option grant to management is met. 
6 Regarding the characteristics of corporate governance in Japan, see Mizuno and Tabner (2009). 
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 2.3. Time to IPO 
As a proxy for firm growth, I use the time to IPO, measured as the time between the birth of 
the company and the time the company went public, in months. An IPO is one of the milestones 
in the company’s lifecycle because the company needs to meet many criteria that provide some 
assurances about the viability and quality (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). Growing quickly is also 
critical to the survival of start-ups. In addition, it is a successful exit route for investors. This is 
often used in the previous literature as a performance measure for start-ups (e.g., Chang, 2004; 
Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Kim and Heshmati, 2010), since sufficient accounting 
information is not available from the time period before the IPO. 
 
2.4. Sample distribution 
Panel A of Figure 1-1 represents when managers join the companies. The duration from 
founding date to the date a new manager joins a company is scaled by time to IPO of the firm. 
The value of zero represents the founding date. Founders are plotted on zero because the time 
when the founders joined the companies and the time of founding was the same. This figure 
shows that the number of managers join the companies after firms were founded gradually 
increases, suggesting that firms build their board teams as firms ready to go public. Some 
new managers entered the firm soon after the firm was founded. I expect that new managers 
who entered in the early stage of the firm’s lifecycle play an important role for growth of the 
firms because the firms, in the early stage, lacked human capital and cash to attract and retain 
highly skilled workers. 
Panel B of Figure 1-1 illustrates those firms that grant stock options before the IPO. Time on 
the horizontal axis is scaled by time to IPO. The options granted by firms that go public early 
are plotted on the right side, even if the firms granted stock options soon after their 
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establishment. The figure shows that the number of grants increases sharply after the midpoint 
of the firm’s history and gradually increases until the IPO. Many of the firms grant stock 
options just before the IPO. This trend is consistent with Hand’s (2008) suggestion that stock 
options are granted as a reward for employees. On the other hand, some grants are given in the 
early stages of the firm’s lifecycle. 
[Insert Figure 1-1 here] 
 
Next, I quantify these graphical findings in Table 1-2. The grants are divided into three 
types: (1) grants to management, (2) grants to employees, and (3) grants to others including 
auditors, co-operators, and employees of subsidiaries. The time to option grants scaled by 
time to IPO, is divided into quartiles. Panel A describes the distribution of options granted 
prior to the IPO and shows that many firms grant stock options to management and 
employees in the early stages. 
Panel B of Table 1-2 shows the amount of option grants by each quartile. In the first 
quartile (i.e., the earlier period), the amount of option grants to management is large. The 
remaining quartiles show that, on average, the amount of option grants to management is 
relatively larger than that of grants to employees and others. In addition, when comparing the 
volume of options to management in the fourth quartile to that of the first quartile, the 
volume of options to management in the fourth quartile is smaller than in the first quartile. 
The total stock option grants sample is divided into quartiles based on the duration from 
founding date to the date of stock option grants. Panels C and D reveal a similar pattern to 
Panels A and B, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1-2 here] 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Probit model 
To examine the attraction and retention effects of stock options, I estimate a probit model 
with the regression specified as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚) = 𝑜𝑜(𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚) 
𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚 = 1) = 𝐺𝐺(𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡,𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚) 
 
The independent variable of interest is the Grants to management, which is a dummy 
variable that takes value of one if the stock options is granted to management. I expect that 
the Grants to management dummy should be positive. I include the number of members of the 
board of directors (Number of board members). I further control for founding market 
conditions and history by dividing founding years into three periods: before 1998, between 
1999 and 2000, and after 2001. Firms founded before 1998 are set as the baseline. 
 
3.2. Hazard model 
Since this study is interested in the effect of stock options on the length of time it takes a 
firm to go public, I use a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). When the dependent 
variable is measured in time, it is not appropriate to use an OLS model because the duration, 
such as time to IPO, is distributed non-normality.7 The Cox proportional hazard model is 
frequently used in the study to examine a firm’s decision to go public or private, as well as its 
post-IPO survivability.8 The Cox proportional hazard model is used to estimate the following 
7 Yang et al. (2011) use OLS to estimate the effect of CEO characteristics on time to IPO (i.e., firm age). 
However, Bouis (2009), estimates the time from the filing date to the IPO date using the Cox proportional 
hazard regression because the dependent variable is measured in time. 
8 Using a sample of 160 Internet IPOs, Jain, Jayaraman, and Kini (2008) estimate Cox proportional hazard 
models to identify the factors that affect post-IPO profitability, showing which firms will attain profitability, fail, 
or remain unprofitable in a quarterly operating profitability base. In the context of VCs, Hellmann and Puri 
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equation: 
λ𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡|𝐗𝐗) = λ0(𝑡𝑡)exp (𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗), 
where λ0(𝑡𝑡) is the baseline hazard rate at time t, X is the row vector of covariates, and β 
represents the column vector of estimated regression coefficients. The conditional probability 
of the firm going public is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = λ (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖|𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖)∑ λ (𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖|𝐗𝐗𝑗𝑗)𝑗𝑗∈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = exp (𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖)∑ exp (𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗𝑗𝑗)𝑗𝑗∈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  
 
𝐿𝐿(𝛽𝛽) = � � exp (𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖)
∑ exp (𝛃𝛃′𝐗𝐗𝑗𝑗)𝑗𝑗∈𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 � 
In the Cox proportional hazard model, it is not necessary to make assumptions about the 
baseline hazard function. Time to IPO is not right-censored because all firms in the sample are 
IPO firms. Estimation specification is as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝐺𝐺(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁,𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚) 
 
The dependent variable is Time to IPO. The independent variable of interest is Attraction 
effect in the early stage, which is a dummy variable that equals one if firm that could attract 
new managers by granting stock options to management in the early stage. I expect a positive 
relationship between time to IPO and the number of new managers entering a company in the 
early stage. 
The study controls for VC backing. Financing from VC firms, strategic alliances, and 
(2000) use 173 startups and analyze the relationship between VC financing and the subsequent time to bring a 
product to market by using a Cox proportional hazard model. Hellmann and Puri (2002) also use a Cox 
proportional hazard model to investigate the relationship between the VC investment, which measures the 
time-varying VC dummy, and a stock option grant after the VC investment. They find that the presence of VCs 
is related to an increased likelihood of stock option grants. 
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networks provide the cash necessary for the start-up to grow rapidly. By examining Internet 
start-ups, Chang (2004) finds that these resources help the rapid growth of start-ups and the 
reputation of the VC firms and alliance partners induces an IPO more quickly. More reputable 
VC firms are able to lead successful exits (i.e., IPO or acquisition) and early exits from a 
value-added perspective (Nahata, 2008; Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy, 2011). VC 
investments are signals of a startup’s quality and prospects. Both strategic alliances and VC 
funding positively affect the hazard rate of an IPO (Ozmel, Robinson, and Stuart, 2013). 
This study also controls for firm size, measured as the logarithm of the firm’s total assets in 
the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Following Gibrat’s Law, the relationship between firm size and 
growth is independent. However, some literature finds evidence that small companies grow 
faster (e.g., Lotti, Santarelli, and Vivarelli, 2003). It also controls for CEO age (Yang et al., 
2011). The study includes industry fixed effects to control for characteristics across 
industries. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The effect of stock option grants on new manager joining 
Table 1-3 contains the results of regressions that examine the attraction effect of stock 
options. Columns 1–3 report the OLS estimates, where Ln(Number of new managers) is the 
dependent variable. Column 1 uses the full sample and shows that the coefficient of the 
Grants to management is positive and statistically significant. Moreover, I test the robustness 
of the results using the subsample of young firms with a ten-year history at the time they go 
public in column 2. Additionally, in column 3, I drop the period that to ensure that the results 
were not being driven by the characteristics of the firms across founding years. In columns 2 
and 3, the coefficients on Grants to management remain positive and statistically significant. 
Columns 4–6 report the results of probit regressions where the dependent variable is New 
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manager joining dummy. While I drop observations with zero in columns 1–3, the zeros are 
used in columns 4–6. As a result, the number of observations increases from 402 to 685 for 
the full sample. In column 4, the Grants to management remains positive and statistically 
significant. I divide my sample into subsamples and ask whether the main results are robust if 
the sample is restricted. I find that the result is similar with the main result. The results from 
both the OLS and probit regressions show the same pattern. The coefficients on Grants to 
management are similar in terms of sign and significance. 
Overall, there is evidence that firms grant stock options to managers to attract them. This 
result implies that stock options play an important role for start-ups that lack human capital to 
build management teams. 
[Insert Table 1-3 here] 
 
4.2. The effect of new manager joining on time to IPO 
Table 1-4 presents the results of the hazard model estimation. The intercept is not reported 
because the intercept of the Cox model is subsumed into the baseline hazard. The coefficients 
and the exponentiated coefficients (hazard ratios) are reported for the estimated models. A 
positive (negative) coefficient means that the variable increases (decreases) the probability of 
going public. In all models, the estimation controls for birth cohort and industry dummies. 
In column 1, the coefficient for the Attraction effect dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% levels. To distinguish the timing of attraction effect, in column 2 attraction 
effect in 1st or 2nd quartile is added. The coefficient of attraction effect remains positive and 
statistically significant. In order to identify the timing of attraction effect in more detail, 
column 3 includes Attraction effect in 1st quartile and Attraction effect in 4th quartile 
dummies instead of the Attraction effect in 1st or 2nd quartile dummy used in column 2. The 
coefficient of the Attraction effect in 1st quartile remains positive and statistically significant 
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at 1% levels. As a robustness check, I restrict the period in columns 4 and 5. The results 
remain unchanged. 
The evidence in Table 1-4 suggests that the time to IPO is shorter for firms with attraction 
effect early. These results are consistent with hypothesis that firms that attract managers in the 
early stages of the firm’s lifecycle are more likely to go public early. This result implies that 
stock options play an important role for start-ups that lack cash and human capital. Stock 
options may incentivize, attract core human capital inside and outside the firms. 
[Insert Table 1-4 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although many startups grant stock options prior to the IPO, the effect on startups is unclear. 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of granting stock options before the 
IPO on time to IPO, by examining 206 Japanese IPO firms listed between 2006 and 2011. 
Using OLS and probit regression analysis, a positive relationship can be shown between the 
number of new managers or new manager joining and subsequent stock option grants. This 
result suggests that firms grant stock options after new managers join their firms to attract 
those managers. By using a Cox proportional hazard regression model to examine the 
attraction effect of stock options, a positive relationship can be shown between granting stock 
options to new managers in the early stages and the hazard rate of IPO. This result suggests 
that stock options granted in the early stages contribute to the attraction of new managers, 
leading to a sooner IPO. My findings show that granting stock options early contributes to 
attracting new managers and going public early. 
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Table 1-1. Number of IPOs by year 
The table reports the number of IPOs that went public on the IPO markets for emerging companies in Japan (i.e., 
Mothers, Hercules, Centrex, Ambitious, Q-board, and NEO) between January 2006 and December 2011, 
excluding foreign issues and the number of IPOs with stock options prior to the IPO. In addition, the percentage of 
firms with stock options relative to the total number of IPOs is reported. 
 
  
Panel A: Number of IPOs by IPO year
IPO year Number of IPOs
Number of IPOs with
stock options
Percent with stock
options
2006 98 88 90%
2007 59 48 81%
2008 24 23 96%
2009 7 6 86%
2010 7 7 100%
2011 11 11 100%
Total 206 183 89%
Panel B: Number of IPOs by founding year
Founding year Number of IPOs
Number of IPOs with
stock options
Percent with stock
options
1949 - 1998 109 90 83%
1999 - 2000 44 42 95%
2001 - 2009 53 51 96%
Total 206 183 89%
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Table 1-2. Number and amount of grants in each quartile based on timing of stock 
option grants 
Panel A (Panel C) of this table reports the distribution of the number of times options were granted. Panel B 
(Panel D) reports the distribution of the amount of option grants relative to shares outstanding. The size of the 
grant is defined as the number of shares granted as stock options relative to the number of shares outstanding. 
This value is winsorized at the 98% levels to limit the effects of outliers that can be induced by data errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Distribution of the number of times of option grants
Grants to management Grants to employees Grants to others
<=0.25 N 37 37 37
73.0% 70.3% 32.4%
0.25<<=0.5 N 90 90 90
68.9% 74.4% 36.7%
0.5<<=0.75 N 180 180 180
61.7% 72.8% 43.9%
0.75< N 418 418 418
53.8% 75.6% 42.1%
Panel B: Distribution of the amount of option relative to shares outstanding
Grants to management Grants to employees Grants to others
<=0.25 N 27 26 12
Mean 17.3% 12.9% 16.2%
Median 9.2% 5.7% 11.3%
0.25<<=0.5 N 62 67 33
Mean 10.9% 7.9% 8.9%
Median 5.8% 4.2% 4.1%
0.5<<=0.75 N 111 131 79
Mean 9.1% 5.8% 6.5%
Median 4.8% 3.5% 2.8%
0.75< N 225 316 176
Mean 6.5% 4.3% 4.8%
Median 3.5% 1.9% 2.3%
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Table 1-2 
(Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of the number of times of option grants
Quartile Grants to management Grants to employees Grants to others
1 (early) N 175 175 175
67.4% 73.1% 37.7%
2 N 175 175 175
63.4% 76.6% 44.6%
3 N 175 175 175
51.4% 78.3% 48.6%
4 (late) N 174 174 174
60.3% 80.5% 40.8%
Panel D: Distribution of the amount of option relative to shares outstanding
Quartile Grants to management Grants to employees Grants to others
1 (early) N 118 128 66
Mean 12.1% 8.3% 10.2%
Median 5.9% 4.0% 4.3%
2 N 111 134 78
Mean 9.0% 6.1% 6.9%
Median 5.2% 3.5% 3.1%
3 N 90 137 85
Mean 6.8% 4.2% 4.6%
Median 3.7% 1.9% 1.9%
4 (late) N 105 140 71
Mean 4.9% 3.5% 3.7%
Median 3.3% 1.8% 1.9%
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Table 1-3. The effect of stock options on attraction of new managers 
This table presents OLS regression where Ln(Number of new managers) is the dependent variable and probit 
regression where the dependent variable is New manager joining dummy. The table reports the coefficients and, in 
parentheses, the robust standard errors. The sample includes firms that went public between 2006 and 2011. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Entire sample
Drop firms with
more than a
ten-year history
Drop if
founding year is
before 1998
Entire sample
Drop firms with
more than a
ten-year history
Drop if
founding year is
before 1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Grants to management 0.107** 0.162*** 0.144** 0.244** 0.309** 0.381***
(0.051) (0.062) (0.064) (0.111) (0.135) (0.145)
Grants to employee -0.047 -0.046 -0.049 -0.380*** -0.317* -0.337*
(0.059) (0.072) (0.074) (0.136) (0.166) (0.179)
Grants to others 0.023 0.042 0.051 -0.180* -0.161 -0.167
(0.050) (0.062) (0.066) (0.105) (0.132) (0.142)
Early grant (1st and 2nd quartile) 0.122 0.297*** 0.253** 0.373** 0.366* 0.573***
(0.076) (0.095) (0.100) (0.156) (0.202) (0.215)
Ln(duration from the grant to IPO) -0.101** -0.172** -0.213*** 0.109 0.067 -0.009
(0.050) (0.067) (0.068) (0.105) (0.143) (0.153)
Ln(1 + vesting periods) -0.030 -0.007 0.002 0.005 0.030 -0.021
(0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.054) (0.062) (0.068)
Ln(1 + exercise periods) 0.039 0.038 0.035 0.188 0.171 0.329*
(0.066) (0.076) (0.081) (0.152) (0.181) (0.194)
The degree of board completion -0.064 -0.253 -0.307* 1.419*** 1.243*** 1.513***
(0.126) (0.154) (0.160) (0.250) (0.295) (0.322)
Number of board members 0.017 0.038* 0.039* 0.134*** 0.092*** 0.106***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033)
Ln(Total asset) -0.006 -0.053 -0.024 -0.136** -0.090 -0.094
(0.029) (0.043) (0.045) (0.061) (0.070) (0.093)
Founder 0.045 0.131* 0.160** -0.063 0.057 0.076
(0.053) (0.075) (0.080) (0.111) (0.145) (0.169)
Constant 0.530 0.964 0.940 -1.816* -1.769 -2.072
(0.441) (0.585) (0.614) (0.931) (1.084) (1.282)
Founding year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations (grants) 402 276 259 685 450 416
R-squared 0.078 0.140 0.116
Adjusted-R-squared 0.0369 0.0838 0.0577
Pseudo R-squared 0.103 0.0949 0.133
Dependent variable: Ln(# of new
manager) or New manager joining
OLS Probit
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Table 1-4. Cox proportional hazard models for time to IPO 
This table reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard models. The dependent variable is Time to IPO, which 
measures the time between the birth of a company and the date of going public, in months. The table reports the 
coefficients and, in parentheses, the standard errors. The sample includes firms that went public between 2006 and 
2011. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Coeff. Hazard Coeff. Hazard Coeff. Hazard Coeff. Hazard Coeff. Hazard
Attraction effect 0.334** 1.397**
(0.167) (0.233)
Attraction effect (1st and 2nd quartile) 0.485** 1.624**
(0.194) (0.314)
Attraction effect (3rd and 4th quartile) 0.180 1.197
(0.167) (0.200)
Attraction effect (1st quartile) 0.624*** 1.867*** 0.801*** 2.227*** 0.870*** 2.387***
(0.220) (0.411) (0.282) (0.629) (0.301) (0.717)
Attraction effect (4th quartile) 0.049 1.050 0.553 1.739 0.491 1.634
(0.194) (0.203) (0.353) (0.613) (0.366) (0.598)
Early grant (1st and 2nd quartile) -2.857*** 0.057*** -3.149*** 0.043*** -3.345*** 0.035*** -4.041*** 0.018*** -5.068*** 0.006***
(0.939) (0.054) (0.966) (0.041) (0.992) (0.035) (1.333) (0.023) (1.506) (0.009)
Number of board members 3.083*** 21.821*** 3.270*** 26.323*** 3.332*** 27.991*** 4.261*** 70.886*** 4.922*** 137.243***
(0.915) (19.971) (0.927) (24.391) (0.932) (26.098) (1.139) (80.738) (1.226) (168.233)
Ownership 0.875*** 2.399*** 0.788*** 2.199*** 0.812*** 2.252*** 0.569** 1.767** 0.446* 1.562*
(0.188) (0.451) (0.192) (0.422) (0.189) (0.426) (0.235) (0.416) (0.248) (0.387)
Ln(Total assets) 0.060 1.062 0.054 1.055 0.050 1.051 0.036 1.036 -0.017 0.983
(0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.053) (0.054) (0.065) (0.064)
Profitability -0.002 0.998 -0.003 0.997 -0.002 0.998 0.015*** 1.015*** 0.013** 1.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
VC backing -0.163* 0.850* -0.180* 0.836* -0.192** 0.826** -0.005 0.995 0.067 1.070
(0.097) (0.082) (0.097) (0.081) (0.097) (0.080) (0.160) (0.159) (0.161) (0.172)
CEO age 0.543 1.721 0.557 1.746 0.524 1.689 0.279 1.322 0.288 1.334
(0.367) (0.632) (0.368) (0.643) (0.385) (0.650) (0.584) (0.771) (0.570) (0.761)
Founder -0.065 0.937 -0.014 0.986 0.003 1.003 0.029 1.030 0.010 1.010
(0.191) (0.179) (0.193) (0.190) (0.190) (0.191) (0.305) (0.314) (0.306) (0.309)
-0.044*** 0.957*** -0.042*** 0.959*** -0.044*** 0.956*** -0.005 0.995 -0.009 0.991
Founding year dummies (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Industry dummies 0.705*** 2.024*** 0.718*** 2.051*** 0.720*** 2.054*** -0.110 0.896 -0.108 0.897
(0.185) (0.375) (0.189) (0.388) (0.186) (0.382) (0.315) (0.282) (0.327) (0.293)
Number of observations (Number of firms) 206 206 206 206 206 206 112 112 97 97
Chi-squared statistics 294.6 294.6 297.6 297.6 298.3 298.3 96.40 96.40 71.31 71.31
Log-likelihood -748.8 -748.8 -747.2 -747.2 -746.9 -746.9 -374.0 -374.0 -316.4 -316.4
Drop if founding year is
before 1998
Entire sample
Drop firms with more
than a ten-year history
Dependent variable: Time to IPO
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Figure 1-1. The timing of when managers join firms and when firms grant stock options 
Panel A presents when managers join the firm. The horizontal axis plots the time to new managers joining scaled 
by time to IPO. Panel B presents when firms grant stock options prior to the IPO; the figure plots the 
distribution of a total option grants. The horizontal axis plots the time to option grants scaled by time to IPO. 
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 Chapter 2: Dynamics of bank relationships in entrepreneurial finance 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the role of commercial bankers in banks’ efforts to build relationships 
with small and young firms. Using Japanese IPO data, this study reveals that banks tend to 
provide an additional banker to firms with limited financial experts on the board. In addition, 
the banker’s entry as a proxy to establish a lending relationship is more likely to occur before 
the bank’s venture capital (VC) investment. These findings suggest that commercial banks 
provide bankers to supplement financial expertise in their client’s firms and use this 
relationship to build subsequent VC investment. 
 
Keywords: banks; venture capital; lending relationship; board of directors; financial expertise 
JEL classification: G21; G24 
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1. Introduction 
Previous studies have examined the role of commercial bankers on the board of large and 
mature firms (e.g., Booth and Deli 1999; Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi 
2005).9 Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) examine the largest U.S. public firms, as 
classified by Forbes magazine, to determine the role of financial experts in corporate 
decisions and explain that small firms are excluded from their sample because “small 
early-stage firms may benefit from the financial expertise of venture capitalists.” Although 
these studies provide insight into the role of bankers, it is difficult to apply results based on 
large and matured firms to small early-stage firms. This is probably because venture 
capitalists do not always play a significant role in the development of small firms for the 
following two reasons. First, only a small proportion of firms can raise venture funding.10 
Second, unlike those in the U.S., venture capitalists are inactive monitors in countries such as 
Japan (Hamao, Packer, and Ritter 2000). Thus, relatively little is known about the role of 
financial experts in small early-stage firms. Therefore, this study aims to shed new light on 
the involvement of bankers in small and young firms in Japan, where venture capital (VC) 
activities are less prevalent. 
Focusing on smaller and younger firms allows us to address the issue of how commercial 
banks build relationships with these firms. Berger and Udell (1998) argue that firms access 
intermediated finance on the equity (VC) and debt side (banks, finance companies, etc.) and 
explain that the source of financing varies by firm size and age as well as information 
availability. According to this theory, small firms with high growth potential but a limited 
track record can acquire financing from short terms and VC. However, when banks provide 
equity and debt simultaneously, little is known about how banks establish their equity and 
9 Booth and Deli (1999) use non-financial S&P 500 firms. Kroszner and Strahan (2001) study firms classified 
by Forbes magazine as the largest 500 firms in terms of sales, profits, assets, and market value. Byrd and 
Mizruchi (2005) use data for the 500 largest U.S. manufacturing firms, as reported in Fortune (May 1981). 
10 See, for example, Berger and Udell (1998). 
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debt relationships with small early-stage firms. 
Few recent studies examined banks engaged in VC financing. Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri 
(2008) examine the dynamic relationship between a bank’s VC investments and subsequent 
lending in terms of cross-selling. They employ a probit model whose dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the bank participated in a loan to the company and the 
main dependent variable of interest is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
bank made a prior venture investment in the company. They assume that bank’s VC 
investment precedes lending and find that building VC relationships early on leads to 
subsequent lending relationships. Nevertheless, the dynamics of bank activities between 
lending and investment relationships must be carefully examined. However, it is difficult to 
obtain data to identify the procedure of establishing bank relationships with small early-stage 
firms. 
To solve this problem, this study adopts Japanese IPO data. Japan is a bank-oriented 
country (e.g., Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh 2005) and the presence of bankers on the board is 
larger (Kroszner and Strahan 2001). While independent VC firms dominate the VC industry 
in the U.S., a large number of Japanese banks have subsidiary VC firms and invest in their 
client through VC funding. Thus, instead of directly identifying the start date of a lending 
relationship, this study assumes that the lending relationship has already been established 
before the banker’s board representation. It then compares the timings between lending from 
and investments by the bank. This assumption does not require us to identify the start date of 
lending relationships. 
Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) examine German non-financial companies and find 
that bankers act as financial experts to obtain funding. Bank support is beneficial for firms 
that do not have financial experts in their founding teams. For example, bankers on the board 
supplement clients’ financial skills and knowledge. Thus, the study posits that commercial 
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bankers are on the board to support a firm with limited financial expertise in the IPO process. 
This hypothesis is tested by dividing bankers into two types: commercial and investment 
bankers. If commercial bankers play an important role and are necessary in the IPO process, 
firms that lack commercial bankers are more likely to receive an additional (commercial) 
banker. On the other hand, if a commercial banker can play a supplemental role of financial 
experts, such as an investment banker or accountant, firms that have fewer financial experts 
are more likely to receive an additional banker. 
To examine the role of bankers in small early-stage firms, first, the determinants of an 
additional banker’s presence on the board of an IPO firm are analyzed. Next, the 
characteristics of firms with and without bankers on the board are compared. Then, a probit 
model with the probability of a bank joining is estimated. To examine the dynamics of bank 
relationships with small early-stage firms, the date of a banker joining the firm’s board and 
the bank’s VC investment date are compared. Since the aim is to understand the timing of a 
lending relationship and VC investment by banks, this study focuses on bank-affiliated 
VC-backed IPO firms with an additional banker. 
The findings are summarized as follows. First, commercial bankers tend to be on the 
boards of firms that have a low percentage of financial experts. This suggests that banks 
support their borrowing firms in the IPO process by providing an additional banker. The 
commercial bankers do not necessarily play a crucial role in the IPO process but a 
supplemental one as financial experts. Second, banks build lending relationships before 
investing in the firms through their subsidiary VC firms. This differs from the findings of 
Hellmann et al. (2008), who argue that banks strategically invest at an early stage and 
subsequently develop lending relationships. 
The contributions of this article are as follows. First, this study discusses the role of 
bankers in smaller and younger firms. The findings supplement previous studies that have 
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examined the role of financial expertise (Booth and Deli 1999; Kroszner and Strahan 2001; 
Byrd and Mizruchi 2005). Second, it provides insight into the determinants of board 
compositions in IPO firms. While Baker and Gompers (2003) investigate the impact of VC 
on the board structures of IPO firms, this study provides evidence that a banker affects the 
board composition of IPO firms. Finally, it elucidates the dynamics of bank activities 
between lending and VC relationships, which differ from those argued in the previous 
literature. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 
provides the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The sample consists of 658 non-financial firms that went public in the Japanese markets 
(i.e., JASDAQ, Mothers, Hercules, and other regional exchanges for startup companies) 
between January 2004 and December 2012.11 The data collected for each firm include 
biographical information on the board members, date of a banker joining the firm’s board of 
directors, and bank’s VC investment date using IPO prospectuses. In addition, information on 
firm characteristics, such as firm size and age, are adopted from the IPO White Book. 
To test the hypotheses, it is important to identify financial experts: commercial, investment, 
and additional (commercial) bankers. A commercial banker is a board member who has work 
experience in commercial banks, and an investment banker is a board member who has work 
experience in investment banks, including foreign investment banks. If the board member has 
work experience in both commercial and investment banks, the member is classified under 
both categories. The additional banker is a board member who has worked in a commercial 
bank, by whom he is strategically sent, and becomes the board member of the IPO firm. This 
11 Following previous studies (e.g., Byrd and Mizruchi 2005; Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider 2010), financial 
institutions have been excluded (Tokyo Stock Exchange industrial classification codes 28, 29, 30, 31). 
 
 
31 
                                                        
study refers to firms with commercial bankers on their boards as “firms with commercial 
banker” and those with an investment banker as “firms with investment banker.” Firms with 
an additional commercial banker are indicated as “firms with additional banker.” 
Table 2-1 shows the frequency distribution of IPOs and the percentages of firms with 
financial experts by IPO year. The number of IPOs is small after the financial crisis between 
2008 and 2011. The percentage of firms with commercial banker is almost stable and on 
average is 50%, which is constantly larger than that of firms with investment banker. For 
2009, the percentage of firms with investment banker is about 54%, while that of firms with 
commercial banker is roughly 62%. The percentage of firms with additional banker is lower 
than that of firms with commercial and investment banker, except in 2010. On average, 
however, firms with additional banker dominate 7% of the sample. Figure 2-1 plots these 
trends over the sample period. 
[Insert Table 2-1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2-1 here] 
 
3. Results 
3.1.Bankers as board members 
First, the study examines the characteristics of firms with financial experts and divides the 
sample by firm with and without commercial, investment, and additional banker. To examine 
the role of financial expertise of directors on the board, three variables are employed: the 
fractions of financial experts, commercial banker, and investment banker on the board. The 
fraction of financial experts is calculated as the number of board members who have one of 
the following current titles or work histories—commercial banker, investment banker, 
financial executive such as CFO, accountant, venture capitalist, and other financial 
institutions (except the additional banker)—divided by the total number of board members 
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(Frc. Financial experts). Next, I define the rate of commercial bankers (investment bankers), 
which is the number of commercial bankers (investment bankers) on the board relative to the 
total number of board of directors (Frc. Commercial banker and Frc. Investment banker). The 
definitions of other firm characteristics are presented in Appendix 2-A. 
Panel A of Table 2-2 provides the univariate comparison results of the characteristics 
between firms with and without commercial banker. On average, firms with commercial 
banker are larger in terms of board and firm size. The result is consistent with that of 
Kroszner and Strahan (2001), who find that firms with banker are larger and stable than those 
without banker. 
Panel B compares firm characteristics between firms with and without investment banker 
and shows that firms with investment banker are smaller, younger, and more profitable than 
those without investment banker. The results from panels A and B suggest that firms with 
commercial banker and those with investment banker differ in characteristics. For instance, 
firms with investment banker are smaller and more profitable than those with commercial 
banker.12 
Panel C provides the results for firm characteristics with and without additional banker. On 
average, the percentage of financial experts of firms with banker is 25% and that of firms 
without banker is 35%; the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 
suggests that bankers are more likely to be on the board of IPO firms with few financial 
experts. These firms have large boards and assets and are mature compared to those without 
bankers. Next, multivariate regression is used to confirm these significant differences. 
[Insert Table 2-2 here] 
 
12 To test this, the firm characteristics are compared between firms with commercial banker and those with 
investment banker, after excluding firms with commercial and investment bankers on their boards from both 
groups. The findings suggest that the results are consistent with my assumption. These results, however, are not 
reported here. 
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Table 2-3 provides a correlation matrix and shows that Frc. Financial experts is relatively 
highly correlated with Frc. Commercial banker and Frc. Investment banker (0.448 and 0.514, 
respectively). The result provides insight into collinearity problems across financial expertise 
measures, and thus, the results that include these measures are reported separately and 
simultaneously in the multivariate analyses below. 
[Insert Table 2-3 here] 
 
Table 2-4 reports the results of probit regressions with Additional banker as the dependent 
variable, a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has an additional banker on the board. 
Each regression in Table 2-4 includes industry and IPO year fixed effects. As expected, in 
column 1, the percentage of financial experts has a negative effect on banker’s board 
representation, suggesting that IPO firms with a small proportion of financial expertise are 
more likely to receive an additional banker on their boards. This implies that commercial 
banks support client firms by lending and supplementing financial expertise by sending 
bankers. This relationship is not only statistically significant but also economically 
meaningful. In column 5, ceteris paribus, a one-standard deviation (0.18) decrease in the 
percentage of financial experts in a firm increases the probability of a banker joining the 
board of a firm by 5.1%. In contrast, a one-standard deviation increase is associated with a 
decrease in the probability by 2.0%. 
Columns 2–4 show that the coefficients of Frc. Commercial banker and Frc. Investment 
banker are negative and only the coefficient of Frc. Investment banker is statistically 
significant. The results suggest that an additional banker is associated only with the lack of an 
investment banker, not with the lack of a commercial banker. The result is inconsistent with 
the crucial commercial banker hypothesis and consistent with the supplemental role of 
commercial banker hypothesis. 
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Financial expertise measures are simultaneously included in column 5. As a result, the 
effect of Frc. Investment banker now disappears after allowing for Frc. Financial experts. 
Overall, these results suggest that a commercial banker plays the supplemental role of other 
financial experts, such as an investment banker, and banks tend to send a commercial banker 
to client firms that lack financial expertise to supplement financial skills or knowledge of IPO 
processes.13 
[Insert Table 2-4 here] 
 
3.2. Dynamics of bank relationships 
This subsection identifies which bank relationship comes first between lending and 
investment relationships by comparing the date of an additional banker joining the firm and 
the date the firm receives its first VC investment from the bank. Let us assume that a lending 
relationship has already been established prior to the date of an additional banker joining the 
firm. 
Of the total firms in the sample, 48 firms have an additional banker from commercial 
banks (see Table 2-1), of which 32 firms receive bank-affiliated VC investments and are 
represented in a matrix in Table 2-4. The deals are assigned to a particular cell depending on 
whether the timing of deals can be identified or if the investments are conducted before 
building lending relationships. The matrix indicates that the number of deals is larger when 
conducted after building lending relationships. Although investments are generally made 
before establishing lending relationships, the number of deals is smaller than that conducted 
after building the relationships. Unlike Hellmann et al. (2008) showing that banks 
strategically invest at an early stage and subsequently develop lending relationships, I find 
that banks are more likely to invest in their clients after building lending relationships. In 
13 As a robustness check, a linear probability model is estimated, but the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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addition, the results show that banks tend to invest after sending a banker to the investees, 
suggesting that bank-affiliated VC firms are more risk averse. 
[Insert Table 2-5 here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines the role of commercial bankers and how banks build relationships 
with smaller and younger firms using Japanese IPO data. The Japanese VC industry is a 
useful setting to examine a bank’s activities across lending and VC investments. The results 
suggest that firms with additional banker have limited financial expertise on their boards than 
firms without additional banker; in other words, banks support firms by supplementing 
financial expertise. Also, the lending relationship is more likely to occur to be established 
before an investment relationship. These findings provide some implications for 
entrepreneurs. If the founding team has a lack of financial expertise, banks support them by 
providing not only debt and/or equity capital but also skills and knowledge. 
Although this study provides new insight into a bank’s dynamic activities in 
entrepreneurial finance, there are several limitations. First, the data includes only firms that 
will go public, which can lead to sample selection biases. Second, board members could quit 
their job before the IPO and this is not reported in IPO prospectuses. Third, the empirical 
results for the bank’s dynamic procedures may not be robust due to a small sample size. Thus, 
future research should use a larger sample of small and young private firms to identify the 
timing of establishing lending relationships. 
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 Figure 2-1. Trends for bankers on the board 
This figure plots the percentage of firms that have commercial, investment, or additional bankers on the board 
across the sample period. The percentages are calculated as the number of IPO firms that have commercial, 
investment, or additional bankers relative to the number of IPOs in the same year. 
   
 
 
38 
Table 2-1. Firm distribution by year 
This table presents descriptive statistics on the number of firms that went public between 2004 and 2012. 
 
  
IPO year
No. of
firms
commercial
banker
investment
banker
additional
banker
commercial
banker
investment
banker
additional
banker
2004 142 69 49 9 48.6% 34.5% 6.3%
2005 135 70 42 8 51.9% 31.1% 5.9%
2006 147 67 48 12 45.6% 32.7% 8.2%
2007 102 49 29 5 48.0% 28.4% 4.9%
2008 40 25 14 5 62.5% 35.0% 12.5%
2009 13 8 7 1 61.5% 53.8% 7.7%
2010 14 8 3 4 57.1% 21.4% 28.6%
2011 27 12 6 1 44.4% 22.2% 3.7%
2012 38 23 12 3 60.5% 31.6% 7.9%
Total 658 331 210 48 50.3% 31.9% 7.3%
No. of firms with % of firms with
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Table 2-2. Summary statistics of sample firms 
This table presents the means and medians of firm characteristics for non-financial IPO firms between 2004 and 
2012. Panels A, B, and C present results for firms with and without commercial, investment, and additional 
bankers, respectively. The definitions of variables are described in Appendix 2-A. t-tests were conducted to test 
for differences in the means and Wilcoxon test for differences in medians. ***, **, and * represent significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: Firms with and without commercial banker
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Diff. Diff.
Frc. Investment banker 0.060 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.008 0.000
Board size 8.843 8.000 8.318 8.000 0.525 *** 0.000 ***
Founder 0.514 1.000 0.566 1.000 -0.052 0.000
Firm size 8.059 7.941 7.833 7.850 0.226 ** 0.092 **
Firm age 5.070 5.030 5.067 5.037 0.003 -0.007
ROA 0.118 0.103 0.136 0.110 -0.018 -0.006
Panel B: Firms with and without investment banker
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Diff. Diff.
Frc. Commercial banker 0.108 0.083 0.091 0.000 0.017 * 0.083
Board size 8.757 8.000 8.500 8.000 0.257 0.000
Founder 0.552 1.000 0.533 1.000 0.019 0.000
Firm size 7.777 7.720 8.026 7.996 -0.249 ** -0.276 ***
Firm age 4.880 4.804 5.157 5.228 -0.277 *** -0.424 ***
ROA 0.152 0.114 0.115 0.103 0.038 *** 0.011 **
Panel C: Firms with and without additional (commercial) banker
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Diff. Diff.
Frc. Finance experts 0.250 0.250 0.353 0.333 -0.103 *** -0.083 ***
Frc. Commercial banker 0.082 0.080 0.098 0.029 -0.015 0.051
Frc. Investment banker 0.020 0.000 0.059 0.000 -0.039 ** 0.000 **
Board size 9.521 9.000 8.508 8.000 1.013 *** 1.000 ***
Founder 0.542 1.000 0.539 1.000 0.002 0.000
Firm size 8.707 8.738 7.887 7.829 0.820 *** 0.909 ***
Firm age 5.637 5.705 5.024 4.980 0.614 *** 0.725 ***
ROA 0.096 0.092 0.129 0.109 -0.033 -0.016 **
Firms without
additional banker
N  = 331 N  = 327
Mean test
Firms with investment
banker
Firms without
investment banker
Firms with commercial
banker
Firms without
commercial banker
Median test
Mean test
Mean test
N  = 48 N  = 610
Mean test
N  = 210 N  = 448
Mean test
Firms with additional
banker
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Table 2-3. Correlation matrix 
This table presents correlations across selected variables used in this study. The definitions of variables are 
described in Appendix 2-A. 
 
  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) Frc. Finance experts 1.000
(2) Frc. Commercial banker 0.448 1.000
(3) Frc. Investment banker 0.514 0.060 1.000
(4) Board size -0.105 -0.019 -0.076 1.000
(5) Founder 0.041 -0.042 0.043 -0.198 1.000
(6) Firm size -0.102 0.046 -0.153 0.451 -0.218 1.000
(7) Firm age -0.167 -0.015 -0.195 0.222 -0.252 0.510 1.000
(8) ROA 0.117 -0.028 0.179 -0.156 0.093 -0.227 -0.166 1.000
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Table 2-4. Probability of bank’s intervention 
This table presents the results from probit regressions. The dependent variable is Additional banker. The 
definitions of variables are described in Appendix 2-A. The estimated coefficient and Huber-White 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported for each independent variable. In all 
regressions, industry and IPO year fixed effects are included but not reported. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Frc. Finance experts -0.024*** -0.028***
(0.006) (0.007)
Frc. Commercial banker -0.008 -0.008 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Frc. Investment banker -0.025** -0.025** -0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Board size 0.032 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.035
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Founder 0.355** 0.334* 0.319* 0.322* 0.357**
(0.173) (0.171) (0.173) (0.173) (0.174)
Firm size 0.193** 0.186** 0.170** 0.183** 0.174**
(0.087) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.088)
Firm age 0.429*** 0.455*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.430***
(0.128) (0.125) (0.126) (0.127) (0.127)
ROA 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -5.333*** -5.944*** -5.631*** -5.657*** -5.175***
(0.851) (0.808) (0.816) (0.820) (0.850)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPO year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 658 658 658 658 658
Pseudo R -squared 0.224 0.177 0.184 0.187 0.229
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable:
Additional banker
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Table 2-5. Bank’s lending and investment relationships 
This table presents 32 bank-affiliated VC-backed IPO firms that have an additional banker. The sample includes 
48 firms with an additional banker, of which 16 firms did not receive VC investments from commercial banks. 
 
  
Bank VC investment
comes first
Bank lending comes
first
Time of VC
investments unknown
Total
Banker sits on the board,
and bank invests
7 11 10 28
Banker sits on the board,
but bank does not invest
4
Total number of bank-
affiliated VC-backed firms
32
4
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Appendix 2-A. Variable definitions 
 
 
  
Variable Definitions
Additional banker Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a board member from a
commercial bank, and zero otherwise.
Frc. Finance experts
The number of board members who have one of the following current titles or work histories:
commercial banker, investment banker, financial executive such as CFO, accountant, venture
capitalist, and other financial institutions (except the additional banker) divided by the total
number of board members of the firm.
Frc. Commercial banker
The number of board members who have work experience in commercial banks divided by
the total number of board members.
Frc. Investment banker
The number of board members who have work experience in investment banks divided by
the total number of board members of the firm.
Board size
The number of board members.
Founder
Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is a founder, and zero otherwise.
Firm size
The natural logarithm of total assets before the IPO.
Firm age
The natural logarithm of duration from founding date to IPO date, measured in months.
ROA
Return on assets measured by operating income to total assets at the fiscal year-end prior to
the IPO.
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 Chapter 3: Prior affiliation, financing, board-member engagement, and IPO 
performance 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the effect of prior affiliation between a start-up’s board member and 
various types of venture capital firm on resource investments to start-ups in the Japanese 
capital market. Specifically, using a unique dataset containing career path of board members, 
we examine how prior affiliation promotes financial and human resource investments from 
the affiliated venture capital firm. We find that prior affiliation increases the likelihood that a 
start-up will receive financing from the affiliated investor, particularly when the investor is a 
bank-affiliated or a corporate venture capital firm. We also find that prior affiliation increases 
the likelihood of human resource investment to the start-up (in the form of board-member 
engagement) particularly from a corporate venture capital firm. However, we find little 
evidence that affiliation-based resource investments reduce underwriting fee; rather it leads to 
higher post-IPO failure rate. Our results suggest that prior affiliation could worsen screening 
and monitoring activities of the affiliated venture capital firms. 
 
Keywords: affiliation; start-ups; venture capital; IPO performance 
JEL classification: G24; M13
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1. Introduction 
Financial intermediaries play an important role in the innovation, growth, success and 
certification of start-up companies (Chemmanur, Krishnan and Nandy, 2011; Kortum and 
Lerner, 2000; Samila and Sorenson, 2011). Chemmanur et al. (2011) find that start-ups have 
greater manufacturing efficiency when they have venture capital (VC) firm backing and the 
screening and monitoring role that these intermediaries play. However, due to uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, it is a difficult task for start-ups to attract funds from these external 
investors (Cochrane, 2006; Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri, 2008).14 
Since the lack of resources often prevents start-ups from fulfilling their growth opportunities 
and future potential, how start-ups and investors overcome information asymmetry between 
them is an important issue that is underexplored in the literature (Shane and Cable, 2002), 
which is the focus of this study. 
Prior research has shown that start-ups have greater access to financing when the start-up is 
located closer to the VC firm (geographic proximity), and when the start-up operates in the 
industry in which the VC firm has previous investment experiences (Sorenson and Stuart, 
2001). Research has also shown that the composition of the start-up’s board matters 
(Beckman, Burton, and O’Reilly, 2007). Start-ups with boards that have greater functional 
diversity and affiliation diversity tend to more easily attract VC investment (Beckman et al., 
2007). Shared ethnicities between partners of the VC firm and the start-up also leads to a 
higher probability of VC investment in the start-up (Bengtsson and Hsu, 2013). Each of these 
factors relate to either a VC’s characteristics or capabilities that allow for greater access to 
information regarding the start-up and/or an increased ability to assess the quality of the 
start-up by a potential investor, reducing the information friction between the VC firm and 
start-up. 
14 We use the word “firm” for the investor, and the word “company” for the investee (Hellmann et al., 2008). 
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In this study, we focus on affiliation of the start-up’s board that could be beneficial in 
accessing resource investments from VC firms. Specifically, we examine whether a start-up’s 
board member’s prior affiliation with a VC firm reduces information asymmetry between the 
start-up and potential investor such that the start-up (1) has easier access to resources (e.g., 
financial investment from the VC firm, human resource investment in the form of board 
membership) through this affiliation, and (2) is able to go public with lower costs relative to 
start-ups that do not have this affiliation. 
We therefore examine prior affiliation across different types of VCs. Prior research has 
shown that there are distinct differences in the manner in which different types of VCs select, 
support and monitor their start-up investments. Maula, Autio, and Murray (2005) find that 
independent VC (IVC) firms add value to start-ups by assisting in raising additional financing 
and recruiting key employees, whereas corporate VC (CVC) firms help build credibility and 
capacity in the start-ups they invest in. Hellmann et al. (2008) find that bank-affiliated VC 
(BVC) firms tend to invest in later, less risky, stages of VC financing than IVC firms. The 
overall framework of our paper is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
[Insert Figure 3-1 here] 
 
We choose to examine the Japanese market in our study for two reasons. First, the Japanese 
VC industry can be characterized as one in which the fraction of affiliated VCs (bank, 
security, or corporate) is greater than in the U.S. or Europe, which facilitates a comparison 
across VC types. There are substantial differences in the investment strategies and practices 
of different types of VCs across counties. Bertoni, Colombo, and Quas (2012), comparing the 
VC industry in the U.S. with that in Europe, find that there is a significantly higher 
percentage of IVCs in the U.S. (68%) than in Europe (55%), and that, unlike in the U.S., 
IVCs in Europe tend to invest in older, more established start-ups. While research on captive 
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VC firms has attracted much attention, there is still less work on BVC firms (Da Rin, 
Hellmann, and Puri, 2011). Second, to our knowledge, no research has examined the impact 
of affiliation on reducing information asymmetry in the Japanese context, an area in which 
we plan to make a contribution. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find that prior affiliation increases the 
likelihood that the start-up will receive financing from the affiliated VC firm, especially when 
the VC firm is BVC firm, or a CVC firm. We also find, in the context of a CVC firm, that 
prior affiliation increases the likelihood of human resource investment in the form of 
affiliated investor engagement with the start-up. However, we find little evidence that the 
affiliate relationship reduce IPO underwriting fee. These findings allow us to build on our 
understanding of the effectiveness of the top management team and its social networks with 
respect to resource investment by VCs (Beckman and Burton, 2008). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief 
overview of the Japanese VC Industry. In section 3, we develop our hypotheses. In section 4, 
we describe our data and methodology. In section 5, we present our results and findings. In 
section 6, we conclude the paper. 
 
2. Japanese VC industry 
The Japanese VC industry is the third oldest in the world after the U.S. and the U.K. but 
whereas the VC industries in the latter two countries have thrived, the Japanese VC industry 
has historically funded relatively very few start-up firms. The main reason for this is that the 
necessary institutional conditions for the establishment of a successful VC market were not 
satisfied in Japan. Specifically, investing in start-ups is inherently very risky as a substantial 
percentage of these firms do not succeed. VC firms, therefore, have to be willing to take on 
the risk and, consequently, also require large capital returns in a reasonably short time for 
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taking on the risk. The latter requirement necessitates appropriate avenues of exit. 
Traditionally, majority of Japanese VC funds were provided by VC firms that were 
affiliated with financial institutions, predominantly security firms and commercial banks. As 
such, these VC firms were unwilling to tolerate high levels of risk. Stringent listing 
requirements on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) compounded the problem. For example, 
companies that wanted to list on the TSE were required to have generated profits of 100 
million Japanese Yen two years immediately prior to listing and have a total market 
capitalization of at least 100 billion Japanese Yen at listing. It would generally take successful 
start-ups ten to twenty years to attain these levels. This period of time from start-up to exit 
was too long for traditional VC firms with an equity stake in a start-up to wait to earn a return 
on their capital. Therefore, rather than take equity stakes in the start-ups that would provide a 
return only if the start-up was purchased or went public, VC firms would provide funding 
only for mature companies in the form of loans. Because of this risk-averse attitude of VC 
firms and lack of an expeditious exit, investment during the earlier stages of development of 
start-ups (five years or less in age) was very limited. These factors stifled the growth of the 
VC industry in Japan.15 
During the late 1990s and 2000s, a number of institutional and regulatory changes have 
allowed the Japanese VC industry to flourish. The introduction of the market for high-growth 
and emerging stocks (Mothers) in 1999 and NASDAQ Japan in 2000 provided VC firms with 
a more efficient means of exiting their investments as listing requirements on these 
exchanges are much less stringent than the Japanese OTC market (JASDAQ) or TSE. For 
example, Mothers, a section of the TSE, has no minimum requirements for profits or market 
capitalization at the time of listing. These new exchanges, therefore, now provide 
opportunities, that were previously unavailable or limited, to small firms and entrepreneurs to 
15 See Kenney, Han, and Tanaka (2002) for a detailed discussion of the history of Japanese VC industry. 
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raise money through equity offerings. 
As a result of these changes, there has been a substantial increase in VC firms and new 
venture capital subsidiaries. Khoury, Mathew, and Yamakawa (2014) find that of the 269 
Japanese VC-backed IPOs between 2006 and 2010, approximately 30% were BVC firms, 
20% were securities firm-affiliated VC (SVC) firms, 23% were CVC firms, and 11% were 
IVC firms - a distribution that is becoming much more equal than in other markets around the 
world. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
A key to success for start-ups is their ability to obtain financial resource investments 
(among others). Convincing VC firms to provide external financing is particularly difficult 
for start-ups that do not have established reputation. In the absence of other information 
asymmetry reducing mechanisms, from the perspective of the VC firm, their willingness to 
provide capital may be predicated on their ability to design contracts such that they are 
protected (to the extent that they can be protected) from the risks inherent in the start-up. 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) find that internal risks - those that are related to management 
actions and the quality of the management team - are associated with the asymmetric 
information between the VC firm and start-up. To mitigate these risks, VC firms can design 
contracts in which they have greater cash flow rights and greater control of the start-up. 
In the event that the start-up has prior affiliation with a VC firm, assessing the quality of 
the management team can potentially be easier thus reducing the need for stricter contracts 
between the VC firm and the start-up. Therefore, we would expect that, holding other factors 
constant, a VC firm would be more inclined to provide resources to a company where there is 
prior affiliation. Accordingly, we establish the following hypothesis relating prior affiliation 
with VC investment. 
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 Hypothesis 1. Prior affiliation between a start-up company’s board member and investor 
promote financial investment from the affiliated investor (and his/her venture capital firm). 
 
We expect that CVC firms are more likely to rely on prior affiliation due to their risk 
aversion and a lack of ability to evaluate their investees. CVC firms may also be more likely 
to rely on the prior affiliate relationship due to a lack of their investment experience 
compared with other organizational types of VC firms. While IVC firms dominate the VC 
industry in the U.S., many VC firms in Japan are affiliated with financial institutions, such as 
banks or securities firms (Hamao, Racker, and Ritter, 2000; Mayer, Schoors, and Yafeh, 
2005). Studies that examine the European VC industry find that 55 - 60% of the VC firms - 
are IVC firms (Bertoni, Colombo, and Quas, 2012; Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann, 2008). 
The different organizational structures of VC firms have different investment objectives 
(Hellmann et al., 2008), and use different types of contracts (Hirsch and Walz, 2013). 
Although IVC firms seek financial gains, captive VC firms pursue strategic objectives. 
Hellmann et al. (2008), comparing the investment activity of BVC firms with that of IVC 
firms, find that banks use their “affiliated” VC firms at the early stage to further build on a 
lending relationship towards the later stage. Nahata (2008) as well as Dushnitsky and Shapira 
(2010) also find that compared to IVC firms, CVC firms are more likely to invest during a 
later stage due to an unwillingness to take risks. Accordingly, we establish the following 
hypothesis related to the type of affiliated VC firm. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Financial investment based on prior affiliation (between a start-up company’s 
board member and investor) is more likely when the board member’s affiliation is with a BVC 
or a CVC firm than with other types of VC firms. 
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 In the U.S., it is quite common for VC firms to place a partner or an employee on the board 
of a start-up to provide better monitoring and control of the start-up. However, in Japan, prior 
to 1995, VC firms were not permitted by law to place employees on the board of directors of 
a start-up that the VC firm invested in. Traditionally, Japanese VC firms have not played a 
large monitoring role in their investees. Given this historical context, we use our empirical 
setting to examine whether VC financing leads to start-up board membership. Specifically, 
we propose the following hypothesis relating VC investment to subsequent board 
membership by a VC firm employee. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Prior affiliation between a start-up company’s board member and investor 
promotes human resource investment from the affiliated investor (and his/her venture capital 
firm) in the form of a board-member engagement. 
 
By taking a stake in a company that is in the process of going public, VCs have the 
potential to provide certification of the quality of the issue and reduce the level of 
underpricing sought by investors for the new issue to enter the public market (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Cai and Wei, 1997; Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Hsu, 2004; Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991). From the perspective of an outside investor at the time of an IPO, if they 
see that an affiliated VC firm has invested in a start-up, expecting that the affiliated firm has 
greater access to information about their start-up because of their prior affiliation, this 
investor may be more inclined to invest in the start-up. Additionally, they may be more 
willing to accept a lower initial return, i.e., IPO underpricing, because of the certification role 
the affiliated VC firm plays in this process. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis 
related to the certification role that affiliated VC firms play. 
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 Hypothesis 4. Financial investment based on prior affiliation (between a start-up company’s 
board member and investor) provides investor with a certification of quality of the start-up 
and thus leads to reduced IPO costs compared to IPOs for which there is no prior affiliation. 
 
We argue that from an outside investor’s perspective the affiliation between a VC firm and 
a start-up could lead to lower required IPO underpricing as this investor may view the VC 
firm’s ability to screen and monitor the start-up increases with affiliation. If the affiliation in 
fact allows for better screening and monitoring of potential investments by the VC firm, we 
would expect to find that there would be a lower likelihood that the start-up would delist 
following a public listing compared to a startup for which there was no affiliated VC firm 
investment. 
However, Bengtsson and Hsu (2013) find that investments by VC firms in which there is a 
shared ethnicity between members of the VC firm and the startup tend to underperform (i.e., 
are less likely to provide an IPO or mergers and acquisition exit for the VC firm) relative to 
start-ups for which there is no shared ethnicity. They argue that the VC firm may 
overestimate the benefits of investing in a startup for which there is this shared ethnicity, or 
that the VC firm does not monitor the startup sufficiently post-investment. A similar argument 
could be made for affiliation-based VC firm investments. If the VC firm’s investment 
decision is motivated by affiliation rather than startup quality, the affiliated VC firm may 
invest in startups of inferior quality. Additionally, the affiliation may lead to reduced 
monitoring by the VC firm as the VC firm may not impose the same level of control over the 
startup as maintaining the relationship with the affiliated firm is valued. If the affiliation 
reduces the VC firms ability to screen and monitor investments, we would expect to find that 
there would be a greater likelihood that the start-up would delist following a public listing 
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compared to a startup for which there was no affiliated VC firm investment. We hypothesize 
accordingly. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Prior affiliation between a start-up company’s board member and investor 
lead to better screening of quality of the company and higher survival rate (lower delisting 
rate) of the company. 
 
4. Methods 
4.1. Data 
We obtain the list of companies that went public in the stock exchange for start-ups in Japan 
(i.e., JASDAQ, Mothers, Hercules, Centrex, Ambitious, Q-board, and NEO) between January 
2004 and December 2007, and their attribute data from the IPO White Book.16 A total of 564 
IPOs took place during the time period. We exclude non-VC-backed companies, second-time 
IPOs, and financial companies.17 As a result, the sample consists of 382 companies. For each 
company, we collect information on company’s board members, such as their positions and 
prior work experience, from the IPO prospectuses. 18 19  Information on board member’s 
positions and date of entering are double checked by using the Nikkei database. Data on 
investors are collected from the IPO White Paper and IPO prospectus. Additionally, in order 
to identify the type of VC firms, we rely on the entrepedia website 
16 We exclude IPO companies that are listed on the TSE or other existing stock exchanges because the 
characteristics of companies intending to go public on those markets are different from that of companies listed 
on the emerging markets (i.e., JASDAQ, Mothers, Hercules, Centrex, Ambitious, Q-board, and NEO). For 
instance, companies listed on the TSE tend to be large, mature, and profitable. 
17 We identify financial companies (i.e., banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial 
related companies) with the TSE 33 industry classifications. 
18 This study uses a unique dataset on board members’ career paths, which are not available from Japanese 
commercial databases (e.g., Nikkei or TOYO KEIZAI). While these commercial databases do not contain 
members’ career paths and if any usually contain information about the most prominent previous career 
experience of the board member, the data used in this study enables us to identify a sequence of his/her careers 
before s/he has founded or entered the current start-up. Using more detailed information on the career paths 
allows us to correctly evaluate the effect of the prior affiliation, which is the core construct of our study. 
19 IPO prospectus usually reports the information on board members at the time of the IPO. Thus, if there is any 
manager that has already quit his/her job before the IPO, we cannot identify their history. Although there is a 
possibility of survivorship biases by using sample of IPO companies, it enables us to access rich information. 
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(http://entrepedia.jp/en/home) provided by Japan Venture Research Co., LTD. 
 
4.2. Alternative sets of investors 
To examine the effect of prior affiliation on subsequent VC financing, we use a sample 
composed of “realized matches” and “unrealized matches” of companies and investors 
(Hellmann et al., 2008).20 We construct both realized pairs in which a specific affiliated 
investor him/herself or his/her subsidiary VC firms invests in the affiliated company, and 
unrealized pairs in which a specific affiliated investor him/herself or his/her subsidiary VC 
firm does not invest in the affiliated company. 
Previous studies indicate that it is necessary to set potential alternatives from which the 
company can raise capital. For instance, Hellmann et al. (2008) assume that each company 
has 50 alternatives. In this study, we assume that each company has a total of 32 potential 
alternatives, which are composed of 31 investors that meet the two criteria and a choice of 
any of the VC firms that do not meet the criteria and are not among the 31 potential 
alternatives selected. In this study, with the need to link board members’ prior work 
experience in the firm to the affiliated investors, we employ the following two criteria to 
select investors as potential choices: (1) there are a total of more than two inside board 
members that have prior work experience in a specific firm in our sample; and (2) the firm is 
an active investor or has active subsidiary VC firms. The word “active” here means that the 
firm or its subsidiary VC firms has invested in one of the companies in our sample.21 
Furthermore, we categorize these selected investors into three groups based on the following 
organizational types of VC firms: BVCs, CVCs, and SVCs.22 
20 To examine the effect of prior VC relationships, Hellmann et al. (2008) consider all possible company-bank 
pairs: realized matches and unrealized matches in a loan market. 
21 For example, we find that many board members who have worked for IBM Japan, Ltd. or Sony Corporation. 
However, these firms do not meet our definition of active investor, at least not in the Japanese VC industry. 
22 In our sample, there are few independent VC firms and insurance company-affiliated VC firms that meet our 
criteria. Therefore our analyses do not include independent VCs, insurance company-affiliated VC firms, and 
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 4.3. Methodology 
To examine the likelihood that an affiliated company board member will lead to VC 
financing, we perform a probit regression. The probability when a company i choses an 
investor j is determined as follows: 
 Pr (𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1) = 𝐹𝐹�𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗′ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 + 𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗�, (1) 
 
where F(･) is the normal density function. In equation (1), the dependent variable is Affiliated 
VC financing, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the company receives 
financing from the affiliated VC firms, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we consider the 
timing of VC financing to identify the causality between the prior affiliate relationship and 
VC financing. When the company with board members who have prior work experience in a 
specific firm has received financing from that firm or its subsidiary VC firms, we identify 
whether the investment is conducted before or after the member joined the company. If the 
VC firm invested before the board member with work prior experience in the firm joins the 
start-up, we replace the dependent variable with zero because we try to examine the causality 
between prior work experience and the affiliate investment. 
The main independent variable of interest is prior affiliation, which is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the company has board members who have prior work 
experience in any firm that meet the criteria (e.g., 31 alternatives), and zero otherwise. To 
isolate the impact of prior affiliation on VC financing, we control for other relationships 
between the VC firm and startup (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗′ ), which is the vector of independent variables. Loan is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bank has an outstanding loan to the company, 
other type of VC firms such as governmental VC firms. 
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and zero otherwise before the IPO. 23  Hellmann et al. (2008) find that BVC firms 
strategically invest in start-ups that are more likely to require subsequent loans. Accordingly, 
we expect loan positively associates with the probability of VC financing. Loan data are 
obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS loan database, which provides information on loans made 
by each lender. For SVCs and CVCs, loan takes the value of zero because there is no lending 
relationship. If the hypothesis that a company with board members that have prior affiliation 
with investors is more likely to attract financing from the affiliated VC firms or their parent 
firms is not rejected, we expect the coefficient on prior affiliation to be positive. 
In the regression we control for company-specific characteristics (𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖′). We control for the 
following variables. (1) Ln(total assets), which is the natural logarithm of a company’s total 
assets (million Japanese Yen) at the time of the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO; (2) 
Leverage, which is defined as total assets minus net assets divided by total assets at the time 
of the fiscal year end just prior to the IPO; (3) Tokyo, which is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the company is located in Tokyo, and zero otherwise. Geographic proximity of 
the company to potential VC investors facilitates knowledge acquisition and transfer and 
promotes the formation of network ties (Sorenson and Stuart, 2008). In Japan, VC firms are 
highly concentrated in Tokyo and we therefore expect that companies located in Tokyo can 
more easily access VC funds;24 and (4) subsidiary dummy is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the company is subsidiary of parent company. 
Start-ups with high growth potential are more likely to receive VC financing. Thus, as a 
proxy for the start-up’s growth potential, we include a stock options dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if the company has adopted stock option plans when the company is 
private, and zero otherwise. 
23 We do not identify the time dimension between loans and investments from banks due to a limitation of the 
data on IPO firms in their private period. 
24 This idea is similar to the California and Massachusetts dummy used in previous literature (e.g., Hellmann et 
al., 2008; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). 
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We also include the following additional control variables. JASDAQ, which is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the company is been listed on JASDAQ, and zero 
otherwise. This variable is the ‘subsequent outcomes’ (Hellmann et al., 2008). Thus, it might 
not be cause of VC financing, but consequence. Stock exchange listed the company, however, 
is represent the characteristics of companies thus we include this variable in the specification 
of VC financing. Hellmann et al. (2008) use IPO dummy, which is a dummy variable if the 
company went public.25 We also include the industry dummies (i.e., IT/communication, 
retail, service, and other industries) based on the TSE industry classifications. Finally, we add 
investor fixed effects to capture investor-specific characteristics such as differences in VC 
firms’ investment strategies. 
 
4.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3-1 provides the descriptive statistics for variables used in the main regression 
analysis. The unit of observation is company-investor pairs. As the table indicates, 
approximately 9.4% of the observations have the value of one for affiliated VC financing, and 
4.3% of the observations have the value of one for prior affiliation. In Hellmann et al. (2008), 
5.5% of variables of the dependent variable equal to one and 2.6% of variables of the 
independent variable of interest equal to one, before restricting the companies with complete 
information that is used in the main regressions. Our sample is slightly more balanced 
between zero and one values. 
[Insert Table 3-1 here] 
 
The correlation matrix of all independent variables is also shown in Table 3-1. The 
correlations among the variables of company age, total assets, leverage, and JASDAQ are 
25 We do not use IPO dummy because our sample consists of IPO companies. 
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slightly higher (the absolute correlation is more than 0.5) than that among other variables. 
The correlation matrix, however, indicates low correlations among independent variables.26 
Thus, we do not need to be concerned with a potential multicollinearity problem in our 
multivariate analysis. 
As a preliminary examination, we compare the characteristics of companies that received 
financing from BVCs, SVCs, CVCs and IVCs. Following previous literature (e.g., Hellmann 
et al., 2008; Dushnitsky and Shapira, 2010), we set IVCs as the base group and compare it 
with the characteristics of each captive VC firm. Table 3-2 provides descriptive statistics for 
this comparison where each subsample is mutually exclusive and companies are categorized 
based on the affiliation of the lead VC firm. , such as companies whose lead VC firm is a 
governmental VC firm, are excluded. We find significant differences in characteristics of 
companies across types of VC firms. BVC firms invest in larger companies, in terms of total 
assets, and BVC-backed companies tend to have higher leverage. This implies that there is 
lending relationships between companies and banks. If BVCs are not willing to take risks, we 
expect that BVCs invest in less risky industry. Consistent with this expectation, BVCs invest 
in less IT/communication industry. BVCs invest companies whose headquarter is located 
outside Tokyo. This result is consistent with Hellmann et al. (2008) who find that BVCs are 
more active outside the cluster states in the U.S. (i.e., California and Massachusetts). 
Companies with BVCs are less likely to grant stock options before the IPO. This implies that 
BVCs invest in companies with less risky and fewer growth opportunities. Companies have 
long history from founding to their IPOs. Regarding to subsequent outcomes, we compare the 
exit market.27 Companies with BVCs are more likely to go public on the JASDAQ which is 
the stock exchange for relatively larger and mature companies compared to other emerging 
26 The percentage of VC firms’ share holdings is highly correlated (the correlation is 0.7) with the number of 
VC firms. Thus, we do not include the value of VC firms’ shareholdings from my analysis. 
27 In this study, we only use IPO samples. Thus, we compare the exit IPO market, and not consider other exit 
rout, such as merger and acquisition. 
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stock exchanges in Japan. Our results confirm that BVCs are risk-averse, as previous studies 
assume. 
[Insert Table 3-2 here] 
 
5. Results 
Our main analysis examines prior affiliation using a sample of IPO firms with prior 
affiliation to mitigate the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity (Hellmann et al., 2008). We 
find that 176 companies satisfy the two criteria. As a robustness check, we later relax these 
two criteria and use our entire sample of 382 companies. 
 
5.1. The effect of prior affiliation on financing from affiliated investor 
Table 3-3 presents the results from the probit regressions in which the dependent variable 
is affiliated VC financing. We report the estimated coefficients and standard errors clustered 
at the company level. In column (1), using the limited sample of companies that meet the 
criteria, we find that prior affiliation is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that companies with board members who have worked for a specific firm are more 
likely to receive financing from the affiliated investor. Furthermore, this result is not only 
statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. The probability of affiliated VC 
financing increases 3.8% and becomes 6.0% when we change the value of prior affiliation 
from zero to one and set other independent variables at their mean. These findings support 
hypothesis 1. Note that the lending relationship is statistically significant, suggesting that 
companies that borrow from the lender are more likely to receive financing from the lender’s 
subsidiary VC firm. Furthermore, higher leverage is also positively related the likelihood of 
VC financing. We also find that the likelihood of affiliate financing increases with the size 
(Ln(total assets)) of the company. 
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In order to investigate the effects of the organization of VC firms, we include dummy 
variables that represent the organizational types of each VC firm (e.g., BVC, SVC, and CVC 
firms) in column (2), we find that prior affiliation in BVCs and prior affiliation in CVCs are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result means that if there is a board 
member on a start-up with prior affiliation to a BVC (CVC) firm, this start-up is more likely 
to receive financing from that BVC (CVC) firm. In columns (3) and (4) we conduct our 
analysis using the entire sample of 382 VC-backed IPOs. The effect of prior affiliate 
relationship remains unchanged and statistically significant compared to the results in 
columns (1) and (2). 
[Insert Table 3-3 here] 
 
As an additional robustness check of our probit model, we use a conditional logit model, 
including company fixed effects that can control for the company-specific factors. Table 3-4 
reports the results of the conditional logit regressions. Note that the variables that are constant 
across company-investor pairs are dropped. Column (1) reports the result of the entire sample 
with company fixed effects. The coefficient of prior affiliation is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The results of signs and significance are essentially unchanged 
from those reported in Table 3-3; the coefficient of prior affiliation of BVC firms and CVC 
firms are statistically significant. 
Overall, the evidence from the regressions suggests that prior affiliation has a positive 
impact on the subsequent financing from the affiliated firms or their subsidiary VC firms. 
Specifically, prior affiliate relationship works effectively in BVC firms, and even more so in 
CVC firms. These findings provide support for hypothesis 2. These results are consistent with 
evidence that BVC firms and CVC firms are more risk averse than other organizational 
structures of VC firms (e.g., Dushnitsky and Shapira, 2010; Hellmann et al., 2008; Nahata, 
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2008). One possible explanation for the stronger prior affiliate relationship effect in CVC firms 
is that the investor and the director who has worked in the firm have experienced the same 
corporate culture and can communicate with each other using the same language about the 
company-specific knowledge (Beckman, 2006). Thus, the prior affiliate relationship may work 
more effectively for the companies with technologies that are difficult to be evaluated by 
outside investors. CVC firms typically have strategic objectives that are related to the profits of 
the parent firms. They can evaluate the value of the technologies of the start-up correctly. 
Furthermore, the start-ups are willing to receive investments from the investor that has an 
understanding of the technology. Another possible explanation for the results is that CVC firms 
may be more likely to rely on the prior affiliate relationship due to the lack of investment 
experience compared with other organizational types of VC firms. If so, the significant positive 
impact for bank-affiliated VC firms can also account for a lack of investment experience. 
[Insert Table 3-4 here] 
 
5.2. The effect of prior affiliation on board-member engagement 
The evidence from our analysis thus far shows the significance and effectiveness of prior 
affiliation in obtaining VC financing. We next examine whether investment by a VC firm in a 
start-up leads to board membership. To identify the causal effects, we perform the same 
regression as in Equation (1); however, the dependent variable, affiliated VC financing, is 
replaced with affiliated board member, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
a company has a board member, including outside directors that have work experience in a 
specific investor, and zero otherwise. The affiliated board member variable differs from the 
affiliate VC financing variable in that the affiliated board member is replaced with zero if the 
VC firm invests in the start-up after the board member with prior affiliate relationship with 
the VC firm has entered the start-up. We expect that if there is the path of the prior affiliate 
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relationship effect on bringing VC firm employees to the start-up board, the coefficient of 
affiliated VC financing should be positive. 
Table 3-5 reports the results of the probit regression model. Columns (1) and (2) define 
board members as only insiders. We broadly define the members and include outsiders and 
auditors in columns (3) and (4). In column (1), the coefficient of affiliated VC financing is 
significant at the 1% level. However, once the organizational types are taken into account in 
column (2), we find that the coefficient of BVC investment is insignificant and the coefficient 
for CVC investment is significant. Furthermore, in column (3) and (4), the results that the 
board members include outside directors and auditors show the direction of the prior affiliate 
relationship effect is not observed in BVCs and CVCs, except for the subsample of CVC 
firms. 
[Insert Table 3-5 here] 
 
As shown in Table 3-6, when we use a conditional logit model with company fixed effects, 
we find similar results to those in Table 3-5. The significantly positive coefficient in CVC 
firms remains unchanged. These results provide support for hypothesis 3 but only for our 
subsample of CVC firms. 
[Insert Table 3-6 here] 
 
In sum, the results show that for CVC firms prior affiliation is effective in bringing VC 
firm employees to the board of the start-up. This finding is consistent with the notion that 
Japanese VC investments made by affiliated VC firms tend to involve less monitoring by the 
VC firm, and that it is in the start-up selection process where the VC firm identifies and 
invests in companies that are more stable, consistent with Japanese VC firms’ risk-averse 
attitude. 
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 5.3. The effect of affiliate investment on IPO performance 
We next examine the consequences of affiliate investment using several variables which 
are related to the IPO performance: underwriting fee, initial return, liquidation, and 
acquisition. Underwriting fee is calculated as the percentage of the offer price minus the 
underwriting price relative to the underwriting price. Initial return is calculated as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the closing price of the first day of trading, 
following the standard definition used in previous literatures. Failure is a dummy variable 
that tales the value of one if the company delists caused by liquidation within five years after 
the IPO, and zero otherwise.28 Information on underwriting fee is obtained from the IPO 
prospectus. Information on stock price and delisting are obtained from the Nikkei database. 
 
5.3.1. Univariate tests 
Table 3-7 provides univariate comparisons of IPO performances between companies with 
affiliate investment and two control groups. One control group is companies that have board 
members with affiliate relationship but have not received financing from the VC firms; the 
other is companies without affiliate investment. The table shows that all performance 
measurements are insignificant, except for the underwriting fee. The mean underwriting fee 
for companies with affiliate investment is 7.8%. This is significantly lower than the mean 
underwriting fee for those companies that meet the criteria for affiliate investment but do not 
have affiliate investment, and for companies without affiliate investment. The mean of the 
initial return is also lower for controls but the differences are statistically insignificant. The 
failure rate is higher for companies with affiliate investment but the difference is 
insignificant.  
28 The period of five years is widely used in previous literature. The period of three years is also used as a 
robustness check. Our sample of delisting firms is too small with a three year period so we do not include this 
analysis. 
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[Insert Table 3-7 here] 
 
5.3.2. Multivariate regressions 
Table 3-8 reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions that examine the 
effects of affiliate investment, where, in the first two columns, the dependent variable is 
underwriting fee. The dependent variable in the last two columns is initial return. In all 
models, the primary variable of interest here is the affiliated investment dummy, which takes 
on the value of one if the company receives VC financing from a VC firm with which a board 
member of the company has a prior affiliation, and zero otherwise. The regression also 
includes control variables that may affect IPO costs; Ln(total assets), Ln(issue size), Average 
of initial returns in prior thirty days, and Prior thirty day JASDAQ index return. These 
control variables strongly predict IPO initial returns (Butler, Keefe, and Kieschnick, 2014).29 
We also include industry and IPO year dummies. 
We find that the coefficient of affiliated investment is positive but statistically insignificant, 
indicating that affiliated VC backing is not associated with lower underwriting fee. This 
insignificant effect is unchanged even if we divide the organizational types of VC firms. 
In column (3), we find little evidence that the affiliate investment reduces the initial return. 
Additionally, we further examine the effect of the affiliate investment in more detail by 
including dummy variables of VCs’ organization in the column (4). We find that the SVC 
investment is negative and significant at the 10% level. This indicates that if the company has 
one or more directors on its board that has a prior affiliation with a SVC firm, initial return is 
further reduced. On the other hand, CVC investment is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. This indicates that if a company receives financing from the CVCs with which there is 
a prior affiliation, initial return is much greater. This finding is consistent with the ‘cost of 
29 We confirm that total assets predict better than sales in Japanese IPO market. Thus, we use total assets one of 
a series of control variables. 
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friendship’ theory proposed by Gompers, Mukharlyamov, and Xuan (2014) where 
affiliation-based financing where homophily exists could lead to poor decision-making and 
reduced investment success. Within the context of our study, investors seek to get 
compensated for this risk through greater IPO initial returns. 
[Insert Table 3-8 here] 
 
We then examine the affiliate investment effect on post-IPO performance by considering 
startup failure rates, measured by delisting due to financial distress after the IPO.30 Table 3-9 
reports the results of probit regressions. The variable of SVC investment is dropped because 
there is no case that companies with affiliate investment with SVCs delist within five years 
after the IPO. We include Founder and Reputable underwriters dummies. The results, in 
column (1), show that the coefficient on affiliate investment is positive but insignificant. This 
suggests that there is no significant difference in post-IPO performance between companies 
that receive affiliate investment and those that do not. In column (2), the coefficient for BVC 
investment, however, is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result 
suggests that BVCs are worse at screening and/or monitoring when they invest using 
affiliation relationship. In columns (3) and (4), we examine the merger after the IPO. 
However, we do not find any significant relationship. 
In sum, the results suggest that the affiliated VC backing, when provided by BVC firms, 
lead to less monitoring and poorer screening. The costs of affiliate relationship may exceed 
the benefits of it. These results are consistent with the results of Bengtsson and Hsu (2013).  
[Insert Table 3-9 here] 
 
30 We examine the event for five years after the IPO because there are few events when we limit the span for 
three years. 
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6. Conclusion 
The success of a start-up is often dependent on its ability to acquire external financing to 
grow. Venture capital firms provide a significant proportion of the financing for these firms. 
However, because of the information-asymmetric environment in which they operate, VC 
firms require compensation commensurate with the risk inherent in these ventures. Research 
has shown that certain attributes of the start-up or the start-up-VC firm relationship, such as 
industry specialization and geographic proximity, can reduce information asymmetry and 
thus lead to a greater likelihood of receiving financing. 
In this study, we examine another such attribute - prior affiliation of the start-up’s board 
member to a VC firm. We examine this attribute in the context of resource investment (e.g., 
financing, board-membership engagement) likelihood as well as IPO costs and the 
subsequent performance. We find that start-ups with board members who have prior 
affiliations attract financial investments from the affiliated VC firms. This prior affiliation 
effect is more pronounced in bank-affiliated VC firms and CVC firms, while it is less 
pronounced for SVC firms. In addition, for CVC firms, prior affiliation increases the 
likelihood that a start-up will recruit new board member from the affiliated investor. Unlike 
in the US, VC financing does not seem to increase the likelihood of board membership for an 
employee of the VC firm in other types of VCs. Perhaps this is consistent with the view that 
Japanese VC firms do not monitor their investments as closely as their US counterparts, at 
least from a board membership perspective. These results are robust to controlling for 
company characteristics, industry, and investor- and company-fixed effects. This finding is 
consistent with the theory that prior affiliation serves as an information asymmetry reducing 
mechanism for the start-up. We also find that start-ups that receive financing from VC firms 
with which they have an affiliation tend to be less underpriced. This finding is consistent with 
the theory that these VC firms play a certification role in the IPO process, and that investors 
 
 
67 
view this form of certification to be stronger than for VC-backed companies that do not 
receive financing from affiliated VC firms. We further examine the effect of the affiliate 
investment on IPO performance. Consistent with Bengtsson and Hsu (2013) and Gompers, 
Mukharlyamov, and Xuan (2014), we find that companies with affiliate investment have 
higher failure rate within five years after the IPO. The results imply that the cost of the 
relationship leads to less screening and monitoring efforts, and exceeds the benefits of the 
affiliated relationship. 
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Figure 3-1 
Overall framework 
 
 
  
Prior affiliation 
(between board member 
and investor) 
Financial investment 
(e.g., venture financing) 
Human-resource investment 
(e.g., board-member 
engagement) 
IPO performance 
(e.g., reduced IPO cost,  
post-IPO survival) 
Affiliation type (e.g., bank, corporate, securities-based) 
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Table 3-1 
Descriptive statistics of company characteristics and correlation matrix of the variables 
 
 
Table 3-2 
Characteristics of the difference in investment activities among VC types 
  
Variable Mean Std.dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Affiliated VC financing 0.094 0.292 1.000
2 Prior affiliate relationship 0.043 0.204 0.147 1.000
3 Loan 0.051 0.219 0.281 0.150 1.000
4 Ln(total assets) 7.864 1.293 0.047 -0.001 0.154 1.000
5 Leverage 0.573 0.242 0.004 -0.011 0.159 0.603 1.000
6 Tokyo 0.688 0.464 -0.005 0.006 -0.031 -0.188 -0.178 1.000
7 Subsidiary 0.222 0.415 -0.009 0.015 -0.045 -0.025 -0.129 0.212 1.000
8 Stock options 0.778 0.415 0.011 0.011 -0.049 -0.351 -0.267 0.231 0.054 1.000
9 Ln(company age) 4.842 0.815 0.029 -0.009 0.073 0.593 0.353 -0.286 -0.131 -0.454 1.000
10 JASDAQ 0.352 0.478 -0.002 -0.004 0.074 0.548 0.334 -0.170 -0.050 -0.408 0.557 1.000
Number of observations = 5,632
IVC-backed
companies (N = 48)
Variable Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean
Ln(total assets) 8.193 0.872 *** 7.818 0.497 ** 7.431 0.110 7.321
Leverage 0.653 0.153 *** 0.580 0.080 * 0.504 0.004 0.500
IT/Communication 0.157 -0.239 *** 0.286 -0.110 0.386 -0.009 0.396
Tokyo 0.528 -0.201 ** 0.557 -0.172 * 0.750 0.021 0.729
Subsidiary 0.056 -0.173 *** 0.129 -0.101 0.364 0.134 0.229
Stock options 0.607 -0.247 *** 0.829 -0.026 0.932 0.078 0.854
Ln(company age) 5.298 0.591 *** 4.909 0.202 4.688 -0.018 4.706
JASDAQ 0.596 0.429 *** 0.314 0.148 * 0.205 0.038 0.167
Bank-affiliated VC-backed
companies (N = 89)
Securities firm-affiliated
VC-backed companies (N
= 70)
CVC-backed companies (N
= 44)
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Table 3-3 
The effect of prior affiliate relationship on affiliated VC financing 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior affiliate relationship 0.596*** 0.622***
(0.104) (0.093)
Prior affiliation in BVCs 0.557*** 0.562***
(0.148) (0.144)
Prior affiliation in SVCs 0.345* 0.342*
(0.207) (0.207)
Prior affiliation in CVCs 0.817*** 0.833***
(0.183) (0.174)
Loan 0.789*** 0.793*** 1.329*** 0.849***
(0.127) (0.128) (0.069) (0.087)
Ln(total assets) 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.102*** 0.125***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.024) (0.027)
Leverage -0.477*** -0.490*** -0.561*** -0.541***
(0.182) (0.181) (0.106) (0.119)
Tokyo 0.010 0.013 -0.070 -0.072
(0.080) (0.080) (0.047) (0.052)
Subsidiary -0.059 -0.066 -0.011 -0.032
(0.088) (0.089) (0.064) (0.071)
Stock options 0.147 0.143 0.097* 0.106
(0.097) (0.098) (0.059) (0.065)
Ln(company age) 0.066 0.067 -0.025 -0.033
(0.060) (0.061) (0.036) (0.040)
JASDAQ -0.156 -0.162 -0.094 -0.102
(0.102) (0.103) (0.063) (0.069)
Constant -2.703*** -2.711*** -1.866*** -2.113***
(0.413) (0.414) (0.243) (0.290)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,632 5,632 12,224 12,224
Number of companies 176 176 382 382
Pseudo R -squared 0.229 0.230 0.0910 0.223
Dependent variable:
Affiliated VC financing
Companies with affiliate
relationship
Entire sample
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Table 3-4 
The effect of prior affiliate relationship on affiliated VC financing: Company fixed 
effects 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior affiliate relationship 1.037*** 1.043***
(0.206) (0.207)
Prior affiliation in BVCs 0.820*** 0.832***
(0.292) (0.289)
Prior affiliation in SVCs 0.651 0.606
(0.424) (0.438)
Prior affiliation in CVCs 1.689*** 1.720***
(0.376) (0.366)
Loan 1.506*** 1.523*** 1.723*** 1.732***
(0.245) (0.246) (0.165) (0.166)
Investor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,344 5,344 11,488 11,488
Number of companies 167 167 359 359
Pseudo R -squared 0.282 0.284 0.279 0.281
Dependent variable:
Affiliated VC financing
Companies with affiliate
relationship
Entire sample
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Table 3-5 
The effect of affiliated VC involvement 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior affiliate investment 0.134 0.354***
(0.113) (0.090)
BVC investment -0.193 0.021
(0.186) (0.152)
SVC investment -0.148 0.134
(0.234) (0.175)
CVC investment 0.780*** 1.047***
(0.173) (0.158)
Loan 0.843*** 0.909*** 0.720*** 0.784***
(0.125) (0.131) (0.111) (0.113)
Ln(total assets) -0.014 -0.019 -0.009 -0.015
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
Leverage -0.255*** -0.246*** -0.200** -0.181*
(0.090) (0.095) (0.101) (0.104)
Tokyo 0.007 0.000 0.046 0.034
(0.045) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050)
Subsidiary 0.101** 0.085* 0.121** 0.112**
(0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050)
Stock options 0.042 0.034 0.094* 0.087
(0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.054)
Ln(company age) -0.021 -0.013 -0.036 -0.027
(0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036)
JASDAQ 0.029 0.034 -0.012 -0.003
(0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052)
Constant -1.908*** -1.870*** -1.670*** -1.625***
(0.277) (0.284) (0.259) (0.266)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Investor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,456 5,456 5,456 5,456
Number of companies 176 176 176 176
Pseudo R -squared 0.0881 0.0998 0.110 0.122
Dependent variable:
Affiliated board members
Only insiders
Including outsiders and
auditors
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Table 3-6 
The effect of affiliated VC backing on the VC involvement: Company fixed effects 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prior affiliate investment 0.219 0.642***
(0.263) (0.197)
BVC investment -0.487 -0.027
(0.391) (0.307)
SVC investment -0.371 0.226
(0.541) (0.362)
CVC investment 1.645*** 2.088***
(0.351) (0.315)
Loan 1.848*** 1.997*** 1.447*** 1.585***
(0.303) (0.312) (0.245) (0.246)
Investor dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,632 5,632 5,632 5,632
Number of companies 176 176 176 176
Pseudo R -squared 0.117 0.134 0.136 0.154
Dependent variable:
Affiliated board members
Only insiders
Including outsiders and
auditors
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Table 3-7 
The univariate comparisons for IPO performance 
 
Variable
Number of
companies
Mean
Number of
companies
Mean Difference
Number of
companies
Mean Difference
Underwriting fee 68 7.8% 115 8.0% -0.2% ** 313 7.9% -0.1%
Initial return 68 96.2% 116 106.3% -10.1% 314 101.7% -5.5%
Failure within 5 years 68 0.060 116 0.028 0.03 314 0.041 0.02
Companies with affiliate
investments
Companies that have the affilaite
relationship and without affiliate
investments
Companies without affiliate
investments
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Table 3-8 
The effects of affiliate investment on IPO costs 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affiliate investment 0.101 6.079
(0.073) (13.117)
BVC investment 0.125 -1.179
(0.092) (16.546)
SVC investment 0.127 -56.256*
(0.163) (29.169)
CVC investment 0.055 49.395**
(0.131) (23.425)
Ln(total assets) -0.126*** -0.129*** -17.561*** -17.487***
(0.032) (0.033) (5.750) (5.808)
Ln(issue size) -0.159*** -0.159*** -13.022** -12.323**
(0.034) (0.034) (6.075) (6.031)
JASDAQ -0.844*** -0.845*** -8.648 -9.050
(0.067) (0.067) (11.966) (11.898)
Avg. initial returns prior 30 days 0.486*** 0.475***
(0.087) (0.087)
Prior 30 day JASDAQ index 67.111*** 66.998***
(16.774) (16.658)
Constant 11.305*** 11.318*** 382.885*** 377.650***
(0.429) (0.430) (78.115) (77.685)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
IPO year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 381 381 382 382
Adjusted R -squared 0.541 0.540 0.258 0.269
Dependent variable:
Underwriting fee (%) Initial return (%)
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Table 3-9 
The effects of affiliate investment on post-IPO performance 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Affiliate investment 0.765 0.424
(0.494) (0.301)
BVC investment 1.482** 0.796**
(0.634) (0.344)
CVC investment 1.044 0.493
(0.772) (0.611)
Leverage 1.708 1.649 0.608 0.500
(1.119) (1.186) (0.597) (0.609)
Subsidiary 0.015 0.040 -0.628 -0.644
(0.575) (0.628) (0.466) (0.496)
Ln(company age) -0.544* -0.897** -0.455*** -0.532***
(0.302) (0.397) (0.165) (0.176)
Constant -0.248 1.156 0.339 0.723
(1.215) (1.513) (0.801) (0.849)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 133 133 382 382
Pseudo R -squared 0.140 0.234 0.106 0.134
Dependent variable: Failure
within 5 years after the IPO
Companies with affiliate
investments
Entire sample
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Appendix 3-A 
List of potential pool of outside investors 
 
  
Type Investor name
1 SVC Ant Capital Partners Co., Ltd.
2 BVC Aozora Investment Co., Ltd.
3 BVC Chuo Mitsui Capital Co.,Ltd
4 SVC Daiwa Corporate Investment Co.,Ltd.
5 CVC docomo.com
6 CVC HIKARI Private Equity, Inc.
7 SVC Ichiyoshi Securities Co., Ltd.
8 CVC iSigma Capital Corporation
9 CVC ITOCHU Technology Ventures. Inc.
10 CVC ITX Corporation
11 SVC JAFCO Co., Ltd.; Nomura Securities Co., Ltd.
12 CVC KIZUNA CAPITAL PARTNERS Co., Ltd.
13 BVC Mitsubishi UFJ Capital Co., Ltd.; The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.
14 CVC Mitsui & Co. Global Investment Ltd.
15 BVC Mizuho Capital Co.,Ltd.
16 SVC Mizuho Securities Investment Services Co., Ltd.
17 SVC MU Hands-on Capital Ltd.
18 SVC Okasan Venture Capital Co., Ltd.
19 CVC ORIX Capital Corporation.
20 CVC Recruit Holdings Co.,Ltd.
21 BVC Resona Capital Co., Ltd.
22 CVC SBI Investment Co., Ltd.
23 BVC Shinsei Bank, Limited
24 BVC SMBC Venture Capital; Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation
25 BVC The Chugin Lease Company, Limited
26 BVC The Hokkaido Bank, Ltd.
27 BVC The Tokyo Tomin Bank, Limited
28 CVC transcosmos inc.
29 CVC Venture Link Co., Ltd.
30 BVC Yamaguchi Capital
31 BVC Yokohama Capital
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 Chapter 4: Affiliation ties and underwriter selection 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the determinant of an initial public offering (IPO) underwriting mandate. 
As a determinant, I focus on affiliation ties, which are the relationships between issuers’ 
board members and underwriters that these members have worked with. Using board 
members’ biographical information, I find that the presence of board members who have 
worked at a specific bank or its parent company increases the probability of them selecting 
the bank as a lead underwriter. The effect is more pronounced in bank-affiliated securities 
firms and when firms with small-sized issues choose more prestigious underwriters. On the 
other hand, I find little evidence that affiliation ties reduce underwriting spreads, initial 
returns, or failure rates. 
 
Keywords: underwriters; affiliation; IPOs; board of directors 
JEL classification: G24 
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1. Introduction 
Selecting an underwriter is one of the most important decisions for initial public offering 
(IPO) issuers. Underwriters play an important role in coaching, marketing, pricing, and 
distributing an IPO. These underwriting services enhance the “going public” process (e.g., 
Brau and Fawcett, 2006). For underwriters, winning an IPO underwriting mandate is 
important not only for underwriting revenue but also for attracting future business. Previous 
studies have examined the determinants of underwriter selection through surveys of chief 
financial officers (CFOs) (Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001; Brau and Fawcett, 2006; Brau, 
Ryan, and DeGraw, 2006) and data on the various relationships between issuers and 
underwriters (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm, 2006; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and 
Srinivasan, 2007).31 However, these studies did not focus on the social ties that could affect 
corporate decisions (e.g., Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider, 2010; Engelberg, Gao, and 
Parsons, 2012; Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and Krishnan, 2014). 
As a determinant of the underwriter selection, I focus on “affiliation ties,” defined as 
relationships between issuers’ board members and a particular securities firm or its parent 
company that the member had worked with, and I examine two research questions.32 First, I 
examine the effects of affiliation ties on the probability of the underwriter being selected as a 
lead IPO underwriter or syndicate member and avoiding the selection of the underwriter’s 
rival banks. Second, I examine the effects of affiliation ties on IPO performance. 
To identify affiliation ties, I link board members’ work experience in banks to the banks by 
collecting board members’ biographical information from the prospectuses of Japanese IPO 
firms between 2004 and 2008. The findings of this study can be summarized as follows. I 
31 Drucker and Puri (2005) and Yasuda (2005) use data on the issuer-underwriter relationships and examine 
SEO and corporate-bond underwritings. 
32  In this paper, I use the term “affiliation ties” instead of “work experience” to distinguish the 
issuer-underwriter relationship from simple work experience such as a board member’s previous work 
experience in the financial industry. The latter does not consider the relationship between the issuer and a 
specific financial institution. 
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find that having a board member who has affiliation ties to a particular bank positively affects 
the likelihood of the firm choosing that bank as the lead underwriter. The economic effects 
are larger than those of the debt and equity relationships between issuers and underwriters (or 
their parent company). These results are robust when considering the strengths of the ties. 
Second, the effect of affiliation ties is more pronounced in bank-affiliated securities firms 
than in independent ones and when firms with small-sized issues choose more reputable 
underwriters. I also find that affiliation ties to a particular bank positively affect the 
likelihood that the bank will be selected as a syndicate member and negatively affect the 
likelihood of the underwriter’s rival underwriters being selected. Finally, when IPO firms 
choose an underwriter that has affiliation ties, I find little evidence that affiliation ties are 
associated with lower underwriting fees, underpricing, or IPO failure rates. 
These findings contribute to the literature in two ways. First, this study contributes to the 
research on underwriter selection. While previous studies have examined the impact of 
lending relationships on underwriter selection (e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005; Yasuda, 2005; 
Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Bharath et al., 2007), I provide evidence that the effects of affiliation 
ties are economically larger than those of lending relationships. Drucker and Puri (2007) 
discuss the issue of investment banks’ survival and provide one possibility that helps 
investment bankers to survive: lending relationships. The findings from the Japanese IPO 
market provide implications for other countries, that is, underwriters win business by relying 
on social ties. This paper is closely related to that of Cooney Jr., Madureira, Singh, and Yang 
(2014), which examines the effect of interpersonal social ties between IPO firms and 
investment banks or two investment banks within a syndicate and finds that the presence of a 
personal relationship increases the probability that an investment bank is chosen as a book 
manager or syndicate member. 33  While Cooney Jr. et al. (2014) use the measure of 
33 According to their study, however, Cooney Jr. et al.’s (2014) interest is to examine the role of social ties in 
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interpersonal relationships, which is similar to that used by Engelberg et al. (2012)—the 
linkage between executive or director of issuers and those of book managers in terms of 
school connections, past jobs, and board membership connections—my measure (i.e., 
affiliation ties) is different from any existing literature. Furthermore, unlike Cooney Jr. et al. 
(2014), I consider the strength of the tie in various ways. 
Second, my study also contributes to the literature on social networks. Previous studies 
have found that social networks in finance are beneficial for influencing lending terms 
(Engelberg et al., 2012), attracting venture capital (VC) financing (Shane and Cable, 2002; 
Shane and Stuart, 2002), and M&A transactions (Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014). 
I provide evidence that the affiliation ties, which involve social networks, positively affect 
corporate decisions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
data and presents summary statistics. I then explain my empirical methods and provide the 
main results in Section 4. Section 5 provides the results of additional analyses. Section 6 
examines the economic benefits of affiliation ties. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
The process of selecting an underwriter, the first step in going public, has received much 
attention from academics and practitioners. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000) explain that 
the choice is a function of an investment banker’s reputation, expertise, and quality of 
research in a specific industry. Draho (2004) summarizes the factors of underwriter selection 
as follows: (1) issuing costs minimization, (2) receiving a lot of attention through analyst 
coverage, (3) earning a higher status among investors through the underwriter’s reputation 
and certification, (4) information specialization, and (5) getting external monitoring. Drucker 
securing a place in IPO underwriting syndicates rather than the underwriter selection issues between issuers and 
underwriters. 
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and Puri (2007) summarize four papers on underwriter selection (i.e., Drucker and Puri, 
2005; Yasuda, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2006, Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 
2007) and conclude that lending relationships between issuers and underwriters are important 
when selecting an underwriter. 
Existing research on underwriter selection has two streams. One includes studies that use 
data and surveys from corporate decision makers (Krigman et al., 2001; Brau and Fawcett, 
2006; Brau et al., 2006). Krigman et al. (2001) ask CFOs about their reasons for choosing 
their IPO lead underwriter and find that (1) reputation and status, (2) the quality of the 
research department or analyst, and (3) the industry expertise of the IPO lead underwriter are 
cited as the top three reasons for selecting a lead underwriter. The other stream is studies that 
use an empirical approach based on a large amount of data on issuer-underwriter relationships 
(e.g., Drucker and Puri, 2005; Yasuda, 2005; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Ljungqvist et al. (2006) 
find that there is no evidence that analyst behaviors influence winning either debt or equity 
underwriting mandates, but prior underwriting and lending relationships determine a bank’s 
likelihood of attracting underwriters. These existing studies examine underwriter selection in 
the context of several types of underwriting services: IPO, SEO, and corporate-bond 
underwritings. My paper involves the latter stream and focuses on IPO underwriting since it 
is typically the first public offering of any security and it is a way to build subsequent 
relationships between firms and underwriters. 
However, although the importance of social ties has been studied, little is known about 
whether these resources affect underwriter selection, except for Cooney Jr. et al.’s study 
(2014), which examines the effect of social ties on the composition of syndicate members. 
Recent studies provide some evidence that social ties could affect corporate decisions. For 
instance, in the context of credit markets, Engelberg et al. (2012) find that personal 
relationships between borrowers and lenders affect lending terms, and they argue that 
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personal relationships are the original determinants of a firm’s financing partners. 
Chemmanur, Ertugrul, and Krishnan (2014), in the context of M&A, find that an investment 
banker’s deal experience is most important, not the investment bank’s reputation. In addition, 
Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2010) find a positive relationship between bankers on the 
boards of large firms and M&A advisory services. Affiliation ties can be expected to solve 
information asymmetry between issuers and underwriters. Further, affiliation ties could affect 
familiarity. Thus, I first test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with affiliation ties to a particular bank are more likely to select that 
bank as a lead IPO underwriter. 
 
Drucker and Puri (2005) and Yasuda (2005) study one-sided decisions where issuers 
choose a particular underwriter from a set of potential underwriters. Contrary to those studies, 
Fernando et al. (2005, 2013) argue that this one-sided choice is not suitable in the real world; 
they introduce a more natural model based on the view that underwriter selection is 
determined by mutual choice between issuers and underwriters. Once a firm decides to issue 
equity, it must choose an underwriter. At the same time, the underwriters must choose which 
issuers to serve. Fernando et al. (2005, 2013) find that higher quality issuers associate with 
more reputable underwriters and vice versa.34 
Underwriters have a variety of issuers seeking their services. More reputable underwriters 
have many potential issuers, and they can choose the profitable deals among them. Issuers 
look to the ability of underwriters, and underwriters look to the characteristics of the issuers. 
More reputable underwriters are more likely to underwrite firms with large-sized issues. If 
affiliation ties reduce information asymmetry, and this leads to lower underwriter due 
34 Fernando et al. (2005, 2013) use the term “quality” to mean and issuer’s characteristics, such as issue size, 
how the issuing will be done, and the probability of issuer survival. 
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diligence costs, more reputable underwriters are able to underwrite firms with small-sized 
issues, which would usually not be accepted by reputable underwriters due to the cost-benefit. 
Thus, I test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of affiliation ties on underwriter selection is more pronounced 
among reputable underwriters and firms with small-sized issues. 
 
I next investigate the economic benefits for issuers. A few existing studies examine the 
effects of prior relationships on loan pricing or issuing costs. Drucker and Puri (2005) find 
that concurrent lending relationships lead to lower underwriting spreads due to informational 
economies of scope from combining lending and equity underwriting. Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2009) also find that lender-borrower relationships lead to a lower 
cost of borrowing. In the previous literature, costs in the commercial bond market (e.g., 
Yasuda, 2005) or bank loans (e.g., Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri, 2008) are often examined, 
but the results of the analysis of underwriting spreads in the equity underwriting market are 
still unclear (Fernando et al., 2013). Brau and Fawcett (2006) also point out the possibility 
that CFOs accept the typical seven percent spread.35 
In VC financing or VC syndication settings, the effect of ties is unclear (Bengtsson, 2013; 
Bengtsson and Hsu, 2013). Gompers, Mukharlyamov, and Xuan (2014) explore the causes 
and consequences of VC syndication and find that affinity-related characteristics influence 
VC syndication, which leads to poor investment returns. This result suggests the “cost of 
friendship.” In the context of credit markets, Engelberg et al. (2012) find that personal 
relationships lead to better information flow. If the affiliation ties reduce information 
asymmetry, they will reduce a lead underwriter’s due diligence costs or be able to correctly 
35 Chen and Ritter (2000) find that gross spreads cluster exactly at seven percent. Abrahamson, Jenkinson, and 
Jones (2011) find that this seven percent clustering has become more prevalent. 
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evaluate information about issuers, leading to a minimum pricing error. Thus, I test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.1: Firms with affiliation ties are charged lower direct and indirect issuing costs 
when compared to firms without affiliation ties. 
 
Engelberg et al. (2012) have also found that personal relationships lead to better 
monitoring. The lead underwriter can use private information about the issuer’s quality 
through the affiliation ties and thus select high-quality issuers. These issuers might have high 
post-issue survival rates. Thus, I test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: Firms with affiliation ties have lower failure rates than firms without 
affiliation ties. 
 
3. Data and sample selection 
3.1. Data sources 
The IPO White Book reports 566 Japanese firms going public on stock exchanges for new 
ventures between 2004 and 2008, excluding the IPOs of financial companies.36 I further 
exclude second-time IPOs, IPOs underwritten by foreign investment banks, and IPOs only 
with board members who joined the firm three years after its founding and three years before 
the IPO. The sample period ends on December 2008 because of a few significant mergers in 
the Japanese underwriting industry in 2009.37 These mergers make it difficult to examine the 
36 I use IPOs listed in JASDAQ, Mothers, Hercules, Centrex, Ambitious, Q-Board, and NEO and exclude IPOs 
listed in the first or second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) because those tend to be larger in 
offering and firm sizes, for which underwriter selection will not be influenced by the firm’s decision. 
37 In May 2009, Shinko Securities merged with Mizuho Securities. In September 2009, Daiwa Securities and 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group decided to dissolve their joint venture in the wholesale business, and then 
Nikko Cordial Securities became a member of Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group in October 2009. 
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impacts of issuer-underwriter relationships on underwriter selection. After these restrictions, 
the sample comprises 556 IPOs. 
The issuer-specific data, including the lead underwriter, IPO proceeds, firm size, and age, 
also come from the IPO White Book. I obtain lending and shareholding data from Nikkei 
NEEDS Financial QUEST. In order to identify the links between board members and 
underwriters, I collect board members’ biographical information from IPO prospectuses.38 
To do so, I use only the board members who joined the firm from the founding year to three 
years before the IPO to reduce concerns about reverse causality; that is, the selected 
underwriters send board members to an issuer after the issuers selected the lead underwriter. 
In general, in Japan, the timing of underwriter selection is conducted two or three years prior 
to the IPO, unlike in the U.S., where it is conducted one year prior to the IPO (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist, 2001). 
 
3.2. Potential choices for the lead underwriter 
Estimating the likelihood of a particular underwriter being selected requires potential 
choices that are composed of a selected bank and its competitor that issuers can choose from. 
As potential choices, this study takes the top 10 underwriters measured by (1) the number of 
IPOs and (2) the cumulative total amount of IPO proceeds by each underwriter during the 
2004–2008 period.39 Appendix 4-A reports the underwriter ranking and shows that 10 
underwriters meet the two criteria above. As a result, I assume that each issuer has a total of 
11 potential choices, which comprise the 10 underwriters and a single choice of any of the 
38 To identify the affiliation ties, IPO prospectuses are a reliable information source compared with commercial 
databases in Japan, such as Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha. While the databases record only one work experience, IPO 
prospectuses report a series of work experiences for each board member, which enables us to identify the 
affiliation ties more precisely. For instance, I assume that a firm has a board member X who has worked for 
banks B1 and B2. In this case, member X has two affiliation ties between banks B1 and B2, respectively. 
However, if we only consider just one work experience, we accordingly ignore either the affiliation tie between 
X and B1 or between X and B2. 
39 I use the cumulative based market share rather than the year-by-year or rolling window based market shares 
because the number of IPOs was small in Japan from 2007–2008. If I accept the year-by-year or rolling window 
based calculations, it may lead to biases. 
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underwriters that are not ranked in the top 10.40 
Appendix 4-A also shows that the top 10 underwriters dominate a large share of the 
Japanese underwriting market (approximately 94% of the number of issues and 96% of the 
total amount of proceeds in my sample), especially with the largest three independent 
securities firms (i.e., Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko Securities Co. Ltd.) accounting for 47% and 
more than 70%, respectively. Additionally, the ranking of Kirkulak and Davis (2005), who 
investigate the underwriter ranking in Japan between 1998 and 2002, is similar to my ranking. 
Regarding the underwriting markets in the U.S., Bharath et al. (2007) report that the top 20 
underwriters dominated more than 95% of the equity and debt underwriting markets between 
1986 and 2001. 
In the following analysis, I use 122 IPO firms that have affiliation ties to the selected 
underwriters and their 1,342 issuer-underwriter pairs to mitigate the unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms with and without affiliation ties, but I also perform several 
analyses using the full sample to confirm the robustness. 
 
3.3. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Panel A of Table 4-1 provides summary statistics of the choice-specific and issuer-specific 
variables. The unit of observation is issuer-underwriter pairs. The choice-specific variables 
are CHOSEN, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the issuer chooses a particular 
underwriter as the lead underwriter; AFFILIATION, which is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if the issuer has board members who have prior work experience with the 
underwriter or its parent company; DURATION, which is the length of time that the member 
had worked with the banks measured in months; LENDING, which is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the underwriter’s parent bank lends to the issuer before the IPO; and 
40 Drucker and Puri (2005) assume 21 potential choices that include the top 20 underwriters and a single choice 
that is not ranked in the top 20. As the potential choices, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) set the 16 most active debt and 
equity lead underwriters based on the nominal proceeds. 
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SHAREHOLDING, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the underwriter holds 
equity shares of the issuer directly or indirectly (through subsidiary VC firms) before the IPO. 
LENDING-SHARE is a percentage of the loan of the bank relative to the total amount of 
loans to the issuer. OWNERSHIP is a percentage of total shareholdings held by an 
underwriter or its financial holding company and subsidiary VC firms before the IPO.41 
The issuer-specific variables are the number of syndicate members in the IPO 
(SYNDICATE-SIZE), the offer proceeds (in thousand yen) (PROCEEDS), the book value of 
the assets (in million yen) of the issuer at the time of the fiscal year-end of two years prior to 
the IPO (ASSETS),42 and the age of the firm defined as the number of months from the 
founding date to the date of the IPO (AGE). In the regression analysis, I use the natural 
logarithms of offer proceeds, firm size, and age rather than the raw values. 
Panel B reports a correlation matrix for independent variables used in the regression 
analysis. The low correlations among choice-specific variables suggest that multicollinearity 
is not a serious problem and including all of them simultaneously in a model is allowed. 
[Insert Table 4-1 here] 
 
4. The effect of affiliation ties on underwriter selection 
4.1. Specification 
In this section, I analyze the effect of affiliation ties on underwriter selection. I estimate a 
probit model with issuer-underwriter pairs, assuming that each issuer i selects a lead 
underwriter j from a set of potential underwriters.43 The empirical model is as follows: 
 
41 I use the values of bank loans and shareholdings at the time of fiscal year ending just before the IPO or at the 
time of the IPO due to data availability. 
42 Some firms do not have accounting information three years prior to the IPO. Due to data availability, I use 
information two years prior to the IPO, which all issuers in my sample have. 
43 During the sample period, there are no IPOs managed by co-managers. This fact suggests that almost all the 
issuers select only one lead underwriter, and my assumption is suitable. 
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Pr�CHOSENi,j = 1� = 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽1AFFILIATIONi,j + 𝛽𝛽2LENDINGi,j + 𝛽𝛽3SHAREHOLDINGi,j +
𝛽𝛽4 SYNDICATESIZEi + 𝛽𝛽5Ln(PROCEEDS)i + 𝛽𝛽6Ln(ASSETS)i + 𝛽𝛽7Ln(AGE)i), 
 
where F(･) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The dependent 
variable is CHOSEN and the main independent variable of interest is AFFILIATION. I expect 
a positive relationship between these variables after controlling for choice-specific and 
issuer-specific characteristics, which are as described in the previous section. In addition, all 
the regressions include underwriter fixed effects to control for underwriter specific 
characteristics, such as reputation and industry expertise. I further include IPO year and 
industry fixed effects, where industries are based on the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s 33-industry 
classifications.44 
 
4.2. Main results 
Table 4-2 presents the results of the probit regressions of choosing a lead underwriter. I 
report the estimated coefficients. Column 1 contains only the control variables. As expected, 
the coefficients of lending and investment relationships are positive. In column 2, I include 
AFFILIATION and find that the coefficient of AFFILIATION is positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that an issuer is more likely to choose a bank that has affiliation ties as 
the lead underwriter rather than other competing underwriters, even after controlling for debt 
and equity relationships. In addition, including AFFILIATION lowers the coefficients of 
LENDING and SHAREHOLDING dummies. 
Although columns 1 and 2 use firms with affiliation ties to any of the selected underwriters 
to mitigate the unobserved issuer-specific heterogeneity, columns 3 and 4 use the full sample, 
44 I consolidate a small proportion of industries that have a share of less than 1% with “others” industries. 
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which ensures that my results are not biased by using the limited sample.45 The full sample 
results also provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1: that firms with affiliation ties to a 
particular investment bank are more likely to select that bank as the lead underwriter. 
The economic effect is significant as well. Based on the estimated coefficients in column 2, 
conditional on the presence of ties to the underwriter’s competitor, the likelihood of the bank 
being selected as the lead underwriter increases from 7.0% to 18.6% when all control 
variables are set at their means and AFFILIATION changes from zero to one. On the other 
hand, when LENDING (SHAREHOLDING) changes from zero to one, the likelihood of the 
bank being selected increases from 7.7% to 11.4% (7.7% to 13.3%). Furthermore, based on 
the estimated coefficients in column 4, the marginal effects for affiliation ties, lending, and 
investment relationships are 8.0%, 2.5%, and 9.5%, respectively. These results suggest that 
affiliation tie is a crucial factor in underwriter selection. 
As a robustness check, I use the conditional logit model in the last four columns. Some 
control variables that have a constant value across firms are removed. When using a 
conditional logit approach, the main results are essentially unchanged, and the coefficient of 
AFFILIATION becomes larger and pseudo R-squared becomes higher. 
 
4.3. The strengths of the ties 
In panel B of Table 4-2, I further test the robustness of the findings. First, I estimate the 
regressions after dropping issuer-underwriter pairs, which have debt relationships, equity 
relationships, or both. Although the correlations among choice-specific variables are low (see 
panel B of Table 4-1), columns 1–3 show that my main results do not come from the presence 
of debt and/or equity relationships. The variables of lending relationship, investment 
relationship, or both are dropped, but the results are similar to the original one. 
45 In unreported results, I also confirm that the results remain unchanged when using a linear probability model. 
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Second, I examine the regressions using subsamples of firms with more than two affiliation 
ties to different underwriters (column 4) and firms with a single affiliation tie to a specific 
underwriter (column 5). In my sample of firms with affiliation ties, 37 out of 122 firms have 
mixed affiliation ties. In both columns, affiliation ties have a significantly positive effect on 
underwriter selection, suggesting that the effect of affiliation ties does not depend on the 
number of affiliation ties. 
Third, the last two columns use the length of time that the board member had worked with 
the underwriter (DURATION) instead of a binary variable (i.e., AFFILIATION). If affiliation 
ties are effective for solving information asymmetry, the length of time of the ties might be 
positively related to the underwriter selection. The finding is consistent with the prediction 
when using the duration measure. 
Overall, the results provide evidence that affiliation ties affect underwriter selection, and 
this effect remains even after controlling for issuer-underwriter debt/equity relationships. 
Engelberg et al. (2012) also find that the effect of past banking relationships on lending terms 
becomes weaker after controlling for personal relationships, suggesting that banking 
relationships could themselves stem from personal relationships, and personal relationships 
are an original determinant of a firm’s financing partners in credit markets. My results are 
consistent with their argument in the IPO underwriting market. 
[Insert Table 4-2 here] 
 
4.4. The combination of issuer and underwriter characteristics 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that affiliation ties are more beneficial for firms with small-sized 
issues that usually would not normally be underwritten by reputable underwriters. To test this 
hypothesis, I begin by conducting univariate comparisons between the characteristics of 
issuers by a lead underwriter’s reputation. I define reputable underwriters as the top five 
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underwriters in Appendix 4-A.46 I use the characteristics of issuers along with offering 
proceeds, issuer’s size, and issuer’s age, which are defined in the previous section. In addition 
to these characteristics, I consider issuer’s profitability and quality: POSITIVE, which is a 
dummy variable that equals one if operating or net income is strictly positive before the IPO; 
and VC-BACK, which is a dummy variables that equals one if the firm receives VC 
financing, following Fernando et al. (2013). 
Table 4-3 reports the mean and median values of issuer characteristics and the results of 
univariate tests by underwriter reputation. I conduct the analysis using two samples. Panel A 
uses firms that have board members who have work experience in banks, and panel B uses 
the full sample. Both panels show a positive relationship between issue size and underwriter 
reputation, suggesting the greater ability of reputable underwriters to place larger issues with 
investors (e.g., Fernando et al., 2013). Further, firms with more reputable underwriters are 
larger compared to firms with less reputable underwriters. In addition, panel B shows that 
firms with reputable underwriters are more mature and less likely to receive VC financing 
compared to firms with low reputation underwriters. 
[Insert Table 4-3 here] 
 
In response to the results in Table 4-3 that more reputable underwriters are associated with 
larger issuers, I control for this mutual choice between issuers and underwriters. Thus, I 
create two variables of underwrite reputation: AFFILIATION-HIGH-UW and 
AFFILIATION-LOW-UW, which equal one if an issuer has affiliation ties to high (low) 
reputation underwriters, and then employ multivariate regressions for two subsamples: firms 
with large size issues (above-median issue size) and firms with small-sized issues 
(below-median issue size). In Table 4-4, the first four columns estimate probit models. The 
46 The results are similar when the reputable underwriters are defined as the top three underwriters. 
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first two columns use a subsample of firms with large size issues, and columns 3 and 4 use a 
subsample of firms with small-sized issues. In the subsample of large size issues, the 
coefficients of AFFILIATION-HIGH-UW and AFFILIATION-LOW-UW become 
insignificant after controlling for underwriter fixed effects in column 2. On the other hand, 
column 4 uses a subsample of firms with small-sized issues and indicates that both the 
coefficients of affiliation ties to high- and low-reputation underwriters are statistically 
significant. These results suggest that affiliation ties are beneficial for low-quality issuers to 
be underwritten by more reputable underwriters and support Hypothesis 2: that the effect of 
affiliation ties is more pronounced among more reputable underwriters and firms with 
small-sized issues. The results are stable when using conditional logit model in columns 5–8. 
Overall, affiliation ties work effectively when small-sized issuers want to be underwritten 
by more reputable underwriters. Firms with small offering proceeds are more likely to be 
underwritten by prestigious underwriters when they have affiliation ties to the underwriters. 
[Insert Table 4-4 here] 
 
5. Additional analyses 
5.1. Independent vs. bank-affiliated securities firms 
In this subsection, I consider the type of securities firms and examine the affiliation effect 
by each type of underwriter. Takaoka and McKenzie (2014) investigate the reason for the 
coexistence of independent and bank subsidiary securities companies in the Japanese 
corporate market and explain that issuers choose independent securities companies to use 
their advantages in marketing abilities and main bank subsidiary securities companies to use 
the main bank relationship. In Japan, investment houses have been prohibited from lending 
loans, unlike commercial banks. Previous studies have found that prior or concurrent lending 
relationships lead to a higher probability of winning lead underwriters (Drucker and Puri, 
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2005; Yasuda, 2005). If the affiliation ties reduce information asymmetry between issuers and 
underwriters, the effect is more pronounced in investment houses because they cannot rely on 
private information from lending relationships and are more likely to rely on affiliation ties to 
get private information. On the other hand, until 1993, commercial banks were prohibited 
from engaging in the corporate bond underwriting market. Due to the lack of underwriting 
experience, commercial banks may tend to rely on affiliation ties to find issuers or to reduce 
information asymmetry. 
To examine this prediction, I classify each underwriter as an independent or a 
bank-affiliated securities firm based on the organizational structure of the parent or holding 
company of the underwriter, and create new variables: AFFILIATION-IBANK, which is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm has affiliation ties to investment banks, and 
AFFILIATION-CBANK, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
underwriter’s parent company is a commercial bank. The results of affiliation effect by type 
of underwriter are reported in Table 4-5. 
In Table 4-5, columns 1 and 2 use the subsamples of each type of underwriter (i.e., 
investment houses and commercial banks) and show that the coefficients of AFFILIATION 
are positive and statistically significant. Note that lending relationships are dropped in the 
subsample of independent securities firms because they are prohibited from lending. Columns 
3 and 4 include AFFILIATION-IBANK and AFFILIATION-CBANK in the estimation. 
Although column 3 shows the significant effects of affiliation ties on both investment and 
commercial banks, the effect on investment banks disappears after controlling for underwriter 
fixed effects and the effect on commercial banks is stable in column 4. The finding is 
consistent with the view that firms with affiliation ties to commercial banks are more likely to 
choose the underwriter as the lead underwriter. These results imply that commercial banks 
tend to use affiliation ties due to a lack of IPO underwriting experience. As a robustness 
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check, I re-estimate the same specifications using the full sample in columns 5–8, but the 
results remain the same. 
[Insert Table 4-5 here] 
 
5.2. Syndicate members 
Thus far, I have analyzed the selection of the lead underwriter, but IPOs are usually 
underwritten by syndicate members or co-managers, and they cooperate to produce 
information for each other. In this subsection, I expand the analysis to include syndicate 
members and to investigate whether underwriters who have affiliation ties to issuers are more 
likely to be chosen as syndicate members. In order to examine this question, as the dependent 
variable, I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the bank is chosen as a syndicate 
member (SYNDICATE-CHOSEN). This variable is defined broadly compared to the 
dependent variable used in Table 4-2. The control variables are the same as in Table 4-2. I 
find that the effect of affiliation ties remains positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that underwriters with affiliation ties are more likely to be selected as syndicate members 
(unreported). 
 
5.3. Selecting rival underwriters 
I investigate whether the affiliation ties affect not only the selection of a lead underwriter 
but also the avoidance of hiring a rival underwriter as a lead underwriter. There is a 
possibility that underwriter selection is influenced by third parties. Asker and Ljungqvist 
(2010) find that concerns about the disclosure of confidential information to strategic rivals 
determine firms’ investment bank choices. In order to examine this possibility, I simply 
investigate the number of issues underwritten by the affiliated underwriter and its rival 
investment banks. 
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I define rival underwriters as underwriters with similar characteristics to one another in 
terms of reputation and organizational structure. Based on the ranking in Appendix 4-A, I 
divide underwriters into two groups. One group comprises the top 3 investment banks: 
Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko Securities. The other includes commercial banks: Shinko, 
Mitsubishi, Mizuho Investors, and Mizuho Securities. I find that issuers with affiliation ties 
rarely select rival banks even when issuers do not select underwriters with affiliation ties 
(unreported). 
 
6. The effect of affiliation ties on IPO performance 
6.1. Univariate comparisons 
I now test the predictions of Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 that firms with affiliation ties will be 
characterized by lower issuing costs and IPO failure. Issuing costs are composed of (1) direct 
fees (or underwriting spreads), defined as the difference from underwriting price to offer 
price relative to underwriting price (DIRECT-FEE), and (2) indirect fees (or underpricing), 
which is the change between the offer price and the closing price on the first trading day 
(INDIRECT-FEE). Direct and indirect issuing costs are different from each other. While the 
underwriting spread is charged by underwriters directly, indirect initial returns are 
opportunity costs for issuers. I thus examine these issuing costs separately.47 IPO failure is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm is delisted due to financial distress within three 
years of the IPO (FAILURE-3Y).48 I compare the means and medians of these performance 
measures between firms with affiliation ties that actually selected the underwriter 
47 As another short-run IPO performance, we might consider providing research coverage. However, the role of 
analysts is less important in Japan because this information is limited to a particular investor, and rather, 
management forecast play a significant role in earnings forecast and other publishers provide more accurate 
earnings forecast. Further, this information is more easily available and less costly than analyst reports. In 
addition, Ljungqvist et al. (2006) find that there is no evidence that analyst behaviors influence winning either 
debt or equity underwriting mandates. 
48 I exclude IPO firms delisted due to M&A since this is not due to financial distress. In addition, as a 
robustness check, the percentage of firms failing within five years of the IPO is also often used in the previous 
literature, but the failure rates of my sample at three years and five years are the same (i.e., there are no firms 
that fail from three years to five years after the IPO). Thus, only failure within three years of the IPO is reported. 
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(“affiliation-realized matches”) and firms with affiliation ties that did not select the 
underwriter (“affiliation-unrealized matches”). 
Table 4-6 presents the results of tests for differences in means and medians of performance 
measures. In this section, the unit of analysis is the issuer, not the issuer-underwriter. I find 
that underwriting spreads are lower for affiliation-realized matches but the differences are 
insignificant in both mean and median tests. In addition, there is no failure in 
affiliation-realized matches, whereas 1.1% of affiliation-unrealized matches will fail within 
three years after their IPOs, but the difference is also insignificant. These results provide little 
evidence for Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2. 
[Insert Table 4-6 here] 
 
6.2. Multivariate analysis 
To test Hypothesis 3.1 in a multivariate setting, I estimate the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions with two different equations in Table 4-7. In the first equation, the dependent 
variable is underwriting spreads. In the second equation, the dependent variable is 
underpricing, and the control variables include the average underpricing in the 30 days prior 
to the IPO issue date (AVG-UP-30D) and a price run-up in the prior 30 days 
(MKT-PRIOR-30D). All the regressions include syndicate size, offer proceeds, firm size, and 
firm age, as well as IPO year and industry fixed effects. In both equations, the primary 
variable of interest is AFFILIATION-REALIZED, which equals one if the firm has a realized 
pair of board member and lead underwriter. If affiliation ties reduce issuing costs, the 
coefficients of AFFILIATION-REALIZED should be negative. I report the results of these 
regressions for the subsample of firms with affiliation ties as well as for the full sample. 
Table 4-7 indicates that the coefficients of AFFILIATION-REALIZED are negative but 
only significant in column 1, suggesting that affiliation-realized matches do not associate 
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with lower underwriting spreads and underpricing. The negative coefficients for issue size, 
firm size, and firm age are consistent with the previous literature on direct and indirect fees. 
Krigman et al. (2001) find that the offer size strongly explains the difference in the fees, and 
underwriters charge higher fees for small offerings due to economies of scale in underwriting. 
In summary, I find no evidence that affiliation ties reduce IPO costs, even after controlling for 
various factors, and these multivariate results also do not support Hypothesis 3.1. The results 
are consistent with the view that underwriting fees are not a crucial factor for determining a 
lead underwriter (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). This finding is also consistent with Yasuda (2005), 
who states that bank loan relationships affect underwriter selection in the bond market over 
and above underwriting fees. 
[Insert Table 4-7 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper empirically studies the effects of affiliation ties between issuers and 
underwriters on underwriter selection. I find that when firms have board members who have 
prior work experience at a specific bank, the firms are more likely to choose that bank as the 
lead underwriter. The effects of affiliation ties are economically larger than those of debt and 
equity relationships. In addition, affiliation ties not only explain underwriter selection but 
also the influence on being selected as syndicate members and avoiding the selection of the 
underwriter’s rival underwriters. For firms with small-sized issues that usually would not be 
underwritten by reputable underwriters, affiliation ties work effectively to connect them with 
more reputable underwriters. I conclude that affiliation ties are beneficial for underwriters 
because the probability of winning IPO underwriting mandates increases. I find little 
evidence that affiliation ties reduce issuing costs or failure rates. 
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Appendix 4-A 
Rankings of lead underwriters. 
Appendix 4-A provides a list of the lead underwriters. Their rankings are judged by the number of IPOs, the 
cumulative total amount of proceeds (in thousand yen), and their market shares, which are calculated using all 
IPOs conducted over the period of January 2004 to December 2008. Here, I use all IPOs conducted in the period 
of 2004–2008 rather than my limited sample because underwriter reputation should be judged by all IPOs that 
are underwritten by the banks. These rankings include IPOs of financial companies and second-time IPOs but 
exclude four IPOs that were underwritten by foreign investment banks (HSBC Securities Japan Ltd. and Credit 
Suisse First Boston). Thus, note that the number of IPOs in Appendix 4-A (584 IPOs) is not consistent with that 
of my sample (556 IPOs) because my sample excludes IPOs of financial companies (TSE industrial 
classification codes 28–31) and second-time IPOs. Rankings are based on IPOs on stock exchanges for startups 
companies (i.e., JASDAQ, Mothers, Hercules, and other exchanges for new and emerging firms). Underwriters 
are categorized into three types: independent, bank-related, and internet-based securities firms. I consider bank 
mergers during the sample period. Underwriters ranked in the top 10 of market share are marked in gray in each 
ranking, and the bold-faced underwriters are potential choices. 
 
  
Underwriter Type Rank Number of IPOs Share Rank
Amount of
proceeds
(in thousand yen)
Share
Nomura Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 1 112 19.2% 1 408,546 31.5%
Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 2 101 17.3% 3 233,183 18.0%
Shinko Securities Co. Ltd. Bank-related 3 71 12.2% 5 97,392 7.5%
Nikko Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 4 63 10.8% 2 282,198 21.8%
Mitsubishi Securities Co. Ltd. Bank-related 5 60 10.3% 4 98,003 7.6%
Mizuho Investors Securities Co. Ltd. Bank-related 6 52 8.9% 6 47,935 3.7%
H.S. Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 7 23 3.9% 7 23,752 1.8%
D.Brain Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 8 13 2.2% 18 3,086 0.2%
Tokai Tokyo Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 9 12 2.1% 8 20,524 1.6%
Kobe Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 10 10 1.7% 11 8,030 0.6%
Mizuho Securities Co. Ltd. Bank-related 10 10 1.7% 9 19,806 1.5%
Ichiyoshi Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 10 10 1.7% 10 11,938 0.9%
Toyo Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 10 10 1.7% 14 5,424 0.4%
SMBC Friend Securities Co. Ltd. Bank-related 14 9 1.5% 17 4,768 0.4%
Cosmo Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 15 6 1.0% 13 6,755 0.5%
SBI Securities Co. Ltd. Internet-based 16 5 0.9% 15 5,258 0.4%
Monex Inc. Internet-based 17 4 0.7% 16 4,906 0.4%
Rakuten Securities Co. Ltd. Internet-based 17 4 0.7% 19 2,916 0.2%
Okasan Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 19 3 0.5% 20 2,231 0.2%
NIS Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 20 2 0.3% 23 450 0.0%
IPO Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 21 1 0.2% 24 140 0.0%
ORIX Securities Co. Ltd. Internet-based 21 1 0.2% 21 594 0.1%
Livedoor Securities Co. Ltd. Internet-based 21 1 0.2% 12 7,410 0.6%
Takagi Securities Co. Ltd. Independent 21 1 0.2% 22 550 0.0%
Top 10 underwriters' shares 93.7% 96.0%
Total 584 1,295,795
IPOs on stock exchanges for new ventures
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Table 4-1 
Summary statistics. 
This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The sample consists of the 122 
IPOs that have affiliation ties. The unit of observation is issuer-underwriter pairs. Panel A reports descriptive 
statistics of the IPO sample, and panel B reports the correlation matrix. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Variable
Number of
observations
Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
CHOSEN 1,342 0.091 0 0.288 0 1
AFFILIATION 1,342 0.122 0 0.328 0 1
DURATION (in years) 1,342 2.469 0 8.018 0 44
LENDING 1,342 0.093 0 0.291 0 1
SHAREHOLDING 1,342 0.079 0 0.270 0 1
LENDING-SHARE (if LENDING > 0) 125 0.331 0 0.289 0 1
OWNERSHIP (if SHAREHOLDING > 0) 106 0.028 0 0.048 0 0.429
SYNDICATE-SIZE 1,342 8.533 8 2.594 4 16
PROCEEDS (in thousand yen) 1,342 2,369,356 1,183,750 4,363,697 220,000 34,500,000
ASSETS (in million yen) 1,342 7,023 1,857 15,948 22 129,589
AGE (in months) 1,342 200 116 172 22 857
Panel B: Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 AFFILIATION 1.000
2 DURATION 0.826 1.000
3 LENDING 0.225 0.244 1.000
4 SHAREHOLDING 0.270 0.298 0.163 1.000
5 SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.015 -0.001 0.077 0.011 1.000
6 Ln(PROCEEDS) 0.017 0.050 0.063 0.090 0.240 1.000
7 Ln(ASSETS) 0.015 0.096 0.202 0.130 -0.017 0.334 1.000
8 Ln(AGE) -0.014 0.044 0.088 0.103 -0.233 0.055 0.663 1.000
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Table 4-2 
The effect of affiliation ties on underwriter selection. 
This table presents the results from probit regressions. The dependent variable is CHOSEN, which is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the issuer chooses a particular underwriter as the lead underwriter, and 
zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
  
Panel A: Main results
Dependent variable:
CHOSEN [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
AFFILIATION 0.590*** 0.446*** 0.879*** 0.753***
(0.162) (0.125) (0.252) (0.231)
LENDING 0.262 0.219 0.170* 0.172* 0.547 0.440 0.383* 0.379*
(0.214) (0.220) (0.099) (0.100) (0.444) (0.455) (0.212) (0.213)
SHAREHOLDING 0.431*** 0.320* 0.540*** 0.523*** 0.836*** 0.597* 1.046*** 1.004***
(0.163) (0.175) (0.075) (0.076) (0.311) (0.349) (0.145) (0.149)
SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(PROCEEDS) 0.001 0.000 -0.018*** -0.020***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(ASSETS) -0.024* -0.019 -0.004 -0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(AGE) 0.005 0.007 -0.010 -0.004
(0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -0.889*** -1.033*** -0.704*** -0.679***
(0.200) (0.214) (0.102) (0.105)
Underwriter fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IPO year fixed effects YES YES YES YES - - - -
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES - - - -
Number of observations 1,220 1,220 6,116 6,116 1,342 1,342 6,116 6,116
Number of IPO firms 122 122 556 556 122 122 556 556
Pseudo R -squared 0.065 0.086 0.089 0.093 0.122 0.142 0.117 0.122
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firms with affiliation ties Firms with affiliation tiesFull sample
Probit Conditional logit
Full sample
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Table 4-2 
(Continued) 
 
  
Panel B: Robustness
No prior
lending
relationship
pairs
No prior
investment
relationship
pairs
No prior
lending and
investment
relationship
pairs
Firms with
mixed
affiliation ties
Firms with a
single
affiliation tie
Dependent variable:
CHOSEN [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
AFFILIATION 0.631*** 0.813*** 0.831*** 0.706** 0.621***
(0.176) (0.172) (0.186) (0.301) (0.215)
DURATION 0.025*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
LENDING 0.073 0.230 0.217 0.209 0.170*
(0.249) (0.413) (0.281) (0.226) (0.100)
SHAREHOLDING 0.332* 0.378 0.323 0.289* 0.517***
(0.196) (0.322) (0.224) (0.175) (0.076)
SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.004 -0.007 -0.017 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Ln(PROCEEDS) 0.005 -0.013 -0.002 0.034 -0.020 0.002 -0.019***
(0.023) (0.027) (0.033) (0.029) (0.017) (0.011) (0.006)
Ln(ASSETS) -0.001 -0.018 0.000 -0.038 -0.014 -0.034** -0.009
(0.017) (0.025) (0.030) (0.035) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006)
Ln(AGE) -0.009 0.083** 0.063 0.028 -0.001 0.010 -0.005
(0.023) (0.037) (0.042) (0.033) (0.017) (0.016) (0.007)
Constant -1.212*** -1.321*** -1.538*** -1.263*** -0.783** -0.919*** -0.654***
(0.397) (0.408) (0.499) (0.376) (0.307) (0.204) (0.106)
Underwriter fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
IPO year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 1,095 1,115 1,017 370 850 1,220 6,116
Number of IPO firms 122 122 122 37 85 122 556
Pseudo R -squared 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.0591 0.117 0.0877 0.0929
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4-3 
Differences in issuer characteristics by underwriter reputation. 
This table presents the issuer characteristics by underwriter reputation. Panel A compares the characteristics for 
firms with affiliation ties, and panel B compares this for the full sample. High reputation underwriters are the 
top five underwriters in Appendix 4-A. Low reputation underwriters are the others. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
   
Panel A: Firms with affiliation ties
Variable
Mean Median Mean Median
Difference
in mean
t -statistics
Difference
in median
z -statistics
Ln(PROCEEDS) 14.204 14.116 13.723 13.623 0.481 2.551 ** 0.492 2.799 ***
Ln(ASSETS) 7.931 7.799 7.101 6.999 0.830 2.822 *** 0.800 2.358 **
Ln(AGE) 4.986 5.011 4.742 4.489 0.244 1.357 0.522 1.228
POSITIVE 0.908 1 0.886 1 0.022 0.372 0.000 0.373
VC-BACK 0.770 1 0.886 1 -0.116 -1.453 0.000 -1.447
Panel B: Full sample
Variable
Mean Median Mean Median
Difference
in mean
t -statistics
Difference
in median
z -statistics
Ln(PROCEEDS) 14.157 13.998 13.346 13.305 0.811 9.813 *** 0.693 9.372 ***
Ln(ASSETS) 7.907 7.875 7.111 7.145 0.796 6.752 *** 0.730 6.329 ***
Ln(AGE) 5.156 5.247 4.868 4.804 0.288 3.962 *** 0.443 3.958 ***
POSITIVE 0.883 1 0.883 1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003
VC-BACK 0.699 1 0.825 1 -0.126 -3.134 *** 0.000 -3.110 ***
Firms with high reputation
underwriter
(N = 87)
Firms with low reputation
underwriter
(N = 35)
Mean test Median test
Firms with high reputation
underwriter
(N = 385)
Firms with low reputation
underwriter
(N = 171)
Mean test Median test
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Table 4-4 
The effect of affiliation ties by issue size and underwriter reputation. 
This table presents the effect of affiliation ties on an issuer’s underwriter selection by considering the 
combination between issue size and underwriter reputation. The dependent variable is CHOSEN, which is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the issuer chooses a particular underwriter as the lead underwriter, 
and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), 
respectively. 
 
  
Dependent variable: CHOSEN
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
AFFILIATION-HIGH-UW 0.724*** 0.420 0.816*** 0.837*** 1.075*** 0.507 1.310*** 1.277***
(0.250) (0.265) (0.257) (0.280) (0.388) (0.397) (0.399) (0.443)
AFFILIATION-LOW-UW -0.839* -0.277 0.589** 0.967*** -1.785* -0.349 1.024** 1.714**
(0.471) (0.510) (0.260) (0.351) (1.055) (1.216) (0.486) (0.749)
LENDING -0.122 0.491 -0.143 0.071 -0.183 0.969 -0.254 0.145
(0.248) (0.334) (0.292) (0.357) (0.496) (0.698) (0.571) (0.676)
SHAREHOLDING 0.714*** 0.620** 0.025 0.081 1.338*** 1.118** -0.059 0.076
(0.236) (0.246) (0.318) (0.333) (0.457) (0.446) (0.665) (0.677)
SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.003 -0.004 0.007 0.006
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Ln(ASSETS) 0.004 -0.046** 0.013 -0.007
(0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019)
Ln(AGE) -0.007 0.020 -0.003 0.027
(0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.022)
Constant -1.564*** -0.958*** -1.632*** -1.230***
(0.195) (0.295) (0.151) (0.263)
Underwriter fixed effects NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
IPO year fixed effects YES YES YES YES - - - -
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES - - - -
Number of observations 671 610 671 610 671 671 671 671
Number of IPO firms 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Pseudo R -squared 0.075 0.152 0.040 0.111 0.097 0.221 0.049 0.173
Prob > Chi-squared 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Probit Conditional logit
Large size issues Small size issues Large size issues Small size issues
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Table 4-5 
The effect of affiliation ties: Independent vs. bank-affiliated securities firms. 
This table presents the effect of affiliation ties on an issuer’s underwriter selection by organizational type of 
securities firms. The dependent variable is CHOSEN, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the issuer chooses a particular underwriter as the lead underwriter, and zero otherwise. Models 1–4 report the 
regression results for the reduced sample, including only the firms with affiliation ties. Models 5–8 report 
regression results for the full sample. All regressions control for IPO year and industry fixed effects. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
   
Dependent variable: CHOSEN Independent
Bank-
affiliated
Independent
Bank-
affiliated
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
AFFILIATION 0.676*** 0.673*** 0.597*** 0.479***
(0.231) (0.215) (0.217) (0.151)
AFFILIATION-IBANK 0.681*** 0.349 0.586*** 0.315
(0.217) (0.232) (0.202) (0.206)
AFFILIATION-CBANK 0.499*** 0.787*** 0.356** 0.519***
(0.187) (0.212) (0.153) (0.156)
LENDING -0.003 -0.178 0.214 0.042 -0.146* 0.172*
(0.213) (0.185) (0.227) (0.094) (0.084) (0.100)
SHAREHOLDING 0.837*** 0.144 0.388** 0.299* 0.955*** 0.451*** 0.631*** 0.521***
(0.250) (0.256) (0.174) (0.174) (0.104) (0.105) (0.072) (0.076)
SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.002 -0.022 0.004 -0.001 -0.010 -0.020 -0.003 -0.003
(0.025) (0.038) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln(PROCEEDS) 0.103* -0.133 -0.014 -0.000 0.150*** -0.126*** -0.020*** -0.020***
(0.062) (0.092) (0.009) (0.011) (0.026) (0.041) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(ASSETS) 0.085* -0.022 0.000 -0.022* 0.031 0.009 0.004 -0.007
(0.052) (0.083) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln(AGE) 0.007 0.031 0.000 0.007 0.073** -0.041 -0.005 -0.004
(0.074) (0.117) (0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.055) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -3.728*** 0.654 -1.341*** -0.952*** -4.125*** 0.540 -1.104*** -0.667***
(0.796) (1.292) (0.142) (0.218) (0.383) (0.593) (0.074) (0.106)
Underwriter fixed effects NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
IPO year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 732 488 1,342 1,220 3,336 2,224 6,116 6,116
Number of IPO firms 122 122 122 122 556 556 556 556
Pseudo R -squared 0.076 0.087 0.036 0.088 0.062 0.036 0.025 0.093
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.012 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firms with affilaition ties Full sample
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Table 4-6 
Differences in IPO performances. 
This table reports the mean and median values of IPO performance measures. DIRECT-FEE is direct issuing costs that are defined as the difference from underwriting price 
to offer price relative to underwriting price. INDIRECT-FEE is the indirect issuing cost, which is the change between the offer price and the closing price on the first trading 
day, which is the widely used definition of underpricing. FAILURE-3Y is the IPO failure, which is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is delisted due to financial 
distress within three years of the IPO, and zero otherwise. Significance of differences in means (medians) is assessed using a t-test (Wilcoxon test). 
 
  
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Difference p -value Difference p -value Mean Median Difference p -value Difference p -value
DIRECT-FEE 0.072 0.070 0.073 0.074 0.00 0.487 0.00 0.232 0.073 0.071 0.00 0.336 0.00 0.213
INDIRECT-FEE 0.730 0.724 0.979 0.504 -0.25 0.270 0.22 0.968 0.950 0.620 -0.22 0.258 0.10 0.715
FAILURE-3Y 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 -0.01 0.545 0.00 0.543 0.011 0.000 -0.01 0.537 0.00 0.537
Mean test Median test
Affiliation-realized
matches
(N = 33)
Affiliation-
unrealized matches
(N = 89)
Mean test Median test
Full sample, except
affiliation-realized
matches
(N = 523)
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Table 4-7 
The effects of affiliation ties on issuing costs. 
This table reports the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for issuing costs. The dependent 
variables are the direct and indirect fees. All regressions control for IPO year and industry fixed effects. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-sided), respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
DIRECT-
FEE
INDIRECT-
FEE
DIRECT-
FEE
INDIRECT-
FEE
[1] [2] [3] [4]
AFFILIATION-REALIZED -0.002* -0.042 -0.001 0.008
(0.001) (0.194) (0.001) (0.161)
SYNDICATE-SIZE -0.001** 0.018 -0.000 -0.011
(0.000) (0.039) (0.000) (0.018)
Ln(PROCEEDS) -0.001** -0.320*** -0.002*** -0.193***
(0.001) (0.100) (0.000) (0.046)
Ln(ASSETS) -0.003*** -0.114 -0.002*** -0.128***
(0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.042)
Ln(AGE) -0.001 -0.210 -0.001*** -0.198***
(0.001) (0.135) (0.000) (0.062)
AVG-UP-30D 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
MKT-PRIOR-30D 1.045*** 0.745***
(0.332) (0.129)
Constant 0.120*** 6.597*** 0.117*** 5.337***
(0.008) (1.392) (0.004) (0.675)
IPO year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 121 122 555 556
R -squared 0.576 0.442 0.438 0.352
Adjusted R -squared 0.520 0.356 0.424 0.333
Firms with affiliation ties Full sample
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 Chapter 5: Executive stock options and performance of IPO firms 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines determinants and consequences of the adoption of executive stock 
options (ESOs) for initial public offering (IPO) firms. IPO firms with substantial ownership 
dilution are predicted to adopt ESOs to align the interests of management and shareholders, 
and as a result, the adoption of ESOs is expected to lead to improved post-IPO operating 
performance. Using a sample of Japanese IPO firms between 2002 and 2007, I find that 
dilution of a CEO ownership can explain the adoption of ESOs after an IPO. I also find that 
ESOs lead to increased post-IPO operating performance. 
 
Keywords: Initial public offering; Operating performance; Stock options 
JEL classification: G24; G32; J33 
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1. Introduction 
An initial public offering (IPO) is one of the most important events for private firms. It 
involves an entrepreneur selling part of a firm to public investors and raising equity capital. In 
general, although private firms are expected to enter a growth stage by using the amount of 
external funding through the IPO, the previous literature has reported a decline in post-IPO 
operating performance (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah, 1997). This 
phenomenon is partly explained by the conflict of interest between management and 
shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
One solution to align the interests of managers and shareholders is to adopt executive stock 
options (ESOs), which are widely recognized as an incentive contract between the principal 
and the agent. Although many studies have explored the determinants and consequences of 
ESOs, little attention has been paid to stock options for IPO firms. Therefore, this paper 
attempts to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing stock options for IPO firms. 
Examining the effects of stock options for IPO firms, especially the post-IPO firms, is 
important for two reasons. First, it will help us to better understanding of the incentive effect 
caused by stock options. Executives of IPO firms generally are given significant discretion in 
financial policies, and the success of the firm is more directly related to good managerial 
practices (Pukthuanthong, Roll, and Walker, 2007). Second, for IPO firms, it is important to 
make efficient governance mechanism that entrepreneurs induce for shareholders’ interests 
after the separation of ownership and control (i.e., post-IPO). 
An entrepreneur faces a trade-off between external funding and diluted ownership at the 
time of the IPO. The more shares entrepreneurs sell, the less their incentives to align the 
interests of entrepreneurs and investors after the IPO. Thus, when entrepreneurs sell more of 
their ownership, firms would introduce ESOs to protect against a decline in the incentive to 
maximize the firm’s value. Moreover, by reducing agency conflicts, the adopting ESOs may 
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lead to better operating performance after the IPO. 
I test these predictions by using Japanese firms going public between 2002 and 2007. The 
characteristics of stock option plans in Japan offer an attractive setting for investigating 
management-incentive effects induced by the stock options. Japanese stock options is shorter 
and that the premium of the exercise price is higher compared with those in the U.S.49 This 
suggests that more effort is required by Japanese managers in a shorter period because of the 
shorter lifetime of the options and because the exercise price is issued out-of-the money. This 
makes it possible to identify the periods that impact of stock options is effective. 
To test the relationship between ownership dilutions and the adoption of ESOs, I estimate a 
probit model and find that large dilutions in CEO ownership are associated with the adoption of 
ESOs after the IPO. I also examine the effect of ESOs on post-IPO operating performance 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and find that the adoption of ESOs positively 
affect post-IPO operating performance. These results imply that ESOs are an effective 
governance mechanism for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. 
This paper contributions to the literature in two ways. First, this paper contributes to the 
literature on stock options. I find IPO firm-specific factors (i.e., ownership dilution) that affect 
the adoption of ESOs after the IPO. Second, this paper also contributes the literature on IPO. I 
provide evidence that the effects of option-based incentives on post-IPO operating 
performance, while much of the IPO research on post-IPO underperformance has ignored 
option-based incentives (e.g., Jain and Kini, 1994; Mikkelson et al., 1997). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 
3 describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 develops the empirical analysis of the 
adoption of ESOs after the IPO. Section 5 examines the effects of stock options on post-IPO 
49 Japanese stock options have a five-year duration (the vesting periods are approximately two years, and the 
exercise periods are approximately three years), and the exercise price has approximately five percentage 
premiums (i.e., issued out-of-the-money) (Kato et al., 2005). In comparison, the U.S. stock options typically 
have a ten-year duration and no premiums (i.e., issued at-the-money) (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Hall and 
Murphy, 2000; Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu, 2012). 
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operating performance. Section 6 presents the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review 
Despite the importance of stock options for start-ups, previous studies have primarily 
targeted older, mature firms or mixed samples that include large and small firms (e.g., Yermack, 
1995). Despite stock options being widely used in start-ups, little is known about how they are 
used in those firms. The role of stock options for IPO firms have not addressed as well.50 
However, a few studies focus on start-ups or IPO firms. Hand (2008) uses surveys and 
examines how and why employee stock options are adopted in pre-IPO venture capital 
(VC)-backed firms. Hellmann and Puri (2002) also use surveys from start-ups that are located 
in Silicon Valley. They analyze the relationship between the time between the inception of a 
company and the time the company adopts a stock option and VC investment and find that 
VC-backed firms are more likely to adopt stock options. 
My study differs from these two studies. Although Hand (2008) focuses on employee stock 
options in pre-IPO firms, this study focuses on ESOs in post-IPO firms. The effects of stock 
options that are adopted in post-IPOs are different from those in pre-IPOs. After the separation 
of ownership and control, adopting ESOs is expected to be a significant incentive mechanism 
for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, but this is not expected in pre-IPOs. In 
addition, while Hellmann and Puri (2002) focus on the relationship between VC funds and the 
adoption of stock options, this study examines another IPO-firm specific factor that affects the 
adoption of ESOs (i.e., ownership dilution) and the effects on post-IPO operating 
underperformance. 
50 For instance, Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) examine the relationship between ESOs and performance 
by targeting firms in the S&P 1500 index. Uchida (2006) examines the determinants of stock options for 
Japanese companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Kato et al. (2005) use a 
sample listed on the TSE from May 1997 through December 2001 and examine factors associated with the 
adoption of stock options and effects on post-adoption operating performance. Nagaoka (2005) examine the 
determinants of stock options by each stock exchange in Japan and find that younger firms tend to adopt stock 
options and that the effect of the age of the firm is stronger for firms not listed in the first section of the TSE. 
However, he does not focus on IPO firms. 
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This paper is related to the work by Roosenboom and Van der Goot (2006), who use a 
sample of 54 Dutch IPO firms between 1985 and 1998 to examine the determinants of stock 
options during the three years after the IPO. However, their annual report data do not permit an 
analysis of the effect of executive stock options because the data do not distinguish between 
stock options that are adopted to employees and management. Distinguishing between these 
two is important, since the determinants of employee stock options are different logic from for 
those of executives. Therefore. This study distinguishes and focuses on executive stock options. 
Further, unlike Roosenboom and Van der Goot (2006), this study examines the effects of ESOs 
on post-IPO operating underperformance. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data sources 
I use 360 Japanese IPO firms filed with JASDAQ from January 2002 to December 2007, 
after excluding IPOs of financial institutions and foreign firms. I collect data on stock options 
from each firm’s IPO prospectus and annual report. I also collect the accounting data and the 
management shareholding data from the IPO White Book and Nikkei NEEDS Financial Quest. 
The sample is limited to IPOs issued after 2002 because the environment of stock option 
plans has been changed in Japan. Until 1997, the Commercial Code of Japan prohibited firms 
from adopting stock options. Following a revision of the code in May 1997, Japanese 
companies could adopt stock options, with some conditional restrictions, that is, (1) the 
adopting target was only executives and employees in own companies, (2) the number of 
options was less than ten percent relative to shares outstanding, and (3) the exercise period was 
shorter than ten years. In November 2001, the Japanese Commercial Code Revision removed 
these restrictions, and the U.S.-style compensation scheme gradually prevails in Japanese 
companies. 
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 3.2. Data description 
Panel A of Table 5-1 reports the number of IPOs for every IPO year in the sample period. 
The greatest number of IPOs occurs during 2004, after which the number of IPOs in the sample 
gradually decreases. As a whole, however, the sample has a similar distribution across years. 
Panel B presents the sample distribution by industry. Percentages of services, wholesale, and 
retail industries dominate the sample. Panel C describes a two-by-two matrix that shows the 
pre- and post-IPO adoption of ESOs. Most firms that adopt ESOs did so before the IPO. 45 IPO 
firms adopted ESOs both before and after the IPO. 120 IPO firms did not adopt additional 
ESOs after the IPO but did so before the IPO. 31 firms adopted ESOs for the first time after the 
IPO. 164 IPO firms did not adopt ESOs either before or after the IPO. 
[Insert Table 5-1 here] 
 
3.3. Methods 
I focus on the firms that adopt new executive stock options after the IPO because managers 
generally have the discretion to determine their companies’ financial policies. I define “firms 
with new ESOs” as firms that adopt additional (or first time) ESOs during the two years after 
the IPO (i.e., Year 0 and Year 1). The “firms without new ESOs” are defined as firms that have 
not adopted new ESOs during the two years after the IPO, irrespective of whether the firms 
adopt ESOs before the IPO. My analysis is constructed in two parts. In the first part, I study the 
determinants of ESOs. In the second part, I study the effect of ESOs on post-IPO operating 
performance. 
 
3.3.1. Determinants of new executive stock options after the IPO 
First, I compare the characteristics of firms with new ESOs after the IPO to those of firms 
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without new ESOs by using the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test and the 
t-test. Then, I employ a pooled probit model based on firm-year data. Subscript i represents the 
firm, and t represents the fiscal year end. The general specification is given by: 
 Pr (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹𝐹(𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼_𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝜷𝜷), (1) 
 
where ESOi,t is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i adopts a new ESO after the IPO 
during two years (i.e., Year 0 or Year 1), and zero otherwise. F(･) is the cumulative normal 
distribution function, and CEO_DILUTIONi,t is the dilution of CEO ownership, which is 
calculated as the change in levels of ownership from Year t minus Year −1. As an ownership 
measure, I use only the CEOs’ shareholding relative to shares outstanding.51 When CEO 
turnover occurs after the IPO, I do not calculate the dilution of CEO ownership because the 
number of shares held change before and after the turnover. CEO_DILUTION usually has a 
negative value. I expect that the estimated coefficients for CEO_DILUTION should be 
negative. 
In the regressions, I control for factors that affect the adoption of ESOs. I control for the level 
of CEO ownership (CEO_OWN), defined above. Management ownership is a possible way of 
reducing agency problems induced by the separation of ownership and control. According to 
the agency theory, a high level of managerial ownership decreases the incentive to adopt stock 
option plans.52 
I control for the status of stock options before the IPO, which is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of one if a firm has adopted stock options before the IPO (PRE-IPO-SO) to treat 
unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics that may affect the adoption of new ESOs 
51 I identified CEOs based on a serial number and representative directors’ flags used in the Nikkei NEEDS. 
52 Chourou, Abaoub, and Sasdi (2008) document a negative association between stock options and CEO 
ownership and blockholders’ ownership. 
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after the IPO. The other control variables include measures of cash constraints: cash and cash 
equivalents plus short-term investment securities divided by total assets (CASH/ASSETS) and 
the IPO proceeds defined as the natural logarithm of the number of public issues times the offer 
prices (LN(PROCEEDS)). Cash-constrained firms may have incentives to offer stock option 
compensation to managers (and also employees) because the adoption of stock options 
involves no outlay of cash.53 In the IPO setting, the proceeds of the IPO are also important 
sources of cash for firms. I use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy of the firm’s 
size.54 
I also add financial leverage (LEVERAGE). Highly leveraged firms are less likely to adopt 
stock options because of the agency cost of debt. In addition, leverage is a proxy of the degree 
of monitoring by the debt holder; thus, high leverage decreases the necessity to increase 
incentives. 55  In addition, I use the market-to-book ratio (MB) as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. 
A younger firm faces more severe information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders. I thus control for the firm’s age (FIRM-AGE). To control for the possibility of the 
horizon problem or managerial power, I add the age of the CEOs (CEO-AGE), defined as the 
age of the CEO at the time of the IPO, and the square of the CEO-AGE (CEO-AGE2). 
Executives make decisions in terms of the limited length of their employment contract, leading 
to the decision horizon problem. The decision horizon problem is more severe when executives 
are approaching retirement. Yermack (1995) examines the horizon problem of CEOs nearing 
53 Hanlon, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2003) find that firms with dividend constraints appear to use stock options as 
cash substitutes; however, they find no association between cash constraints and stock options. 
54 The relation between the size of the firm and the adoption of ESOs is ambiguous. The empirical results are 
also not conclusive. One possible explanation is that larger firms adopt stock options for management as an 
incentive mechanism because of greater difficulty monitoring managers’ actions. Yermack (1995) reports a 
positive but statistically insignificant relation between firm size and the adoption of ESOs. Using Japanese 
mature companies, Kato et al. (2005) and Uchida (2006) also find a positive relationship between these two 
factors. Uchida (2006) suggests another interpretation of this relation that larger firms have superior abilities to 
introduce stock options because they have law, accounting, and taxation staff. 
55 Uchida (2006) focuses on the bank system of Japan, such as keiretsu and the main bank system, and find a 
significant negative relation between leverages and the adoption of stock options. It is expected that firms with 
high growth opportunities adopt stock options. 
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retirement and finds no evidence that firms offer stock-based compensation to older CEOs. 
However, some studies have found results consistent with the limited horizon and 
risk-exposure problems (Lewellen, Loderer, and Martin, 1987). On the other hand, from the 
managerial power perspective, Qin (2011) finds a negative relation between CEO age and the 
adoption of stock options. Performance-vested stock options are used less frequently to 
compensate managers who are approaching retirement. 
In December 2005, the Accounting Standards Board of Japan required that the adoption of 
stock options was reported as accounting costs. In the regressions, I include a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one after 2006 (AFTER2006). I also include industry-fixed effects to 
control for differences across industries and any industry-invariant factors that affect the 
adoption of the ESOs.56 
 
3.3.2. The effect of new executive stock options after the IPO 
From an agency theory perspective, I expect that the firms with ESOs have higher levels of 
operating performance than do firms without ESOs. I compare the differences in the levels of 
and changes in operating performance between firms that have adopted ESOs and those that 
have not. The null hypothesis that the medians (means) of the performance levels between the 
two groups are equal is tested with the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test 
(t-test). Then, I estimate using the OLS regressions. The general specification is given by: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 𝜷𝜷 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡, (2) 
 
As proxies for IPO firm performance, I use ROA, which is calculated as the operating 
56 For instance, managers in highly regulated industries have lower incentives to maximize the value of the firm 
because of restricted managerial discretion. Nagaoka (2005) finds that the probability of adopting stock options 
is lower for regulated industries, such as the electricity, gas, communications, and transportation industries. 
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income scaled by total assets prior to fiscal year end (ROA), and sales growth (SGROWTH).57 
Due to the skewness of the accounting measures, all the accounting variables are winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate the impact of extreme outliers. Using operating 
performance has an advantage over market-based approaches. Accounting performances are 
likely to reflect the actual changes in operating performance induced by stock options 
(Hillegeist and Penalva, 2003). In contrast, stock price performance must be addressed by 
market efficiency, especially after the IPO (Pukthuanthong et al., 2007). 
Moreover, I report industry-adjusted operating performance, which is calculated by 
subtracting the industry median of the corresponding two-digit Nikkei code industry group 
from the median levels in raw operating performance measures (IND-ADJ ROA and IND-ADJ 
SGROWTH). Furthermore, I examine the changes in these operating performance measures. 
The independent variable of interest is ADOPT represents a dummy variable that equals one 
if the firm adopts new ESOs in the year, and zero for all firm-years prior to the adoption year; 
firm-years subsequent to the adoption year are dropped. For firms without ESOs, ADOPT is 
set equal to zero for all years. EFFECTIVE represents a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if ESOs is effective after the IPO, and zero otherwise. ESO represents a dummy variable 
that takes a value of one if firms adopt ESOs during two years after the IPO, zero otherwise. 
I include control variables used in the previous literature. I control for firm size and age.58 
Previous literature has found the effects of financial intermediaries on post-IPO performance. 
Here, I include dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is received financing 
from VC firms (VC-BACK). 59 The quality of the underwriter also affects the long-term 
operating performance. I include industry-fixed effects in all regression models. I also add 
57 Barber and Lyon (1996) explain that ROA is the best index of a proxy of operating performance. 
58 Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that poor post-IPO operating performance is associated with small and young 
firms. They suggest that the lower performance of small and young firms is due to low volumes of sales, high 
initial operating costs, aggressive pricing strategies, and inexperience. 
59 Jain and Kini (1995) focus on the role of VC monitoring and compare the post-IPO operating performance of 
VC-backed IPOs with a matched sample of non-VC-backed IPOs. They show that VC-backed IPO firms 
outperform non-VC-backed IPO firms after the IPO. 
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dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm is underwritten by top underwriters 
(TOP-UW).60 The Appendix 5-A provides definitions of the variables used in this study. 
 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-2 reports the characteristics of the firms prior to or at the IPO. In Panel A, the median 
(mean) CEO ownership of the entire sample is 28.45% (29.14%). In total, 46% of the sample 
adopts ESOs before the IPO. The median age of the firms in the sample is 21 years, and the 
range is from approximately two years to 73 years. Firms less than 13 years old (from the 
founding date to the IPO) account for approximately 25% of all firms, implying that this 
sample includes more young firms. Nagaoka (2005), whose analysis included all Japanese 
stock exchanges, reports that the mean age of firms with stock options is 39.3 years and that of 
firms without stock options is 46.9 years. In that study, age is defined as the “duration from the 
date of establishment.” In addition, the mean ages of firms with stock options for directors, for 
employees, and for both are 44.5, 32.6, and 39.2, respectively. Thus, firms in the sample are 
younger than those in the samples of previous works. The median CEO age is 55. The average 
of the natural logarithm of proceeds from the IPO is 13.95. Panel B of Table 5-2 reports 
firm-year observations of the sample in this study after the IPO. The mean level of dilution is 
−9.18%. 
[Insert Table 5-2 here] 
 
4. Which firms adopt executive stock options after the IPO? 
In this section, I investigate which firms adopt ESOs after the IPO. First, I compare the pre- 
and post-IPO characteristics of firms with new ESOs to firms without new ESOs. Second, I 
estimate a probit model to determine factors that affect the adoption of ESOs after controlling 
60 Top underwriters are Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko Securities firms. 
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for various factors. 
 
4.1. Characteristics of firms following the adoption of new stock options after the IPO 
Table 5-3 presents the descriptive statistics of firms with and without new ESOs after the 
IPO. The last four columns report the differences in the median and the mean between the two 
groups and the corresponding Z-score and t-value of the difference in the medians and the 
difference in the means. 
Panel A presents the characteristics of the firm pre-IPO or at the time of the IPO. When 
comparing between firms with and without ESOs, the two groups have different characteristics, 
such as ownership, the age of the firm, the age of the CEO, leverage, and growth opportunities. 
The median and mean of CEO ownership for firms with ESOs are higher than that for firms 
without ESOs. Furthermore, firms that adopt stock options after the IPO are more likely to 
have adopted ESOs before the IPO. Firms with ESOs are significantly younger than firms 
without ESOs. CEOs are also significantly younger for firms with ESOs. This result is 
inconsistent with the horizon problem. 
Panel B presents the post-IPO characteristics of the firms. The difference in the dilution of 
CEO ownership is consistent with my prediction. For firms with new ESOs, the median 
(median) value of CEO_DILUTION is −9.90% (−11.23%), whereas it is −7.10% (−8.40%) for 
firms without new ESOs. The level of ownership is higher for firms with new ESOs than for 
those without ESOs after the IPO. 
The cash constraint variable is higher for firms with new ESOs, but it is not statistically 
significant. The size of the firm is also not statistically significant across firms with and without 
ESOs. Financial leverage and market-to-book ratio are higher for firms with new ESOs than 
firms without new ESOs and statistically significant at the 1% level. As apparent in Table 5-3, 
the firms with new ESOs appear to be younger. The performance of firms with new ESOs is 
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higher after the IPO than that of firms without new ESOs. Interestingly, the differences in 
performance before the IPO increase after the IPO. The pre- and post-IPO operating 
performance is higher for firms with ESOs than for firms without new ESOs. 
[Insert Table 5-3 here] 
 
4.2. Probit regression analysis 
In Table 5-4, column 1 shows the results of probit regression analyses without controlling for 
industry-fixed effects. I observe that the estimated coefficients on CEO_DILUTION are 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that firms with more of a dilution in CEO 
ownership tend to adopt ESOs after the IPO. In column 2, I include the levels of ownership, 
growth opportunities, and past performance and find that the coefficient on CEO_DILUTION 
is also negative and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
firms with more reduced CEO ownership adopt ESOs to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders after the IPO. 
In column 3, as unexpected, I observe that the estimated coefficients of CASH/ASSETS and 
LN(PROCEEDS) are negative, suggesting that cash-constrained firms do not offer stock 
options as an alternative to cash-based compensation because the adoption of stock options 
involves no outlay of cash. The coefficient of LN(ASSETS) is positive and statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the implication of previous research that large firms 
tend to adopt stock options (e.g., Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003). 
As regard to leverage, a positive result is inconsistent with claims that monitoring by debt 
holders is a substitute for equity-based incentives. However, the coefficients of LEVERAGE 
are insignificant. These relations between the adoption of stock options and leverage suggest 
that in contrast to large, mature public companies, the monitoring perspective cannot explain 
the adoption of stock options in IPO firms. Firm age negatively affects the probability of 
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adopting ESOs and is highly significant at the 1% level. These findings support those of 
Nagaoka (2005) who suggests that younger firms tend to adopt stock options. In untabulated 
results, for robustness, I also run the estimation as a logit model, and the results do not differ 
significantly from those reported in Table 5-4. I use relative issue size, defined as IPO proceeds 
normalized by the book value of total assets just prior to the IPO. The coefficient of the 
AFTER2006 dummy is strongly negative, suggesting that after the change in accounting policy 
in December 2005, firms do not adopt ESOs due to the accounting costs of options. 
In summary, there is evidence that firms with dispersed ownership use stock options to align 
the interests of managers and shareholders. 
[Insert Table 5-4 here] 
 
5. Effects of stock options on operating performance 
5.1. The adoption of executive stock options pre- and post-IPO 
Table 5-5 presents the differences in the characteristics of operating performance across the 
groups. I divide the entire sample into four groups based upon whether firms have adopted 
ESOs pre-IPO and adopt new ESOs post-IPO. The firms without both pre- and post-ESOs are 
the baseline group, and these are compared with the other three groups. I use the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney signed ranked test (t-test) to identify the difference in the median 
(mean) between the two groups is statistically significant, respectively. In each case, I find a 
significant difference between two groups. 
Panel A of Table 5-5 reports the comparison between the levels in industry-adjusted 
operating performance of the firms with pre- and post-ESOs and baseline group. From Year −1 
to Year 3, all the differences in operating performance are positive. Panel B presents the 
comparison between firms with only post-ESOs and Panel C presents the comparison between 
firms with only pre-ESOs, and baseline groups, respectively. As shown in Panel B, the 
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performance of firms with only post-ESOs is superior compared with the baseline group. 
However, the positive difference in operating performance is only observed in sales growth. 
The difference in the industry-adjusted ROA is higher than those of the baseline groups, but 
statistically insignificant. Panel C shows that firms that adopt stock options before the IPO and 
do not adopt additional stock options have poorer post-IPO performance compared with firms 
without ESOs. Interestingly, the difference in sales growth is higher for firms that adopt stock 
options before the IPO, and the difference persists to Year 0. After the IPO, the difference 
disappears and remains negative. In Year 2, the difference in sales growth is negative, but 
insignificant. However, the difference in the median and the mean ROA is negative and 
statistically significant. Untabulated results of raw ROA and raw sales growth figures show a 
similar for industry-adjusted measures. 
[Insert Table 5-5 here] 
 
In Table 5-6, the differences in the change in operating performance are reported. I calculate 
the change in operating performance as the median (means) change in the levels from the fiscal 
year end to subsequent fiscal years. Panels A and B show the performance of firms with new 
ESOs increase from Year 2 to Year 3. Panel C shows that the firms experience a significant 
decline in operating performance from Year 0 to Year 1 and from Year 1 to Year 2. 
Overall, the results show that IPO firms experience a decline in post-IPO operating 
performance, but this decline is less severe for firms that adopt ESOs pre- and post-IPO. For 
firms with only pre-ESOs, their performances show a severe decline post-IPO compared with 
their pre-IPO performance. 
[Insert Table 5-6 here] 
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5.2. Ownership dilution and adoption of executive stock options 
To examine effects of ESOs on post-IPO performance in situations where ownership is more 
diluted or not diluted, I divide the entire sample into four sub-groups based on two dimensions: 
the degree to which firms experience dilution at the IPO and whether firms adopt new ESOs 
after the IPO. I define firms that have below-median CEO ownership dilution (i.e., more 
dispersed ownership) at Year 0 and adopt new ESOs during two years after the IPO as firms 
with more dilution and new ESOs. I define firms that experience more CEO ownership dilution, 
whereas they have not adopted ESOs during two years after the IPO as firms with more dilution 
and without ESOs. I define firm that have above-median CEO ownership dilution (i.e., less 
dispersed ownership) and have adopted new ESOs after the IPO as firms with less dilution and 
ESOs. I compare these three groups with firms with less dilution and without new ESOs 
adoption after the IPO (baseline group). 
The results of the comparison of operating performance are presented in Table 5-7. Panel A 
presents the results of comparing firms with more dilution and ESOs after the IPO and firms 
with less dilution and without new ESOs pre-IPO and post-IPO over time. Operating 
performance of firms with more dilution and ESOs after the IPO is superior compared with that 
of firms with less dilution and without new ESOs pre-IPO and post-IPO over time. The 
difference in sales growth is statistically significant from Year −1 to Year 3. Panel B shows that 
the performance of firms with more dilution is superior; however, these firms have not adopted 
ESOs after the IPO between Year 0 and Year 1. The difference becomes negative after Year 2 
and Year 3. Lastly, as shown in Panel C, firms with less dilution that adopt ESOs after the IPO 
perform better than the baseline group. For firms with ESOs, the median of the IND-ADJ ROA 
decreases from 0.09 for Year 0 to 0.07 for Year 1 and decreases to 0.04 for Year 3. The 
difference in the level of SGROWTH is statistically significant. The median IND-ADJ 
SGROWTH increases from 0.12 for Year 0 to 0.13 for Year 3. These results imply that there is 
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a negative relationship between ownership dilution and the performance of the company and 
that the adoption of ESOs is positively related to the post-IPO performance of the company. 
The result reveals three important points. First, the performance of firms with more dilution 
declines drastically after the IPO, both in terms of ROA and sales growth. Second, the level of 
the performance of the firms with new ESOs is higher for firms without ESOs after the IPO. 
Finally, when comparing firms with more diluted ownership, the performance of firms with 
new ESOs is higher than that of firms without new ESOs. In addition, the performance of firms 
with new ESOs shows an upward tendency in industry-adjusted sales growth at Year 3. Overall, 
the results show that the adoption of ESOs avert a decline in operating performance. In other 
words, firms with more dilution experience a sharp decline, whereas those with new ESOs 
have superior performance. 
[Insert Table 5-7 here] 
 
Next, I examine the differences in the changes in operating performance in Table 5-8. While 
firms with ESOs after the IPO outperform baseline group after the IPO, firms with more 
dilution, but they have not adopt ESOs after the IPO underperform baseline group. For instance, 
the median changes in IND-ADJ ROA of firms with more dilution and ESOs after the IPO is 
positive compared with baseline group from Year 0 to Year 1, with the difference being 
significant at the 10% levels. On the other hand, the median change in IND-ADJ ROA of firms 
with more dilution, whereas they have not adopted ESOs after the IPO is negative compared 
with baseline group from Year 0 to Year 1, with the difference being significant at the 5% 
levels. 
To summarize, I find a decline in the post-IPO operating performance of IPO firms. 
However, the decline in post-IPO performance is lower in firms that adopt ESOs. 
[Insert Table 5-8 here] 
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 5.3. Multivariate regression analysis 
The results of the univariate comparison reveal that firms with ESOs have superior operating 
performance as a whole. However, these results may not be driven by the adoption of the ESOs 
themselves, but by growth opportunities. To investigate this possibility, I perform OLS 
regressions and report the results in Table 5-9. 
Column 2 of Table 5-9 uses only firms with pre- and post-ESOs and firms with only 
pre-ESOs and column 3 uses only firms with more dilution and ESOs and firms with more 
dilution and without ESOs after the IPO. The first three columns show that ADOPT is 
positively related to IND-ADJ ROA, all else equal. The effect of ownership dilution on 
post-IPO operating performance is negatively and statistically significant in columns 2 and 3. 
Firms with higher growth opportunities as measured by market-to-book ratio are better 
performance after the IPO. 
In columns 4 and 5, while EFFECTIVE takes a value of one if ESOs is effective after the IPO, 
ESO takes a value of one if firms adopt ESOs during two years after the IPO. Thus, the number 
of observations is larger than the regression of columns 1 and 4. In column 4, EFFECTIVE is 
positive, but statistically insignificant. The results of columns 6 and 7 where the dependent 
variable is IND-ADJ SGROWTH are similar to columns 4 and 5, but EFFECTIVE is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Overall, the adoption of ESOs after the IPO affects post-IPO operating performance after 
controlling for growth opportunities and post-performance. In addition, firms that adopt ESOs 
only before the IPO and do not adopt them after the IPO experience a severe decline in 
post-IPO operating performance. 
[Insert Table 5-9 here] 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates determinants of ESOs and their effects on IPO firms. I examine 
whether firms with decreased post-IPO CEO ownership adopt ESOs to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders. As a result of the empirical analysis, I find that firms that 
experience large dilutions in CEO ownership are likely to adopt ESOs after the IPO. I also find 
that IPO firms with ESOs outperform IPO firms without ESOs, suggesting that ESOs induce 
superior operating performance. 
This study has several limitations. I could not obtain detailed data on managerial 
compensation and stock options. Therefore, in this study, the size of stock options is not 
considered because I treated the adoption of stock options as a binary variable. This method is 
criticized in Yermack (1995) because it cannot take into account the frequency or the size of 
awards. Moreover, data limitations prevent me from including the second-order term, which 
represents a nonlinear relationship between the adoption of stock options and operating 
performance. The second-order term is important for understanding the relationship between 
stock options and operating performance (Larcker, 2003). Despite these data limitations, this 
research contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of stock options for IPO 
firms and their effect on post-IPO investment and operating performance. 
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Table 5-1. Distributions of IPOs 
This table presents the distributions of IPOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007 in JASDAQ. 
Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. Panel A is the year distribution. Panel B is the industry 
distribution. The industries are classified according to the two-digit Nikkei industry code. Panel C presents a 
two-by-two matrix showing the pre- and post-IPO adoption of ESOs. 
 
 
IPO year IPOs in sample % of sample
2002 67 18.6
2003 62 17.2
2004 69 19.2
2005 64 17.8
2006 53 14.7
2007 45 12.5
Total 360 100
Panel B: Industry distribution
Industry IPOs in sample % of sample
Chemical products 11 3.1
Machinery 20 5.6
Electronic components 26 7.2
Manufacturing 12 3.3
Miscellaneous wholesales 38 10.6
Retail stores 39 10.8
Real estate - Sales 30 8.3
Miscellaneous services 143 39.7
Others 41 11.4
Total 360 100
Panel C: Two-by-two matrix that shows the pre- and post-IPO-adoption of new ESOs
Pre-IPO Firms with new ESOs Firms without new ESOs Total
Firms with ESOs 46 120 166
Firms without ESOs 36 158 194
Total 82 278 360
Post-IPO
Panel A: Year distribution
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Table 5-2. Descriptive statistics for the IPO firms 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the IPO firms with and without new ESOs issued between January 
2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. Panel A shows the pre-IPO 
characteristics of firms with and without new ESOs. Panel B shows the post-IPO characteristics of firms with 
and without new ESOs. A summary of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix 5-A. Accounting 
measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
N Minimun 25thpercentile Median
75th
percentile Maximum Mean Std.dev.
Panel A  Pre-IPO characteristics
CEO_OWN (%) 360 0.00 0.00 28.45 47.20 100.00 29.14 24.85
VCBACK 360 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.47
PREIPOSO 360 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.50
LN(PROCEEDS) 360 11.14 13.30 13.90 14.51 18.47 13.95 0.95
FIRMAGE 360 1.11 12.98 21.09 34.09 73.09 24.21 14.91
CEOAGE 360 29.00 46.03 55.09 61.00 74.00 53.82 9.56
TOPUW 360 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.49
ROA 345 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.07
IND-ADJ ROA 345 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.09 0.07
SGROWTH 345 -0.42 0.05 0.14 0.25 0.53 0.16 0.17
IND-ADJ SGROWTH 345 -0.43 0.03 0.11 0.22 0.50 0.14 0.17
Panel B  Post-IPO characteristics
CEO_DILUTION (%) 1264 -50.13 -14.99 -7.81 0.08 15.10 -9.18 11.46
CEO_OWN (%) 1588 0.00 2.92 16.40 29.60 47.60 18.17 15.32
CASH/ASSETS 1744 0.01 0.12 0.21 0.35 0.55 0.24 0.15
LN(ASSETS) 1744 7.33 8.43 9.03 9.75 13.12 9.13 0.95
LEVERAGE 1744 0.10 0.37 0.54 0.70 0.99 0.53 0.21
MB 1707 0.45 0.93 1.18 1.73 3.62 1.49 0.84
ROA 1734 -0.10 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.10 0.09
IND-ADJ ROA 1734 -0.14 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.05 0.08
SGROWTH 1734 -0.48 -0.01 0.08 0.17 0.53 0.08 0.19
IND-ADJ SGROWTH 1734 -0.50 -0.03 0.05 0.15 0.50 0.05 0.19
Entire sample
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Table 5-3. Descriptive statistics: Comparison between the IPO firms with and without new ESOs 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the IPO firms with and without new ESOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign 
issues are excluded. Panel A shows the pre-IPO characteristics of firms with and without new ESOs. Panel B shows the post-IPO characteristics of firms with and without 
new ESOs. A summary of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix 5-A. Accounting measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test (t-test) is used to test for the difference in the median (mean). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
N Minimun 25thpercentile Median
75th
percentile Maximum Mean Std.dev. N Minimun
25th
percentile Median
75th
percentile Maximum Mean Std.dev.
Differenc
e in
median
Z-stat.
Differenc
e in mean
t -stat.
Panel A  Pre-IPO characteristics
CEO_OWN (%) 76 0.00 13.15 32.90 52.90 100.00 34.23 26.61 284 0.00 0.00 26.75 44.60 97.90 27.78 24.22 6.15 1.81 * 6.45 2.02 **
VCBACK 76 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.46 284 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.47 0.00 0.53 0.03 0.52
PREIPOSO 76 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 284 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.49 1.00 2.63 *** 0.17 2.65 ***
LN(PROCEEDS) 76 12.03 13.21 13.96 14.41 16.63 13.84 0.92 284 12.03 13.33 13.88 14.54 16.77 13.97 0.91 0.07 -0.72 -0.13 -1.29
FIRMAGE 76 2.02 8.06 19.55 27.56 55.01 20.35 13.48 284 1.11 14.03 22.54 35.57 73.09 25.25 15.12 -2.99 -2.52 ** -4.90 -2.56 **
CEOAGE 76 32.07 43.00 52.09 58.56 73.00 51.09 10.22 284 29.00 47.53 56.02 62.00 74.00 54.55 9.26 -3.94 -2.67 *** -3.45 -2.82 ***
TOPUW 76 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 284 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.61 0.49 0.00 -0.21 -0.01 -0.21
ROA 69 0.00 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.08 276 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.26 0.13 0.07 0.01 1.62 0.02 1.51
IND-ADJ ROA 69 -0.06 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.08 276 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.08 0.07 0.00 1.33 0.01 1.41
SGROWTH 69 -0.24 0.06 0.18 0.31 0.53 0.20 0.17 276 -0.42 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.53 0.15 0.17 0.05 2.11 ** 0.05 2.29 **
IND-ADJ SGROWTH 69 -0.26 0.04 0.16 0.30 0.50 0.18 0.17 276 -0.43 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.50 0.13 0.16 0.05 2.04 ** 0.05 2.26 **
Panel B  Post-IPO characteristics
CEO_DILUTION (%) 207 -50.13 -17.32 -9.90 -0.94 13.84 -11.23 13.19 891 -50.13 -14.31 -7.10 0.14 15.10 -8.40 10.78 -2.81 -3.52 *** -2.83 -4.18 ***
CEO_OWN (%) 277 0.00 5.62 19.12 33.94 47.60 20.78 15.92 1056 0.00 2.74 15.91 29.23 47.60 17.99 15.36 3.21 2.75 *** 2.79 2.83 ***
CASH/ASSETS 301 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.33 0.55 0.24 0.15 1114 0.01 0.12 0.21 0.36 0.55 0.25 0.15 -0.02 -1.28 -0.01 -1.33
LN(ASSETS) 301 7.33 8.30 9.09 9.75 11.68 9.13 0.95 1114 7.33 8.40 8.99 9.69 12.99 9.09 0.94 0.10 1.20 0.04 1.25
LEVERAGE 301 0.10 0.42 0.57 0.71 0.95 0.56 0.20 1114 0.10 0.37 0.53 0.68 0.99 0.52 0.21 0.04 3.25 *** 0.03 3.12 ***
MB 299 0.69 1.11 1.38 2.27 3.62 1.77 0.90 1105 0.45 0.94 1.19 1.77 3.62 1.51 0.85 0.20 6.88 *** 0.26 5.14 ***
ROA 299 -0.10 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.12 0.09 1110 -0.10 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.10 0.08 0.02 4.28 *** 0.02 4.02 ***
IND-ADJ ROA 299 -0.14 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.07 0.08 1110 -0.14 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.05 0.08 0.02 3.98 *** 0.02 3.81 ***
SGROWTH 299 -0.48 0.04 0.12 0.23 0.53 0.14 0.18 1110 -0.48 -0.01 0.08 0.16 0.53 0.08 0.19 0.05 5.72 *** 0.06 5.43 ***
IND-ADJ SGROWTH 299 -0.50 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.11 0.17 1110 -0.50 -0.03 0.05 0.14 0.50 0.06 0.19 0.05 5.62 *** 0.06 5.30 ***
IPO firms with new ESOs IPO firms without new ESOs
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Table 5-4. Results of pooled probit regression analysis 
This table presents the results of pooled probit regression. The sample is the IPO firms with and without new 
ESOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. 
A summary of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix 5-A. Firm-year observations from Year 0 to Year 
3 for each IPO firm are estimated. The dependent variable is ESO. ESO, is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the firms adopt new ESOs during the two years after the IPO, and zero otherwise. Control variables include 
industry-fixed effects to control for differences in industries. Some independent variables are lagged. The 
standard errors that are clustered at the IPO firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
ESO ESO ESO
(1) (2) (3)
CEO_DILUTION -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
CEO_OWN_L -0.00 -0.00
(0.004) (0.004)
PREIPOSO 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.090) (0.101) (0.110)
CASH/ASSETS_L -0.59
(0.445)
LN(PROCEEDS) -0.46***
(0.082)
LN(ASSETS)_L 0.41***
(0.089)
LEVERAGE_L 0.17
(0.361)
MB_L 0.06 0.11
(0.064) (0.073)
ROA_L 0.52 1.74**
(0.770) (0.868)
FIRMAGE -0.01***
(0.004)
CEOAGE -0.12**
(0.052)
CEOAGE2 0.00**
(0.000)
AFTER2006 -0.47*** -0.45***
(0.100) (0.106)
Constant -1.22*** -0.22 6.15***
(0.073) (0.346) (1.698)
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,098 961 961
Pseudo R-squared 0.0370 0.0829 0.143
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Table 5-5. Difference in level of operating performance between firms with and without ESOs pre- and post-IPO 
The sample comprises IPOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. A summary of variable definitions is 
provided in the Appendix 5-A. Variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails. The test of difference in median (mean) is Wilcoxon rank-sum test (t-test). ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms with pre- and post-ESOs
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(A) IND-ADJ ROA 41 0.07 0.10 45 0.10 0.12 45 0.07 0.08 44 0.05 0.06 43 0.05 0.06
(B) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 41 0.18 0.18 45 0.12 0.15 45 0.09 0.11 44 0.08 0.08 43 0.12 0.12
Difference (A) - (G) 0.01 1.30 0.02 1.48 0.03 2.43 ** 0.03 2.44 ** 0.02 1.38 0.02 1.40 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.50 0.02 1.48 0.02 1.43
Difference (B) - (H) 0.10 2.61 *** 0.08 2.94 *** 0.03 2.46 ** 0.06 2.50 ** 0.05 2.56 ** 0.06 2.25 ** 0.04 1.10 0.04 1.23 0.10 4.24 *** 0.14 4.20 ***
Panel B: Firms with only post-ESOs
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(C) IND-ADJ ROA 28 0.09 0.10 31 0.06 0.09 31 0.05 0.07 31 0.06 0.06 29 0.04 0.06
(D) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 28 0.14 0.17 31 0.14 0.15 31 0.08 0.10 31 0.10 0.08 29 0.09 0.12
Difference (C) - (G) 0.02 1.07 0.01 1.05 -0.01 -0.23 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.44 0.02 0.51 0.00 0.15 0.02 1.35 0.02 1.30
Difference (D) - (H) 0.06 1.79 * 0.06 2.05 ** 0.06 2.19 ** 0.05 1.82 * 0.03 1.83 * 0.05 1.82 * 0.06 2.00 ** 0.04 1.33 0.07 3.18 *** 0.14 3.83 ***
Panel C: Firms with only pre-ESOs
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(E) IND-ADJ ROA 115 0.07 0.09 120 0.07 0.09 119 0.04 0.05 116 0.01 0.02 111 0.01 0.02
(F) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 115 0.14 0.16 120 0.13 0.17 119 0.07 0.06 116 0.04 0.04 111 0.03 0.02
Difference (E) - (G) 0.00 0.81 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.46 0.01 0.72 -0.01 -0.89 -0.01 -0.70 -0.03 -3.53 *** -0.03 -3.02 *** -0.02 -1.95 * -0.02 -1.76 *
Difference (F) - (H) 0.06 3.03 *** 0.06 2.84 *** 0.04 3.48 *** 0.08 3.98 *** 0.03 1.10 0.01 0.55 -0.01 -0.31 0.00 0.03 0.01 1.38 0.04 1.65 *
Panel D: Firms without ESOs (Baseline group)
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(G) IND-ADJ ROA 161 0.07 0.08 164 0.07 0.09 162 0.05 0.06 160 0.04 0.05 158 0.03 0.04
(H) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 161 0.08 0.10 164 0.08 0.09 162 0.04 0.05 160 0.04 0.04 158 0.02 -0.02
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
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Table 5-6. Changes in operating performance 
This table presents the changes in operating performance measure between firms with ESOs and without ESOs. The sample is the IPOs issued between January 2002 and 
December 2007. I exclude financial institutions and foreign issues. A summary of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix 5-A. Variables are winsorized at 1% level 
in both tails. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (t-test) is used to test for the difference in the median (mean). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms with pre- and post-ESOs
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(A) IND-ADJ ROA 41 0.00 0.01 45 0.00 -0.04 44 -0.01 -0.02 42 0.00 -0.01
(B) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 41 -0.01 -0.04 45 -0.05 -0.05 44 -0.02 -0.03 42 0.00 0.04
Difference (A) - (G) 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.87 0.02 0.87 -0.01 -1.03 0.00 -0.54 -0.01 -1.14 0.01 1.21 0.01 1.41
Difference (B) - (H) 0.00 -0.61 -0.02 -0.80 -0.02 -0.65 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.92 -0.02 -0.69 0.04 2.79 *** 0.10 2.95 ***
Panel B: Firms with only post-ESOs
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(C) IND-ADJ ROA 28 0.00 0.00 31 -0.01 -0.02 31 0.00 -0.01 29 0.00 0.00
(D) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 28 0.00 -0.02 31 -0.01 -0.05 31 0.01 -0.02 29 0.01 0.04
Difference (C) - (G) 0.00 -1.04 -0.01 -0.64 0.00 1.12 0.01 0.46 0.01 1.33 0.00 -0.39 0.01 2.31 ** 0.02 2.23 **
Difference (D) - (H) 0.01 0.39 -0.01 -0.17 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.24 -0.01 -0.22 0.05 2.47 ** 0.10 2.44 **
Panel C: Firms with only pre-ESOs
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(E) IND-ADJ ROA 115 0.00 0.00 119 -0.02 -0.04 115 -0.02 -0.03 110 0.00 -0.01
(F) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 115 -0.01 0.00 119 -0.06 -0.11 115 -0.02 -0.03 110 -0.03 -0.03
Difference (E) - (G) 0.00 -0.78 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.84 -0.01 -1.61 -0.01 -2.92 *** -0.03 -3.66 *** 0.01 1.30 0.01 1.56
Difference (F) - (H) 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.72 -0.03 -2.34 ** -0.06 -2.67 *** -0.01 -0.96 -0.01 -0.49 0.01 0.93 0.03 1.18
Panel D: Firms without ESOs (Baseline group)
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(G) IND-ADJ ROA 161 0.00 0.00 162 -0.02 -0.03 159 -0.01 -0.01 158 -0.01 -0.02
(H) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 161 -0.01 -0.01 162 -0.03 -0.04 159 -0.01 -0.01 158 -0.04 -0.06
Year -1 to 0 Year 0 to 1 Year 1 to 2 Year 2 to 3
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Table 5-7. Difference in level of operating performance of firms with ESOs and without ESOs pre- and post-IPO 
The sample comprises IPOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. A summary of variable definitions is 
provided in the Appendix 5-A. Variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (t-test) is used to test for the difference in the median 
(mean). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Firms with more dilution and ESOs after IPO
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(A) IND-ADJ ROA 34 0.09 0.10 34 0.08 0.11 34 0.06 0.07 33 0.05 0.06 33 0.05 0.06
(B) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 34 0.18 0.21 34 0.15 0.18 34 0.09 0.11 33 0.09 0.11 33 0.10 0.10
Difference (A) - (G) 0.02 1.58 0.02 1.69 * 0.03 2.10 ** 0.03 2.16 ** 0.02 1.33 0.02 1.28 0.01 0.84 0.02 1.03 0.02 1.39 0.02 1.43
Difference (B) - (H) 0.08 2.71 *** 0.10 3.10 *** 0.07 2.57 ** 0.07 2.21 ** 0.04 2.04 ** 0.06 1.77 * 0.06 2.06 ** 0.07 2.01 ** 0.09 3.22 *** 0.10 2.79 ***
Panel B: Firms with more dilution, but without ESOs after IPO
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(C) IND-ADJ ROA 123 0.07 0.09 126 0.09 0.10 125 0.05 0.06 124 0.03 0.04 121 0.02 0.02
(D) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 123 0.11 0.15 126 0.11 0.14 125 0.06 0.06 124 0.05 0.05 121 0.02 -0.01
Difference (C) - (G) 0.01 1.24 0.01 1.32 0.04 2.29 ** 0.02 2.28 ** 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.67 -0.01 -0.74 -0.01 -1.25 -0.01 -1.25
Difference (D) - (H) 0.01 1.32 0.03 1.70 * 0.03 1.69 * 0.03 1.61 0.01 1.03 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.75 0.01 -0.24 -0.02 -0.88
Panel C: Firms with less dilution and ESOs after IPO
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(E) IND-ADJ ROA 35 0.07 0.09 42 0.09 0.10 42 0.07 0.07 42 0.06 0.06 39 0.04 0.06
(F) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 35 0.12 0.15 42 0.12 0.13 42 0.09 0.10 42 0.08 0.06 39 0.13 0.13
Difference (E) - (G) 0.01 0.98 0.01 1.12 0.03 1.46 0.02 1.52 0.03 1.06 0.01 1.00 0.02 1.39 0.01 0.93 0.02 1.71 * 0.02 1.51
Difference (F) - (H) 0.02 0.90 0.04 1.16 0.04 1.03 0.02 0.68 0.04 2.01 ** 0.05 1.64 0.05 1.21 0.02 0.77 0.12 3.25 *** 0.12 3.63 ***
Panel D: Firms with less dilution and without ESOs after IPO (Baseline group)
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(G) IND-ADJ ROA 153 0.06 0.08 158 0.06 0.08 156 0.04 0.06 152 0.04 0.04 148 0.02 0.03
(H) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 153 0.10 0.11 158 0.09 0.11 156 0.04 0.05 152 0.03 0.03 148 0.01 0.01
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
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Table 5-8. Changes in operating performance between firms with ESOs and without ESOs 
The sample comprises IPOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and foreign issues are excluded. A summary of variable definitions is 
provided in the Appendix 5-A. Variables are winsorized at the 1% level in both tails. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test (t-test) is used to test for the difference in the median 
(mean). ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firms with more dilution and ESOs after IPO
N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat. N Median Z -stat. Mean t -stat.
(A) IND-ADJ ROA 34 0.00 0.01 34 0.00 -0.04 33 0.00 -0.01 32 0.00 0.00
(B) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 34 -0.02 -0.03 34 -0.05 -0.07 33 -0.02 -0.01 32 0.01 0.00
Difference (A) - (G) 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.61 0.02 1.77 * -0.01 -0.27 0.01 1.17 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.35
Difference (B) - (H) -0.01 -0.65 -0.03 -0.64 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.50 0.01 0.69 0.04 1.41 0.03 0.39
Panel B: Firms with more dilution, but without ESOs after IPO
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(C) IND-ADJ ROA 123 0.00 0.01 125 -0.02 -0.04 123 -0.01 -0.02 121 -0.01 -0.02
(D) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 123 -0.01 -0.01 125 -0.04 -0.08 123 -0.01 -0.01 121 -0.04 -0.07
Difference (C) - (G) 0.00 0.41 0.01 1.46 -0.01 -2.49 ** -0.02 -2.87 *** 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -1.19 0.00 -1.03 -0.01 -0.66
Difference (D) - (H) 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.61 0.00 -0.50 -0.02 -1.00 0.01 1.07 0.01 0.59 -0.02 -1.13 -0.03 -1.19
Panel C: Firms with less dilution and ESOs after IPO
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(E) IND-ADJ ROA 35 0.00 0.00 42 -0.01 -0.03 42 -0.01 -0.01 39 0.00 0.00
(F) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 35 0.00 -0.03 42 -0.02 -0.03 42 -0.01 -0.04 39 0.01 0.07
Difference (E) - (G) 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.28 -0.01 -0.33 0.00 1.94 * 0.00 0.87 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.43
Difference (F) - (H) 0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.09 0.02 0.77 0.03 0.50 0.01 0.84 -0.02 0.31 0.04 1.80 * 0.11 2.16 **
Panel D: Firms with less dilution and without ESOs after IPO (Baseline group)
N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean N Median Mean
(G) IND-ADJ ROA 153 0.00 0.00 156 -0.02 -0.03 151 -0.01 -0.01 147 -0.01 -0.01
(H) IND-ADJ SGROWTH 153 -0.01 0.00 156 -0.04 -0.06 151 -0.02 -0.02 147 -0.03 -0.03
Year -1 to 0 Year 0 to 1 Year 1 to 2 Year 2 to 3
 144 
Table 5-9. Results of OLS regression 
The sample comprises IPOs issued between January 2002 and December 2007. Financial institutions and 
foreign issues are excluded. A summary of variable definitions is provided in the Appendix 5-A. Firm-year 
observations from Year 0 to Year 3 for each IPO firm are estimated. The dependent variable is the difference in 
IND-ADJ ROA and IND-ADJ SGROWTH from t − 1 to t. Control variables include industry-fixed effects to 
control for differences in industries. Some independent variables are lagged. The standard errors that are 
clustered at the IPO firm level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Diff. IND-ADJ
ROA
Diff. IND-ADJ
ROA
Diff. IND-ADJ
ROA
Diff. IND-ADJ
ROA
Diff. IND-ADJ
ROA
Diff. IND-ADJ
SGROWTH
Diff. IND-ADJ
SGROWTH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ADOPT 0.02*** 0.02* 0.02**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
EFFECTIVE 0.01 0.04***
(0.004) (0.010)
ESO 0.01* 0.02*
(0.004) (0.012)
PREIPOSO -0.01*** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02 0.00
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009)
DILUTION -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01 -0.01
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
MB_L 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
IND-ADJ ROA_L -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.53*** -0.43*** -0.45***
(0.043) (0.062) (0.066) (0.040) (0.040)
IND-ADJ SGROWTH_L -0.72*** -0.74***
(0.047) (0.047)
CEO_OWN_L 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LN(ASSETS)_L -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)
LEVERAGE -0.03** -0.02 -0.04** -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.05 0.06**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.030)
FIRMAGE 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
VCBACK -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
TOPUW -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
AFTER2006 -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant 0.00 0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.16** -0.13*
(0.023) (0.038) (0.039) (0.021) (0.021) (0.068) (0.071)
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,120 479 518 1,320 1,348 1,320 1,348
Adjusted R-squared 0.208 0.275 0.23 0.197 0.202 0.313 0.325
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Appendix 5-A. Definition of variables used in the study 
 
 
Variables Definition
CEO_OWN Only the CEOs’ shareholding relative to shares outstanding.
CEO_ DILUTION The change in levels of CEO ownership at Year t minus ownership at Year −1.
DILUTION
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firms has below-median of
dilution (i.e., more dispersed ownership) at Year 0.
ESO
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if firms adopt new executive stock
options during two years after the IPO, zero otherwise.
ADOPT
A dummy variable that is equal to zero for all firm-years prior to the adoption year;
firm-years subsequent to the adoption year are dropped. For firms without ESOs, it
is set equal to zero for all years.
EFFECTIVE
A dummy variables that takes a value of one if executive stock options have been
working in firm-years.
PREIPOSO
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has adopted executive stock
options before the IPO and zero otherwise.
VCBACK
A dummy variable takes a value one if venture capital firm invested before IPO
and zero otherwise.
MB Market value divided by book value of total assets.
CASH/TASSETS
Cash and cash equivalents plus short-term investment securities divided by total
assets.
LN(PROCEEDS) The natural logarithm of the number of public issues times offer prices.
FIRMAGE The difference between the date of a firm's IPO and its founding date.
CEOAGE The age of the CEO at the time of the IPO (IPO year).
CEOAGE2 The square of CEOAGE.
TOPUW
A dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm is underwritten by top
underwriters (i.e., Nomura, Daiwa, and Nikko Securities), and zero otherwise.
ROA The operating income scaled by total assets prior to fiscal year end.
SGROWTH The rate of sales growth.
IND-ADJ ROA
The median levels in raw ROA minus the industry median levels in ROA of the
corresponding two-digit Nikkei code industry group.
IND-ADJ SGROWTH
The median levels in raw sales growth minus the industry median levels in sales
growth of the corresponding two-digit Nikkei code industry group.
AFTER2006 A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the fiscal-year is after 2006.
LN(ASSETS) The natural logarithm of a firm's total assets.
LEVERAGE The ratio of total liabilities to the value of total assets.
  
